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What in the World Is Semantic Indeterminacy?

2015; Wiley; Volume: 56; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/phib.12068

2153-960X

David E. Taylor, Alexis Burgess,

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Analytic PhilosophyVolume 56, Issue 4 p. 298-317 ORIGINAL ARTICLE What in the World Is Semantic Indeterminacy? David E. Taylor, David E. Taylor University of Minnesota Minnesota Center for Philosophy of ScienceSearch for more papers by this authorAlexis Burgess, Alexis Burgess Claremont McKenna CollegeSearch for more papers by this author David E. Taylor, David E. Taylor University of Minnesota Minnesota Center for Philosophy of ScienceSearch for more papers by this authorAlexis Burgess, Alexis Burgess Claremont McKenna CollegeSearch for more papers by this author First published: 15 September 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12068Citations: 8Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Akiba, Ken (2004). ‘Vagueness in the World’, Noûs, 38(3): 407–429. Barnes, Elizabeth (2010). ‘Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed’, Noûs, 44(4): 601–627. Barnes, Elizabeth and J. Robert G. Williams (2011). ‘ A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy’, in Karen Bennett and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Barnett, David (2008). ‘Indeterminacy and Incomplete Definitions’, Journal of Philosophy, 105: 167–191. Cameron, Ross (2010). ‘Vagueness and Naturalness’, Erkenntnis, 72(2): 281–293. Dummett, Michael (1959). ‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 141–162. Frege, Gottlob (1892). ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitschrifi für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, 100: 25–50. Translated as ‘On Sense and Meaning’, Peter Geach and Max Black (trans.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1960. Glanzberg, Michael (2003). ‘ Against Truth-Value Gaps’, in J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. King, Jeffrey (2009). ‘Questions of Unity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109: 257–277. Lewis, David (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Lewis, David (1993). ‘ Many, But Almost One’, in Keith Campbell et al. (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Merricks, Trenton (2001). ‘Varieties of Vagueness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(1): 145–157. Perry, John (2012). Reference and Reflexivity, 2nd Edition. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information. Rayo, Augustin (2013). The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sainsbury, R. M. (1994). ‘Why the World Cannot be Vague’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33: 63–82. Taylor, David E. (2013). ‘ Essays on Indeterminacy’, PhD Dissertation, Stanford University. Williams, J. Robert G. (2008). ‘Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy’, Philosophy Compass, 3(4): 763–788. Citing Literature Volume56, Issue4December 2015Pages 298-317 ReferencesRelatedInformation