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Alternative possibilities in descartes's fourth meditation

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 14; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09608780600792067

1469-3526

C. P. Ragland,

French Literature and Criticism

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1Harry Frankfurt introduced this terminology in 'Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', Journal of Philosophy, 66: 829–39. 2See Principles of Philosophy I.37 (AT 8a: 18–19/CSM 1: 205) and the 9 February 1645 letter to Mesland (AT 4: 173/CSMK 245). For a later text that may reject PAP, see the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland (AT 4: 115–16/CSMK 233). References to Descartes employ the following abbreviations:AT Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (eds), Oeuvres de Descartes, 2nd edn, 11 vols (Paris: Vrin/C.N.R.S., 1974–86).CSM 1 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I, translated by Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).CSM 2 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, translated by Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).CSMK The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume III: The Correspondence, translated by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch and Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).Translations are from CSM or CSMK unless otherwise noted. 3I think the implications of this fact have not been emphasized enough by commentators. They are very briefly noted in Lilli Alanen, 'Intuition, Assent, and Necessity: The Question of Descartes' Psychologism', Acta Philosophica Fennica, 64 (1999) 112, and in Charles Larmore, 'Descartes' Psychologistic Theory of Assent', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1 (1984) No. 1: 68. 4See Etienne Gilson, La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie (Paris: Alcan, 1913) 286–336, esp. 310–19; Alexander Boyce Gibson, The Philosophy of Descartes (London: Methuen, 1932) 332–9; and Michelle Beyssade, 'Descartes's Doctrine of Freedom: Differences between the French and Latin Texts of the Fourth Meditation', in Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes's Metaphysics, edited by John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 191–206. 5See Larmore; Anthony Kenny, 'Descartes on the Will', in Cartesian Studies, edited by R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972) 1–31; and Jean-Marie Beyssade, La Philosophie Première de Descartes: Le temps et la cohérence de la métaphysique (Paris: Flammarion, 1979) 177–214. 6See S. V. Keeling, Descartes (London: Ernest Benn, 1934) 186–90; Lucien Laberthonnière, Études sur Descartes in Oeuvres de Laberthonnière (Paris: J. Vrin, 1935), vol. 1, pp. 418–31; Jean Laporte, 'La liberté selon Descartes', Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 44 (1937) 101–64, esp.120–46; Jean-Marc Gabaude, Liberté et raison (La liberté cartésienne et sa réfraction chez Spinoza et chez Leibniz), Vol. I: Philosophie réflexive de la volonté (Toulouse: Association des publications de la faculté des lettres et sciences humanines de Toulouse, 1970) 161–97; Robert Imlay, 'Descartes and Indifference', Studia Leibnitiana, 14 (1982) No. 1: 87–97; Georges J. D. Moyal, 'The Unity of Descartes' Conception of Freedom', International Studies in Philosophy, 19 (1987) No. 1: 33–51 and 'Magicians, Doubters and Perverts', Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 50 (1996) No. 195: 73–107; Lilli Alanen, 'Descartes on the Will and the Power to do Otherwise', in Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, edited by Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002); James Petrik, Descartes' Theory of the Will (Durango, CO: Hollowbrook Publishing, 1992); and Joseph Keim Campbell, 'Descartes on Spontaneity, Indifference, and Alternatives', in New Essays on the Rationalists, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro and Charles Huenemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 179–99. 7Fully establishing the third position would require proving that Descartes consistently accepted PAP in later texts. That task is beyond the scope of this paper, but I take it up in 'Descartes on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities' (forthcoming from Journal of the History of Philosophy, 44 (2006) No. 3: 377–94). 8On Leibniz's and Spinoza's view of Cartesian freedom, see John Cottingham, The Rationalists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) 159–62. Cottingham himself there seems to read Descartes as a compatibilist, as he also does in 'Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief', The Monist 85 (2002) No. 3: 343–60. Larmore, Kenny, Petrik and Campbell read Descartes as a compatibilist, as does Vere Chappell in 'Descartes's Compatibilism', in Reason, Will, and Sensation, 177–90. Alanen, Laporte, Moyal and Keeling seem to read him as a libertarian, as does Peter Schouls in Descartes and the Enlightenment (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989) 77–98. Ferdinand Alquié presents Descartes as endorsing PAP throughout his career, but moving from a compatibilist understanding of alternatives in the Meditations to an incompatibilist understanding in later texts; see his La découverte métaphysique de l'homme chez Descartes, 2nd edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966) 280–99. 9Michelle Beyssade, 206. 10Ibid, 194. Similarly, Gilson claims that Descartes 'renounces the requirement of indeterminism for our liberty, and is satisfied by simple absence of constraint' (310). 11Jean Laporte, Le rationalisme de Descartes, 3rd edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988) 271. Imlay makes a similar point when discussing Gilson's reading ('Descartes and Indifference') 91. 12Kenny, 17. 13Ibid, 18; my italics. 14Ibid, 20. 15Anselm, De libertate arbitrii in Opera omnia, edited by Schmitt (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946) I, 225; Susan Wolf, 'Asymmetrical Freedom', Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980): 151–66. 16Similar passages include AT 7: 69/CSM 2: 48; AT 7: 145/CSM 2: 104; AT 7: 166/CSM 2: 117; AT 8a: 21/CSM 1: 207; AT 3: 64/CSMK 147; and AT 4: 115–6/CSMK 233–4. 17According to the Fifth Replies, 'when we direct our will towards something, we always have some sort of understanding of some aspect of it …' (AT 7: 377/CSM 2: 259); and Principles I.34 says: 'In order to make a judgement, the intellect is of course required since, in the case of something which we do not in any way perceive, there is no judgement we can make' (AT 8a: 18/CSM 1: 204). See also Comments on a Certain Broadsheet (AT 8b: 363/CSM 1: 307) and Chappell, 187. 18Further evidence: 'the will does not tend toward evil except in so far as it is presented to it by the intellect under some aspect of goodness' (AT 1: 366/CSMK 56). 19For an excellent discussion of the meaning of 'indifference' covering many of the same issues I discuss here, see Dan Kaufman, 'Infimus gradus libertatis? Descartes on Indifference and Divine Freedom', Religious Studies, 39 (2003): 391–406. 20In another letter, Descartes says that a person is 'more indifferent the fewer reasons he knows which impel him to choose one side rather than another' (AT 4: 155/CSMK 233). Again, degree of indifference is measured by degree of balance. 21It is clear that for Descartes, God's freedom consists in the ability to do otherwise. For example, he says that God 'was free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are equal – just as free as he was not to create the world' (AT 1: 152/CSMK 25), and that 'God cannot have been determined to make it true that contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore that he could have done the opposite' (AT 4: 118/CSMK 235). 22The relevant sentence reads: nam si quae ratio boni eius praeordinationem antecessisset, illa ipsum determinasset ad id quod optimum est faciendum. CSM translates it thus: 'If some reason for something's being good had existed prior to his preordination, this would have determined God to prefer those things which it was best to do.' In English 'to prefer' sometimes mean 'to choose', sometimes merely 'to be inclined toward'. However, the idiomatic Latin phrase ad id faciendum is unambiguous: it means 'to make it'. 23Descartes reiterates the possibility of being free without being indifferent at AT 7: 58/CSM 2: 40 and AT 4: 118/CSMK 234. 24Other passages asserting similarity between divine and human will include AT 11: 445/CSM 1: 384 and AT 5: 85/CSMK 326. The idea of an analogy between divine and created substance is also suggested near the end of the Third Meditation (AT 7: 51/CSM 2: 35) and discussed at length in the Conversation with Burman (AT 5: 156/CSMK 339–40). For an excellent discussion of these passages and relevant scholastic background, see Tad Schmaltz, 'The Disappearance of Analogy in Descartes, Spinoza, and Regis', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30, No. 1: 85–114. Schmaltz argues, in effect, that Descartes's understanding of divine simplicity conflicts with his belief in an analogy between the divine and human wills. Schmaltz's evaluation may be correct, but it does not undermine my claim: the Fourth Meditation (coherently or not) posits an analogy. 25Descartes's denial of univocity might seem to mean that that (a) there is no feature that belongs essentially to both divine and human wills. However, the denial responds to the following argument in the Sixth Set of Objections: 'if indifference cannot be a proper part of human freedom, neither will it find a place in divine freedom, since the essences of things are, like numbers, indivisible and immutable' (AT 7: 417/CSM 2: 281). The objectors assume that (b) a feature is essential to the divine will if and only if it is also essential to the human will. Descartes intends his remark as a denial of (b), not as an assertion of (a). 26Even if we supposed that the point of similarity did not need to be essential to both the divine and human will, identifying two-way power as the point of resemblance would (on the retraction reading) imply that we are most Godlike in our freedom when we are most ignorant. I suspect Descartes would not find this implication acceptable. 27Charles Larmore notes that the similarity between the divine and human will creates a problem for his reading of Cartesian freedom (which seems similar to Kenny's retraction reading). Larmore suggests that the idea of freedom from external determination may provide a solution. See Charles Larmore, 'Descartes' Psychologistic Theory of Assent', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1 (1984): 66–8. 28There is some doubt as to whether reasons in the divine intellect should count as 'external' to God. However, as Dan Kaufman has pointed out to me, Descartes's remark about the Styx and Fates (AT 1: 145/CSMK 23) probably implies that God is not subject to any external force. Descartes links the idea of alternative possibilities to divine freedom in the following passage: God 'was free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are equal – just as free as he was not to create the world' (AT 1: 152/CSMK 25). 29For a very similar argument, see Imlay, 91–2. Here is another way of making the same point: if only spontaneity were essential to freedom, then the greatness of human freedom would be a function of the perfection in the human intellect. We would expect the will to reach infinite perfection only if the intellect were also infinitely perfect; but Descartes insists that 'the will is greater and more godlike than the intellect' (AT 5: 159/CSMK 342). The will is infinite and nothing can be taken away from it, while 'it is in the nature of a finite intellect to lack understanding of many things' (AT 7: 60/CSM 2: 42). Therefore, the scope of will must exceed the scope of the intellect in created beings. God's will ranges over more objects than ours only in its actual exercise, the human will is just as extensive as God's in so far as it is a power to will or not will any possible object. 30Laporte (see esp. Rationalisme de Descartes, 271) Gabaude (168–71), Campbell (186–7), and Imlay (91–2) advance this sort of reading. 31See Gabaude, 171; Kenny, 18. 32This sort of reading is advanced in Alanen (1999) 109–12; in Alquié, 286; in Moyal (1987 and 1996); and in Marlin, 207–8. 33See also AT 7: 166/CSM 2: 117 and AT 7: 145/CSM 2: 104. 34For a good discussion of this natural orientation, see Chappell, 186–9. 35A parallel passage: 'the will does not tend toward evil except in so far as it is presented to it by the intellect under some aspect of goodness' (AT 1: 366/CSMK 56). 36Descartes also presents the will as oriented toward truth (AT 7: 431–3/CSM 2: 291–2), yielding the parallel claim that we cannot assent to a proposition unless the intellect presents it as at least possibly true. But for the sake of simplicity in the argument that follows, I will describe assent as an action aimed at the good – specifically, the good of believing or knowing the truth. 37Descartes refers to the will's 'positive power' in AT 4: 116, 173–4/CSMK 234, 245. For a more detailed summary of Scotus's position and use of similar terminology, see Alanen (2002) 287–91. 38For more on the specification/exercise distinction, see Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.1 q9 a1, and Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (eds), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 1198–9. 39Alanen (2002) 294. 40In his discussion of indifference just following the great light passage, Descartes presents 'refraining from making a judgement' as an option on a par with affirming or denying (AT 759/CSM 2: 41). 41In my opinion, this difference does not reflect any profound shift in Descartes's view. Rather, in the Fourth Meditation he is thinking only about agents wholeheartedly engaged in a search for truth, and who thus are not subject to the kinds of conflicting motivations – such as the desire to prove the extent of their freedom – that do not depend on ignorance, but nevertheless enable them to hold back from assenting to clear perceptions. 42 If, however, I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases where I do not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and avoiding error. But if in such cases I either affirm or deny, then I am not using my free will correctly. (AT 7: 59–60/CSM 2: 41) 43Some might object that Descartes requires only that we feel our actions to be free from external determination, not that they actually be thus undetermined. There are two reasons not to make heavy weather of the word 'feel'. First, sentiamus probably here signifies our inner experience of freedom (AT 7: 56, 191, 377/CSM 2: 39, 134, 259; AT 8a: 6/CSM 1: 194; AT 4: 332/CSMK 277; AT 5: 159/CSMK 342), which Descartes thinks is clear and distinct, and hence veridical (AT 8a: 19–20/CSM 1: 205–6; AT 3: 161/CSMK 161; AT 7: 191/CSM 2: 134; see also Campbell, 181). In this case the feeling of being undetermined probably implies that we really are undetermined. Second, Descartes insists that because we err freely, 'God is not the Cause of our Errors' (AT 8a: 16/CSM 1: 203; AT 7: 54, 60/CSM 2: 38, 41). However, if freedom is merely a feeling, and is thus consistent with behind-the-scenes external control, how can we be sure that God is not making us err after all? 44Passive verb forms used to convey an active, reflexive meaning are a Latin equivalent to the Greek middle voice. See M. Beyssade, 194. 45I am grateful to Michael Della Rocca for suggesting that Principles I.51 might connect to my current topic. 46For a detailed discussion of the relation of God to human freedom, see my 'Descartes on Divine Providence and Human Freedom', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 87 (2005) No. 2: 159–88. 47Campbell, 180. 48See esp. Principles I.45 (AT 8a: 22/CSM 1: 207) and two letters to Mesland (AT 4: 115–8/CSMK 233–4; AT 4: 173/CSMK 244–6). 49This paper has been much improved by the feedback I have received from Dan Kaufman, Calvin Normore, Marilyn Adams, Jim Stone, Eleonore Stump, the members of the free-will reading group in philosophy at Saint Louis University, and an anonymous referee for this journal. I am especially grateful to Robert Adams and Michael Della Rocca, who read and responded to many drafts.