Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Empires and the Modern International System

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14650045.2011.595440

1557-3028

Jan Zielonka,

Global Political and Social Dynamics

Abstract In recent years several important books have argued that the United States of America, China, Russia and even the European Union "look, talk and walk" like empires. However, these books have failed to impress those working in the field of international relations. For some, the Westphalian state is still the major unit of analysis. Others prefer to use the terms "great powers" or "hegemony." This research note will, first, try to assess the added value that the concept of empire brings to the study of international relations. The second aim is to establish how best to study contemporary empires. Which actors can be classified as empires? Should one focus on imperial structure, mission or behaviour? The third objective is to seek ways of identifying patterns of cooperation and competition among empires. Can the contemporary manifestations of empire co-exist without major conflict? ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Rosemary Foot, Christopher Hill, James Hughes, Florent Parmentier, Benoit Pelopidas, Georg Sørensen and three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Notes 1. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State (New York: Basic Books 1999). 2. Niall Ferguson, Colossus. The Price of America's Empire (New York: Allen Lane 2004); Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2006); Harold James, The Roman Predicament. How the Rules of International Order Create the Politics of Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2006); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2002). 3. Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire (Sydney: UNSW Press 2003); Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2002); Helene Carrere d'Encausse and Maxime Rodinson, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris 2009); Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006); Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity 2007). 4. Some of them insist that the history of empires has ended. See James Rosenau, 'The Illusion of Power and Empire', History and Theory 44 (2005) pp. 73–87. 5. See Georg Sørensen, The Transformation of the State. Beyond the Myth of Retreat (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2004); Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books 2004); or Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2003). 6. See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company 2001); or Jonathan Joseph, Hegemony: A Realist Analysis (London: Routledge 2002). Also Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, 'Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Europe, 1495–1999', Security Studies 14 (2005) pp. 1–30; or Azar Gat, 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers', Foreign Affairs 86 (2007) pp. 59–63. 7. Emanuel Adler, The Power of Ideology (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1987) p. 4. 8. This geopolitical imaginary is, according to Gerry Kearns, a type of imperial ideology with a significant geographic element. It orders, in both time and space, the economies, cultures and polities of the global system as a material field of opportunity and threats. Kearns argues that such strategic thinking can be thought of as "Geography adding statecraft or Geopolitics." Gerry Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire. The Legacy of Halford Mackinder (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009) pp. 2–3. 9. Kenneth Pomeranz, ''Civilizing' Missions, Past and Present', Dædalus 134 (2005) pp. 34–45; or Herfried Münkler, Empires. The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States (Polity: Cambridge 2007) pp. 98–102. 10. Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1986) pp. 136–138; Noel Parker, 'Empire as a Geopolitical Figure', Geopolitics 15/1 (2010) pp. 113–114; Münkler (note 9) pp. 98 and 102. 11. Letter to Royer-Collard, 15 Aug. 1840, cited in Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire. The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2005) p. 195. 12. Ibid., p. 166. 13. However, those who talk about the retreat of the state do not necessarily endorse the concept of empire; see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996). While those who embrace the concept of empire do not necessarily associate it with specific international actors; see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000). 14. Article 1 of the Convention stipulates that "the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states." See Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference of American States, signed at Montevideo, 26 Dec. 1933; source: Treaties and International Engagements registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, Vol. CLXV, Nos. 3802 (Geneva: League of Nations 1936) pp. 19–44. 15. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1999); or Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2004). Also John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', International Organization 47 (1993) pp. 139–174; Jim Glassman, 'State Power Beyond the 'Territorial Trap': The Internationalization of the State', Political Geography 18 (1999) pp. 669–696; and Seán Patrick Eudaily and Steve Smith, 'Seeing through States. Sovereign Geopolitics? – Uncovering the "Sovereignty Paradox"', Geopolitics 13 (2008) pp. 309–334. 16. Andres Osiander, 'Sovereignty, International Relations and The Westphalian Myth', International Organization 55 (Spring 2001) pp. 251–287. Also Charles W. Kegley, Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 2002). 17. Thomas J. Volgy and Alison Bailin, International Politics and State Strength (New York: Lynne Rienner 2003). 18. Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer, Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998) p. 177. 19. Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High – Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2002) pp. 225–228; Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers (Cambridge: Polity Press 2004) pp. 56–63 and 129–138; Paul Kennedy, 'On the 'Natural Size' of Great Powers', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 135 (Dec. 1991) pp. 485–489. 20. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1978) pp. 348–349. 21. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979) p. 131. 22. Christopher H. Achen, 'Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong', Conflict Management and Peace Science 22/4 (2005) pp. 327–339; or Henry E. Brady, David Collier, and Jason Seawright, 'Toward a Pluralistic Vision of Methodology', Political Analysis 14/ 3 (2006) pp. 353–368. 23. Immanuel M. Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2004); or Jonathan Joseph, Hegemony: A Realist Analysis (New York: Routledge 2002). Also Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press 1981); or Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', Millennium 12 (1983) pp. 162–175. 24. Patrick Karl O'Brien and Armand Clesse, Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2001 (Aldershot: Ashgate 2002). 25. Niall Ferguson, 'Hegemony or Empire?', Foreign Affairs 82/5 (Sep./Oct. 2003). Also David Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?', International Studies Quarterly 37 (1993) pp. 459–489. 26. For a similar argument see Michael Cox, 'The Empire's Back in Town: or America's Imperial Temptation Again', Millennium 32 (2003) p. 19. Also Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations', Millennium 31 (2002) pp. 109–127. 27. Notable exceptions include Josep M. Colomer, Great Empires, Small Nations (London: Routledge 2007); or Didier Chaudet, Florent Parmentier, and Benoit Pelopidas, When Empire Meets Nationalism. Power Politics in the US and Russia (Farnham: Ashgate 2009). 28. Although the colonial legacy still haunts former colonial empires and their former colonies; see, e.g., Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage 1993); or Leela Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia University Press 1998). 29. Therefore Ikenberry's distinction between empire, hegemony and security community seems fuzzier than the author suggests. See G. John Ikenberry, 'Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age', Review of International Studies 30 (2004) pp. 615–616. 30. Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen (eds.), Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003) p. 251. Noel Parker suggested that the empire that is nearest to legitimate would be that "with the most understanding of, and benefit for its peripheral subordinate parts." Parker (note 10) p. 128. 31. Phil Kelly, 'A Critique of Critical Geopolitics', Geopolitics 11 (2006) p. 25. 32. For typologies of empires see, e.g., S. N. Eisenstadt, Political Systems of Empires (New York: Free Press 1963) pp. 10–12; Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends. The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia University Press 2001) pp. 18–20; or Alejandro Colas, Empire (Polity: Cambridge 2007) pp. 3–26. 33. For an analysis of the complex issue of coercion and consent in the politics of empire see Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research 8 (1971) pp. 81–118. 34. Doyle (note 10) p. 19. 35. John H. Kautsky, The Politics of Aristocratic Empires (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press 1982) pp. 127 and 144. Also J. H. Burns, The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350–c. 1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988) p. 179. 36. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Polities. Authority, Identities, and Change (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press 1996) pp. 355–371. 37. Ole Wæver, 'Imperial Metaphors: Emerging European Analogies to Pre-Nation-State Imperial Systems', in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev, and Victoria Ingrid Einagel (eds.), Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, Territory and Identity (London: Sage 1997) p. 65. 38. Some definitions of empires exclude more loosely organised polities. See Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge 1992) pp. 14–16. Also Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000) p. 177. 39. Alexander J. Motyl, 'Thinking About Empire', in Karen Barkley and Mark von Hagen (eds.), After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation Building (Boulder, CO: Westview 1997) p. 25. 40. This is consistent with theories that argue that power is not solely reflected in concrete decisions. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', The American Political Science Review 56 (1962) pp. 947–952. 41. See Giovanni Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', American Political Science Review 64 (1970) pp. 1033–1053. Also David Collier, Concepts and Methods in Social Science: Giovanni Sartori and His Legacy (London: Routledge 2008); and Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2005). 42. Jean Cohen, 'Whose Sovereignty? Empire versus International Law', Ethics and International Affairs 18 (2004) pp. 1–24. 43. See Council conclusions, 'Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood', available at , accessed 16 June 2003. 44. G. John Ikenberry, 'American Unipolarity: The Sources of Persistence and Decline', in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2002) p. 296. Ikenberry is a leading liberal intellectual. The (neo) conservative imperial rhetoric is more self-righteous. Consider, for instance, the writings of Robert Kagan, Joshua Muravchik or Richard Haass or some of the official documents of the Bush administration. 45. Thomas Ambrosio, 'The Geopolitics of Slavic Union: Russia, Belarus, and Multipolarity', Geopolitics 4 (1999) pp. 73–90; or Mark Bassin and Konstantin E. Aksenov, 'Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in Post-Soviet Geopolitical Discourse', Geopolitics 11 (2006) pp. 99–118. Also C. Fred Bergsten, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek J. Mitchell, China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, DC: The Peterson Institute for International Economics 2008). 46. Michael Mann, The Sources of Power. The History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993). 47. Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002); or Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso 2003). 48. See André Sapir, 'Europe and the Global Economy', in André Sapir (ed.), Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy (Brussels: Bruegel Books 2007) p. 12. 49. Wang Mengkui (ed.), Good Governance in China – A Way Towards Social Harmony (London: Routledge 2008). 50. Jeremy Richardson, European Union. Power and Decision-Making, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge 2001). 51. For a comprehensive comparison of the US, EU, Russia and China see Jan Zielonka, 'The EU as an International Actor: Unique or Ordinary', European Foreign Affairs Review 16 (2011) pp. 281–302. 52. See Mark Lynas, 'How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the Room', Guardian, 22 Dec. 2009, p. 1. Also Amrita Narlikar, Bargaining with the Strong: Negotiation Process in International Regimes (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Inc. 2008). 53. Takashi Inoguchi and Lyn Jackson (eds.), Memories of War: The Second World War and Japanese Historical Memory in Comparative Perspective (Tokyo: United Nations University 1998). 54. However, it should be noted that Japanese military expenditure is circumscribed and does not allow for a global reach. There are also strong cultural and constitutional impediments to the use of the military force by Japan. See, e.g., Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1996). 55. Amrita Narlikar, 'India and the World Trade Organization', in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Timothy Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) pp. 270–284. 56. Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds.), Public Institutions in India: Performance and Design (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006). 57. Paul K. MacDonald, 'Those Who Forget Historiography are Doomed to Republish it: Empire, Imperialism and Contemporary Debates about American Power', Review of International Studies 35 (2009) pp. 47 and 54. 58. Amy Chua, Days of Empire. How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why they Fall (New York: Doubleday 2007). Also Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage 1987). 59. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979). However, others, notably in the fields of foreign policy analysis and international political economy, have argued against this treatment of states as "black boxes"; see, e.g., Christopher Hill, Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2003). 60. Despite all the checks and balances built into the American governance system, the US president is sole commander-in-chief and runs foreign policy with limited input from Congress. See Marie T. Henehan, Foreign Policy and Congress: An International Perspective (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press 2000). For an analysis of the EU governance system in this area see, e.g., Sebastian Princen and Michéle Knodt, Understanding the European Union's External Relations (London: Routledge 2003). 61. Derek Gregory, 'War and Peace', Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 35 (2010) pp. 154–186. On the other hand, Victoria de Grazia, in her discussion of American marketing strategies, demonstrates that the construction of "insides" and "outsides" was key to the expansion of American commercial hegemony. Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2005). 62. Garry Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State (New York: Penguin Press 2010). 63. The notion of "fuzzy borders" is controversial. See Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, 'Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective', Geopolitics 10 (2005) pp. 633–649; or Fredrich Kratochwil, 'Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into Formation of the State System', World Politics 31 (1986) pp. 27–52. Also M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Dispute (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2008). 64. See C. Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek J. Mitchell, China: The Balance Sheet. What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower (New York: Public Affairs 2006) p. 15. 65. See Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire (Sydney: UNSW Press 2003) p. 193. 66. Takeshi Hamashita, 'Changing Regions and China: Historical Perspectives', China Report 37 (2001) pp. 333–351; and John King Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order; Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1968). 67. Milada Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005). 68. David Chandler, Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press 2006). 69. Aleksei I. Miller and Alfred J. Rieber, Imperial Rule (Budapest: Central University Press 2004). 70. 'President Bush's Address to the Nation', New York Times, 7 Sep. 2003. Madeleine K. Albright, while serving as the Secretary of State under President Clinton, also declared: "Freedom is America's purpose." See Madeleine K. Albright, 'The Testing of American Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 77 (1998) p. 64. 71. Clyde Prestovitz, Rogue Nation (New York: Basic Books 2003) p. 36. Also Eric Hobsbawm, On Empire. America, War, and Global Supremacy (New York: Random House 2008). 72. Ikenberry, 'American Unipolarity' (note 44) p. 296. The term "indispensable nation" is attributed to Madeleine Albright. 73. Simon Dalby', Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Geopolitics', Geopolitics 13 (2008) pp. 413–436. 74. The debate about Chinese historical memory and imperial identity is complex. See Zhang Xudong (ed.), Whither China? Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2001); or Paul A. Cohen, 'Remembering and Forgetting: National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China', Twentieth-Century China 27/2 (2002) p. 17. Also William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010). 75. Chen Zhimin, 'International Responsibility and China's Foreign Policy', in Masafumi Iida (ed.), China's Shift. Global Strategy of the Rising Power (NIDS Joint Research Series, 3) (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defence Studies 2009) pp. 12–13. 76. Hu Jintao, 'Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects', Report to the 17th National People's Congress of the CPC (Beijing: People's Press 2007) p. 48. 77. See Peter Hays Gries's discussion of a 2004 book by Lu Benlong from Beijing Normal University talking about "China at the center and barbarians in the four directions": Peter Hays Gries, 'Indignation, Nationalism and China's Japan Policy', SAIS Review of International Studies 25 (2005) p. 108. 78. Ted Hope, 'Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force: Russia's Great Power Identities and Military Intervention in Abkhazia', Review of International Studies 31(2005) pp. 225–243. Also Andrei Tsygankov, 'Vladimir Putin's Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power', Post-Soviet Affairs 21 (2005) pp. 132–158. 79. In her letters to Voltaire, Catherine II presented Russia as the "fighting arm" of civilisation. See Andrzej Nowak, History and Geopolitics: A Contest for Eastern Europe (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych 2008) pp. 201–234. Also Andrei Tsygankov, Russophobia: Anti Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2009) especially Chapter 4. 80. As the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, put it: "Europe does not do 'regime change'. It does system change." See her speech at the EPP "Paneuropa" Group in Strasbourg on 14 Dec. 2005, available at 81. Yang Jiemian, '60 Years of New China's Diplomacy: Characteristics of Practice and Evolution in Thinking', Global Review 1 (2009) p. 9. 82. Lai Hongyi and Lim Tin Seng (eds.), Harmony and Development. ASEAN-China Relations (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2007). Also Chen Dongxiao, 'Building Up a Cooperative and Co-Progressive New Asia: China's Asia Strategy towards 2020' (Shanghai: Shanghai Institutes for International Studies 2008) pp. 24–44. 83. Lawrence Freedman, 'War in Iraq: Selling the Threat', Survival 46 (2004) pp. 7–50. 84. Timothy Garton Ash, Free World (London: Allen Lane 2004); and Diana Crane, Nobuko Kawashima, and Kenichi Kawasaki, Global Culture: Media, Arts, Policy, and Globalization (London: Routledge 2002). 85. Rosemary Foot, 'China and the United States: Between Cold and Warm Peace', Survival 51 (2009–2010) pp. 123–146; or Thomas J. Christensen, 'Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia', International Security 31 (2006) pp. 81–126. 86. Pádraig R. Carmody and Francis Y. Owusu, 'Competing Hegemons? Chinese versus American Geo-Economic Strategies in Africa', Political Geography 26 (2007) pp. 504–524 87. See Edward Rhodes, 'A World Not in Balance: War, Politics, and Weapons of Mass Destruction', in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004) pp. 150–176. Also John A. Vasquez, 'The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research in Waltz's Balancing Proposition', American Political Science Review 91 (1997) pp. 899–912. 88. Although it has been observed that states have begun to engage in "soft balancing," and free riding. See T. V. Paul, 'Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy', International Security 30 (2005) p. 47. 89. Münkler (note 9) pp. 11–13.