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Endogenous Accounting Bias when Decision Making and Control Interact *

2010; Wiley; Volume: 27; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01038.x

1911-3846

Qi Chen, Brian Mittendorf, Yun Zhang,

Financial Reporting and Valuation Research

Contemporary Accounting ResearchVolume 27, Issue 4 p. 1063-1091 Endogenous Accounting Bias when Decision Making and Control Interact† QI CHEN, QI CHEN Duke UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorBRIAN MITTENDORF, BRIAN MITTENDORF Ohio State UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorYUN ZHANG, YUN ZHANG George Washington UniversitySearch for more papers by this author QI CHEN, QI CHEN Duke UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorBRIAN MITTENDORF, BRIAN MITTENDORF Ohio State UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorYUN ZHANG, YUN ZHANG George Washington UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 18 October 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01038.xCitations: 20 † Accepted by Raffi Indjejikian. We appreciate helpful comments from Anil Arya, Shane Dikolli, Paul Fischer, Christian Hofmann, Pino Lopomo, Mohan Venkatachalam, Dae-Hee Yoon, and workshop participants at Baruch College, Emory University, Fudan University, University of Mannheim, and Tsinghua University. Financial support from Fuqua School of Business at Duke University (for Chen and Zhang), from Yale School of Management and Ohio State University Fisher College of Business (for Mittendorf), and from the George Washington University School of Business (for Yun Zhang) is gratefully acknowledged. 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