Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?

2005; Wiley; Volume: 20; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00298.x

1468-0017

Kristin Andrews,

Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Mind & LanguageVolume 20, Issue 5 p. 521-536 Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places? Kristin Andrews, Corresponding Author Kristin Andrews *Kristin Andrews, Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele St. Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Kristin Andrews, Corresponding Author Kristin Andrews *Kristin Andrews, Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele St. Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 October 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00298.xCitations: 31 Support for the presentation of an earlier version of this manuscript was given by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I would like to express thanks to audience members at the joint SPP/ESPP meeting in Barcelona, members of my Honours Seminar at York University (especially David Parke, Brian Bridson, and Mike Distler) and anonymous reviewers for this journal. I would like to thank especially Brian Huss and Jennifer Vonk for helpful discussions of many of the issues addressed in this paper. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract Abstract: I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's theoretical commitments should lead them to accept this new approach, and that experiments which offer subjects the opportunity to look for explanations for anomalous behavior should be explored. Citing Literature Volume20, Issue5November 2005Pages 521-536 RelatedInformation