Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Non‐Propositional Attitudes

2013; Wiley; Volume: 8; Issue: 12 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/phc3.12090

1747-9991

Alex Grzankowski,

Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract Intentionality, or the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, remains central in the philosophy of mind. But the study of intentionality in the analytic tradition has been dominated by discussions of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, and visual perception. There are, however, intentional states that aren't obviously propositional attitudes. For example, Indiana Jones fears snakes, Antony loves Cleopatra, and Jane hates the monster under her bed. The present paper explores such mental states in an introductory but opinionated way.