Contextualism and Counter-Closure
2011; Wiley; Volume: 66; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01280.x
ISSN1746-8361
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and History of Science
ResumoI argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism-specific Gettier-style cases.
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