Assessing the reset: successes and failures in the Obama administration's Russia policy, 2009–2012
2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 22; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09662839.2013.777704
ISSN1746-1545
Autores Tópico(s)Russia and Soviet political economy
ResumoAbstractCritics of the Obama administration's 'reset' with Russia claim that it has failed to improve bilateral relations and has conceded too much to Russia at the expense of American interests. In fact, the reset has delivered significant improvements in key areas and established the institutional basis for continued cooperation in the future, benefiting both states. Although disagreements remain on several important issues including missile defence, humanitarian intervention, and democracy, the reset has been broadly successful on its own terms, which were always limited in scope and based on a pragmatic recognition of the limits of possible cooperation. Future progress is uncertain, however – obstacles include differences of national interest; the complicating effects of relations with third party states and the impact of domestic politics. A continuation of the pragmatic approach underpinning the reset represents the best chance for stability in the US–Russia relationship.Keywords: US–Russia relationsUS foreign policyarms controlhumanitarian interventionsdemocracyUS presidential elections Notes on contributorRuth Deyermond is a Lecturer in War Studies in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. Her publications include Security and Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 'Matrioshka hegemony? Multi-leveled hegemonic competition and security in post-Soviet Central Asia', Review of International Studies 35:1 (January 2009), and 'The Republican challenge to Obama's Russia policy', Survival (October 2012).Notes1. I use the term 'reset' to refer to the 2009–2013 Obama administration's policy towards Russia. The term is used by some analysts to refer only to the initial declarative act of announcing a new US policy towards Russia; however, it is more commonly used to refer to the policy as a whole. Since the individual agreements and other bilateral developments have all taken place in the context of this reorientation of policy, the term 'reset' seems to be the most appropriate one to describe policy towards Russia in this period.2. For example, Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation, one of the fiercest and most prolific critics of the reset, asserted that the reset 'naively bet on President Dmitry Medvedev's staying in power' – an unconvincing claim, given both the quality of expert opinion on Russia within the administration and the nature of the Medvedev–Putin governing tandem between 2008 and 2012 (Cohen Citation2012).3. On Putin's claim that it resembled a mediaeval call for a crusade, see Putin likens UN Libya resolution to crusade call. RIA Novosti [online], 21 March. Available from: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110321/163126957.html [Accessed 15 May 2012].4. On European security questions and the reset, see also Karaganov and Suslov (Citation2011), chapters 3 and 4.5. On the shared political values of the USA and Russia, see, for example, George W. Bush's radio address, 25 May 2002, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020525-3.html and the statement of 14 November 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011114-3.html. This positive phase in US–Russia relations lasted from the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to the disagreement over Iraq in early 2003.6. See, for example, Obama's refusal to criticise the Russian governmental record on democracy and human rights (White House Citation2009c).
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