On the Principle of Total Evidence
1967; Oxford University Press; Volume: 17; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1093/bjps/17.4.319
ISSN1464-3537
Autores Tópico(s)Tree Root and Stability Studies
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessNOTES AND COMMENTSOn the Principle of Total EvidenceI. J. GOODI. J. GOODTrinity CollegeOxford Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 17, Number 4February 1967 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 111Total views on this site Citations: 135Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 111Total views on this site Citations: 135Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/17.4.319 Views: 111Total views on this site Citations: 135Citations are reported from Crossref © 1967 by The Author. 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