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WHY OPEN-MINDED PEOPLE SHOULD ENDORSE DOGMATISM

2010; Wiley; Volume: 24; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00202.x

1758-2245

Chris Tucker,

Free Will and Agency

Philosophical PerspectivesVolume 24, Issue 1 p. 529-545 WHY OPEN-MINDED PEOPLE SHOULD ENDORSE DOGMATISM Chris Tucker, Chris Tucker University of AucklandSearch for more papers by this author Chris Tucker, Chris Tucker University of AucklandSearch for more papers by this author First published: 28 January 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00202.xCitations: 100Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Bergmann, Michael. Manuscript. " Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings. Google Scholar Bergmann, Michael. 2006. Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 Google Scholar Bonjour, Laurence and Ernest Sosa. 2003. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden : Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Google Scholar Chisolm, Roderick. 1942. "The Problem of the Speckled Hen. Mind 51: 368–73. 10.1093/mind/LI.204.368 Google Scholar Cohen, Stewart. 1984. "Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46: 279–95. 10.1007/BF00372907 Web of Science®Google Scholar Conee, Earl. 2004. " First Things First." In Earl Conee and Richard Felman. Evidentialism. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0199253722.001.0001 Web of Science®Google Scholar Farah, Martha. 2004. Visual Agnosia. 2nd edition. Cambridge (MA) : MIT Press. 10.7551/mitpress/7122.001.0001 Google Scholar Goldman, Alvin. 2008. " Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism." In Quentin Smith (ed.). Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 63–82. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0004 Google Scholar Greco, John. 2000. Putting Skeptics in their Place. New York : Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511527418 Google Scholar Huemer, Michael. 2007. "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74: 30–55. 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x Web of Science®Google Scholar Huemer, Michael. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Google Scholar Markie, Peter. 2006. "Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief. Nous 40: 118–42. 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00603.x Web of Science®Google Scholar Markie, Peter. 2005. "The Mystery of Perceptual Justification. Philosophical Studies 126: 347–73. 10.1007/s11098-004-7795-0 Web of Science®Google Scholar Markie, Peter. 2004. "Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68: 530–53. 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00365.x Web of Science®Google Scholar McDowell, Josh. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge (MA) : Harvard University Press. Google Scholar Plantinga, Alvin. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate. New York : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0195078624.001.0001 Google Scholar Pollock, John and Iris Oved. 2005. "Vision, Knowledge, and the Mystery Link. Philosophical Perspectives 19: 309–51. 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00064.x Google Scholar Pryor, James. 2000. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Nous 34: 517–49. 10.1111/0029-4624.00277 Web of Science®Google Scholar Reid, Thomas. [1794] 1997. An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, ed. Derek Brookes. Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press. Google Scholar Siegel, Susanna. Forthcoming . "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification. Nous. PubMedWeb of Science®Google Scholar Stoerig, Petra. 1997. "Phenomenal Vision and Apperception: Evidence from Blindsight. Mind and Language 12: 224–37. 10.1111/1468-0017.00046 Web of Science®Google Scholar Tolhurst, William. 1998. "Seemings. American Philosophical Quarterly 35: 293–302. Web of Science®Google Scholar Tucker, Chris. Forthcoming. " Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology." In VanArragon Raymond and Kelly James Clark (eds.). Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. Google Scholar White, Roger. 2006. "Problems for Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 131: 525:57. 10.1007/s11098-004-7487-9 Web of Science®Google Scholar Wright, Crispin. 2008. " The Perils of Dogmatism. Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Citing Literature Volume24, Issue1December 2010Pages 529-545 ReferencesRelatedInformation