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Feeling the Full Force of a Four Front Offensive: Re-Interpreting the Red Army's 1944 Belorussian and L'vov-Peremshyl' Operations

2008; Routledge; Volume: 21; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13518040802497564

1556-3006

Robert Watt,

European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies

Abstract This article argues that the L'vov Offensive carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front and a significant element of the 1st Belorussian Front in July 1944 should be regarded as the key offensive carried out by the Red Army between June and August 1944. This becomes particularly apparent if Soviet Deep Operations Theory is applied to this period and is further reinforced by an examination of how military assets were assigned in advance of the summer operations undertaken by the Red Army. This reinterpretation would suggest that the ‘Deep Battle’ conundrum concerning the successful delivery of key operational shocks in the summer of 1944 was how to facilitate the movement of German mobile forces away from the areas where these shocks would subsequently be delivered. Thus, while the Belorussian Operation delivered a decisive operational shock to Army Group Centre it also became the means by which German mobile formations were drawn away from the very area where the Red Army intended to deliver its key operational shock in what became known as the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation (originally designated as the L'vov-Peremyshl' Operation).Footnote 1 The political and strategic advantages subsequently gained by the success of the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation, combined with the application of deep operations theory and the deployment of key military assets prior to this operation, suggest that this success was neither accidental nor opportunistic but part of a process of deliberate planning. Notes 1D.M. Glantz & H.S. Orenstein, The Battle for L'vov July 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study (London: Frank Cass 2002) p. xi. 2D.M. Glantz & H.S. Orenstein, Belorussia 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study (London: Frank Cass 2001) p. xiii. 3Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, p. xi. 4The first iteration of this work was an undergraduate research methods project written in 1991/1992. The trigger to propose this as a worthwhile project was the surprise of finding four out of six Tank Armies assigned to the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation. 5D.M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass 1989) pp. 351–352; D.M. Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II (Novato CA: Presidio Press 1990) p. 140. 6Derived Glantz 1989 pp. 351–353; D.M. Glantz & J. House, When Titans Clashed How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press 1995), pp. 195–197; Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, Maps 1 & 3 p. 239 & p. 241; Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, Maps 1 & 2, pp. 167–168; C. Messenger, World War Two - Chronological Atlas (London: Bloomsbury 1989) pp. 190–191. 7Derived from Appendices contained in Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, pp. 149–161. 8See Map in Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, p. 168 & 2001, p. 241. 9Glantz, 1989, p. 351; see also p. 353. 10Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin 1982) p. 402; A. Leonard, A Short Guide to Clausewitz on War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1967) pp. 215–216. 11For example, there is the portrayal of the Red Army as a massive steamroller crushing all in its path through sheer weight of numbers. (See A. Rothberg, Eyewitness History of World War II Volume IV – Victory (London: Bantam 1962) pp. 74–75; J. Ehrman, Grand Strategy Volume V Aug 1943–Sept 1944 (London: HMSO 1956) p. 344; B. Collier, A Short History of the Second World War (London: Collins 1967) p. 434; P. Calvocoressi, & G. Wint, Total War – Causes and Courses of the Second World War (London: Allen Lane 1972) pp. 479–483) Other accounts, stemming from German sources roundly denigrate their Red Army opponents. These have to be read with caution, (See for example F.W. Von Mellinthin, Panzer Battles (London: Futura 1977) p. 354) though some credit is given to the capability of senior Red Army Commanders. (B. Liddell-Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London: Pan Books 1978) pp. 335–336). 12B. Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Pan Books 1973) p. 492. 13The Red Army call this process of concealment “operational deception (maskirovka)” (D.M. Glantz 1989; See also D.M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational: Art In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass 1991) pp. 114–115 & pp. 284–285 note 2; see also pp. 127–128, p. 139, p. 150, p. 158, p. 249). 14Liddell-Hart, 1973, p. 481. 15Ibid. 16H.P. Willmott, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of The Second World War (London: Pimlico 1989) p. 308. 17Ibid., p. 309. 18Ibid., pp. 365–366. 19Glantz, 1995, p. 62. This article will use the term ‘Stavka’ when referring to the Soviet High Command. 20Ibid. 21‘New Questions of War’ 1931 cited in S. Naveh, (1993), ‘Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky’ in Shukman H. (Ed)- Stalin's Generals (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1993), pp. 256–257. 22‘The Evolution of Operational Art’ 1937 cited in Naveh, 1993, pp. 256–257. 23Naveh, 1993, pp. 256–257; See also Glantz, 1991, Chapters 2–4. 24Naveh, 1993, p. 271. 25Triandafillov cited in Naveh, 1993, p. 271 See also Glantz, 1991, p. 21. 29Two Panzer Divisions transferred from Army Group South Ukraine in response to the Belorussian Operation plus Four Panzer Divisions transferred in response to the L'vov-Peremyshl' Operation's capture of the Sandomierz or Baranov Bridgehead. (Madeja, 1987, pp. 34, 49, 62, 74). 26Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, p. 15 & p. 41 See also Map 13 in Glantz, 1990, p.168; Other secondary sources make various efforts to estimate the transfers of Panzer Divisions from Army Group North Ukraine to Army Group Centre (W.V. Madeja, Russo-German War Volume 8 Summer 1944 (Allentown: Valor 1987) pp. 34, 49, 62 & 74; E.F. Ziemke, The Soviet Juggernaut (Chicago: Time-Life 1980) p. 135; A. Seaton, The Russo-German War (London: Arthur Barker 1973) p. 441). 28Derived Madeja, 1987, pp. 34, 49, 62, 74. 27Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, pp. 5–6. 30E.F. Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad – Decision in the East (New York: Military Heritage Press 1988) p. 521 & p. 528. 31Ibid., p. 522. 32Ibid., p. 524. 33V. Larionov et al., World War Two-Decisive Battles of the Soviet Army. (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1984) pp. 514–526. 34See for example: Finland Operation (A. Upton, ‘End of the Arctic War’ in Purnell's History of the Second World War (Bristol: Purnell and Sons 1970) p. 2142); Baltic Operation (M.I. Traktuyev(i), ‘Liberation of the Baltic States’ in Purnell's History of the Second World War (Bristol: Purnell and Sons 1970) p. 2129); Belorussian Operation (A.N. Shimansky, ‘Drive to Warsaw’ in Purnell's History of the Second World War (Bristol: Purnell and Sons 1970) p. 2045 & Glantz & House, 1995, pp.195–196; See also S.I. Roshchin, ‘The Belorussian Operation of 1944’ in Wieczynski J.L. The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History Volume 3 (Gulf Breeze Florida: Academic International Press 1981)); L'vov-Sandomierz Operation (M.I. Traktuyev(ii), ‘The Red Army's Drive into Poland’ in Purnell's History of the Second World War (Bristol: Purnell and Sons 1970) p. 1922; See also F.I. Tsukanov, ‘The Lvov-Sandomierz Military Operation of 1944’ in Wieczynski J.L. The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History Vol. 20 (Gulf Breeze Florida: Academic International Press 1981); R. Overy, Russia's War (London: Allen Lane 1997) pp. 238–239; Glantz & House, 1995, pp.195–196); Yassy Kishinev Operation (J. Erickson, The Road to Berlin (London: Grafton 1983) pp. 464–468). 35See for instance P. Derevyanko & B. Solovyov, ‘The Battle of Kursk in Bourgeoise Historiography’ in Parotkin, I. – General Editor, The Battle of Kursk (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1974) pp. 292–312. 36Ziemke, 1988, p. 524 see also A.Z. Conner and R.G. Poirier, Red Army Order of Battle (Novato CA: Presidio Press 1985) pp. 2–3 and Appendices 2 and 6; D.M. Glantz, The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945) (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office 1997) pp. 2–4 http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/rzhev/rzhev2.html (Downloaded 19 May 1999). 37One could also speculate whether Soviet histories determine the aims in terms of hindsight. For example, Liddell Hart gives a clear account of the steadfast German defence of Belorussia between October and December 1943. The Soviet attacks were launched between Orsha and Rogachev and concentrated their efforts along the Moscow-Minsk road. The Red Army failed to make significant inroads in this area. Yet we are asked to believe that the Red Army casually expected to crush Army Group Centre in the same area six months later. (Liddell Hart, 1973, pp. 496–497; See also Overy, p. 236; Glantz, 1995, p. 193) Was the spectacular collapse of the Wehrmacht in Belorussia planned for in advance or ‘written in’ after the event? 38Glantz, 1989, pp. 2–3 &p. 559. 39Ibid, pp. 9–13, p. 18 & p. 558. 40Vol'pe quoted in Glantz, 1989, p. 8. 41Glantz, 1989, p. 11. 42Ibid., p. 10, p. 25. 43Ibid., p. 21. 44Ibid., p. 27. 45Ibid., p. 27. 46Glantz, 1989, p. 356; Glantz, 1995, p. 196. 47Glantz, 1989, p. 3. 48Ibid., p. 32. 49Shtemenko quoted in Glantz, 1989, p. 350. 50Glantz, 1989, pp. 348–351 inc. map p. 349. 51Glantz, 1989, pp. 35–36, pp. 353–356; Glantz, 1990, pp. 140–141. 52Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, p. 3; 2002, pp. 7–8. 53Glantz, 1989, p. 36. 54Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, p. 8. 55Glantz, 1990, p. 141 see also D.M. Glantz, Red Storm over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania, Spring 1944 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2007). 56Glantz 1989, pp. 354–355; see in particular Map 124 p. 354. 57Glantz, 1989, p. 35; pp. 562–563; Glantz, 1990, p. 140. 58See Glantz, 2007, Chapter 6 in particular, pp. 264–274. 59Derived Conner/Poirier. 60Ibid., p. 3. 61Derived Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, pp. 213–237; 2002, pp. 149–161. 62See Appendix One for a full breakdown of the forces allocated to the Belorussian and L'vov-Sandomierz Operations. 63Derived Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, pp. 213–237; 2002, pp. 149–161. 65Also allocated 1 Fortified Region and 1 Electronics battery. 66Also included are 3 Fortified Regions. 6743rd Army also had allocated to them 2 Separate Sentry Battalions and 1 Fortified Region. 68Also included 1 Fortified Region. 69Also had assigned to it the 1st Guards Motorcycle Regiment. 70Front Reserves also had allocated to them 1 Maskirovka Company, 1 Front Construction Directorate and 1 Construction Directorate. 71Also had assigned to it the 2nd Guards Motorcycle Regiment & 1 Front Construction Directorate & 1 Construction Directorate. 72Also including 1 Construction Directorate. 73Also includes HQ of 4th Artillery Penetration Corps and 1 Construction Directorate. The Front also had the Dnepr Military Flotilla with three brigades of ‘River Boats’ 1 Brigade of Minesweepers and two separate sections of ‘River Cutters’. 83Listed as the 4th Heavy Pontoon Park. 64Derived Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, pp. 213–217; 2002, pp. 149–161. 77Derived Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, 2002, op. cit. 78Ibid. 81Ibid. 82Ibid. 85Derived Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, p. 61; see also Note 1 p. 110. 74These are Brigades and Regiments assigned to each front but independent of the tank or mechanised corps. 75Erickson, 1983, p. 309; S.J. Zaloga Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre. (London: Osprey 1996); Madeja, 1987; p. 9 & p. 78; E. Bauer, The History of World War II (Leicester: Galley Press 1984) p. 511; Upton, pp. 2144 and 2147; Willmott, 1989, p. 385. 76Traktuyev(ii), p. 1924; Tsukanov, 1981, p. 215; Shimansky, p. 2049; Roshchin, 1981, p. 234, p. 235; Willmott, 1989, p. 377 & p. 379; A. Werth, Russia at War (London: Pan Books 1964) p. 771; B. Perrett, Knights of the Black Cross (London: Robert Hale 1986) pp. 245–246; Zaloga, 1996; Erickson, 1983, p. 309. 79It must be remembered that these units are separate from the anti-tank units integral to other Red Army units their primary function was to help set up a secure anti-tank gun defence. 80Derived Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, 2002, op. cit. 84Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, p. 205. 86Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, Note 1, p. 110. 87Ibid, p. 78. 88Ibid, p. 154. 89Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, p. 88. 90Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, p. 196. 91Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, p. 52. 92Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, p. 199. 93Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, p. 12. 94Ibid, p. 35. 95Ibid, p. 36. 96Ibid, p. 106. 97Ibid, p. 106. 98Ibid, p. 88 & p. 106. 103Ibid, p18 & See Maps 24–29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47–50, pp. 190–216. 104Ibid, Map 23, Situation 2400, 18th July 1944, p. 188. 105Ibid, Maps 28, 29, Situations 2400, 24th & 25th July 1944, pp. 194–195. 106Ibid, Maps 38, 40, Situations 2400, 30 & 31 July 1944, p. 204, p. 206. 107Ibid, Maps 24–29, Situations 2400, 20th -25th July 1944, pp. 190–195. 108Ibid, Maps 35, 37, 39, 41, 45 pp. 201–211. 109Ibid, Maps 47, 48, Situations 2400, 14 & 18 August 1944, pp. 213–214. 99Ibid, Map 25, Situation 2400, 21 July 1944, p. 191. 100Ibid, Map 36, Situation 2400, 29 July 1944, p. 202. 101Ibid, Map 44, Situation 2400, 4 August 1944, p. 210. 102Ibid, p. 36. 110Ibid, p. 70. 111Ibid, p. 87. 112Erickson, 1983, p. 243; see also Seaton, p. 453. 113Tsukanov, 1981, p. 216. 114Ibid., p. 216. 115Overy, p.237; Glantz, 1995, p. 195. 116Glantz, 1995, pp. 196–201. 117Ibid., p. 199. 118Ibid., p. 199. 119Glantz, 2007, p. 374. 120Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, pp. 91–92, 96. 121Ibid., p. 97. 122Ibid., p. 96. 123Ibid., p. 87. 124Ibid., p. 89. 125Ibid., pp. 87–89 & Map 38, Situation, 2400, 30 July 1944, p. 204. 126Ibid., pp. 90–91. 128Glantz & Orenstein 2001, pp. 213–217. 12943rd Army also had allocated to them 2 Separate Sentry Battalions and 1 Fortified Region. 130Front Reserves also had allocated to them 1 Maskirovka Company, 1 Front Construction Directorate and 1 Construction Directorate. 131This was a motorised battalion equipped with amphibious vehicles. 132Equipped with mine clearing dogs. 134Equipped with Flame and Mine Clearing Tanks. 135Designated Separate Special Power Artillery Battalion. 136Also had assigned to it the 1st Guards Motorcycle Regiment. 137Also had assigned to it the 2nd Guards Motorcycle Regiment & 1 Front Construction Directorate & 1 Construction Directorate. 138Derived Glantz & Orenstein, 2001, pp. 226–229. 139Also allocated 1 Fortified Region and 1 Electronics battery. 140Designated as a Separate Special Power Artillery Battalion. 141Also including 1 Construction Directorate. 142One of these Brigades designated a Special Designation Engineer-Sapper Brigade. 144Also included are 3 Fortified Regions. 145Also included 1 Fortified Region. 146Designated 4th Heavy Pontoon Park. 147Designated Separate Special Power Artillery Battalion. 148Also includes HQ of 4th Artillery Penetration Corps and 1 Construction Directorate. The Front also had the Dnepr Military Flotilla with three brigades of ‘River Boats’ 1 Brigade of Minesweepers and two separate sections of ‘River Cutters’. 149Three of these battalions equipped with mine-clearing dogs. 150Derived Glantz & Orenstein, 2002, pp. 149–161. 127Derived Glantz & Orenstein 2001, pp. 213–237 & 2002, pp. 149–161.