First‐Person Propositions
2012; Wiley; Volume: 86; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00546.x
ISSN1933-1592
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophical Ethics and Theory
ResumoPhilosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 86, Issue 1 p. 155-182 First-Person Propositions PETER W. HANKS, PETER W. HANKS University of MinnesotaSearch for more papers by this author PETER W. HANKS, PETER W. HANKS University of MinnesotaSearch for more papers by this author First published: 22 March 2012 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00546.xCitations: 16Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1966). "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness. Ratio 8: 130–57. Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1967). "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators. American Philosophical Quarterly 4: 85–100. Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1968). "On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others. Journal of Philosophy 65: 439–56. Chisholm, Roderick (1981). The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Corazza, Eros (2004). "Essential Indexicals and Quasi-Indicators. Journal of Semantics 21: 341–74. Corazza, Eros, William Fish and Jonathan Gorvett (2002). "Who is I?"Philosophical Studies 107: 1–21. Evans, Gareth (1981). " Understanding Demonstratives." In Herman Parret and Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding, pp. 280–303. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. Reprinted in Evans 1985, pp. 291–321. Evans, Gareth (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feit, Neil (2008). Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frege, Gottlob (1892). " On Sinn and Bedeutung." In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader, pp. 151–71. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Frege, Gottlob (1918). " Thought." In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader, pp. 325–45. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Hanks, Peter (2007). "The Content-Force Distinction. Philosophical Studies 134: 141–164. Hanks, Peter (2009). "Recent Work on Propositions. Philosophy Compass 4: 1–18. Hanks, Peter (2011). "Structured Propositions as Types," Mind 120: 11–52. Kaplan, David (1989a). " Demonstratives." In Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, pp. 481–563. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaplan, David (1989b). " Afterthoughts." In Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, pp. 565–614. Oxford: Oxford University Press. King, Jeffrey (2007). The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kripke, Saul (1979). " A Puzzle About Belief." In Avishai Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, pp. 239–83. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Lewis, David (1979). "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review 88: 513–543 Reprinted in Lewis 1983, pp.133–156. Lewis, David (1983). Philosophical Papers, volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Markie, Peter (1988). "Multiple Propositions and 'De Se' Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48(4): 573–600. McGinn, Colin (1983). The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ninan, Dilip (2010). " De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication. Philosophy Compass 5(7): 551–67. Perry, John (1977). "Frege on Demonstratives. The Philosophical Review 86(4): 474–97 Reprinted in Perry 1993, pp.3–32. Perry, John (1979). "The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs 13: 3–21 Reprinted in Perry 1993, pp.33–52. Perry, John (1983). " Castañeda on He and I." In James Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castañeda with His Replies, pp. 15–41. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Reprinted in Perry 1993, pp.91–120. Perry, John (1993). The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Perry, John (2001). Reference and Reflexivity. Stanford: CSLI Publications. Recanati, François (2009). " De Re and De Se. Dialectica 63(3): 249–69. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames (eds.) (1988). Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Soames, Scott (1987). "Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content. Philosophical Topics 15: 47–87 Reprinted in Salmon and Soames 1988, pp.197–239. Soames, Scott (2010). What is Meaning? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stevens, Graham (2009). "Utterance at a Distance. Philosophical Studies 143: 213–21. Turner, Jason (2010). "Fitting Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. Noûs 44(1): 1–9. Citing Literature Volume86, Issue1January 2013Pages 155-182 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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