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Learning, political regimes and the liberalisation of trade

2010; Wiley; Volume: 50; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01982.x

1475-6765

Covadonga Meseguer, Abel Escribà‐Folch,

Social Policy and Reform Studies

European Journal of Political ResearchVolume 50, Issue 6 p. 775-810 Learning, political regimes and the liberalisation of trade COVADONGA MESEGUER, COVADONGA MESEGUER Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics, Mexico City, Mexico and ICREA, Barcelona, Spain;Search for more papers by this authorABEL ESCRIBÀ-FOLCH, ABEL ESCRIBÀ-FOLCH Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, SpainSearch for more papers by this author COVADONGA MESEGUER, COVADONGA MESEGUER Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics, Mexico City, Mexico and ICREA, Barcelona, Spain;Search for more papers by this authorABEL ESCRIBÀ-FOLCH, ABEL ESCRIBÀ-FOLCH Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, SpainSearch for more papers by this author First published: 16 November 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01982.xCitations: 11Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract In this article, the probability of opening to trade is related to a country's propensity to learn from other countries in its region. It is argued that countries have different motivations to learn, depending upon the responsiveness and accountability of their political regimes. Whereas democracies cannot afford to be dogmatic, authoritarian regimes are less motivated to learn from the experience of others, even if they embrace policies that fail. Using data on trade liberalisation for 57 developing countries in the period 1970–1999, it is found that democracies confronting economic crises are more likely to liberalise trade as a result of learning; among democracies, presidential systems seem to learn more, whereas personalist dictatorial regimes are the most resistant to learning from the experience of others. References Aspe, P. (1993). El Camino Mexicano de la Transformación Económica. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Baker, A. (2003). 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