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Regulatory Fit and Voting1

2011; Wiley; Volume: 41; Issue: 11 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00841.x

1559-1816

Dariusz Doliński, Marek Drogosz,

Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Journal of Applied Social PsychologyVolume 41, Issue 11 p. 2673-2688 Regulatory Fit and Voting† DARIUSZ DOLINSKI, Corresponding Author DARIUSZ DOLINSKI Wroclaw Faculty, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Wroclaw, Poland Dariusz Dolinski, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Wroclaw Faculty, Grunwaldzka Street 98, 50-357 Wroclaw, Poland. E-mail: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorMAREK DROGOSZ, MAREK DROGOSZ Faculty of Psychology, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, PolandSearch for more papers by this author DARIUSZ DOLINSKI, Corresponding Author DARIUSZ DOLINSKI Wroclaw Faculty, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Wroclaw, Poland Dariusz Dolinski, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Wroclaw Faculty, Grunwaldzka Street 98, 50-357 Wroclaw, Poland. E-mail: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorMAREK DROGOSZ, MAREK DROGOSZ Faculty of Psychology, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, PolandSearch for more papers by this author First published: 16 November 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00841.x † The authors thank Ryszard Pieńkowski from Sopot Lab of Social Research for his help in establishing the number of places in the Parliament given to parties according to the amount of received votes in Study 2. This paper was supported by Grant N-N106-0775-33 from the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, awarded to Marek Drogosz. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract The problem of many democracies is low voter turnout. One reason is the voting procedure, which only allows voting for a party or candidate. Introduction of voting against could bring more voters to the polls. The concept of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998) suggests that people who focus on prevention would vote more eagerly if they are given the opportunity to blackball disliked candidates. This article describes 2 studies that verify this hypothesis. 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