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Quantitative Decisions by Groups and Individuals: Voting Procedures and Monetary Awards by Mock Civil Juries

1993; Elsevier BV; Volume: 29; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1006/jesp.1993.1015

1096-0465

James H. Davis, Mark F. Stasson, Craig D. Parks, Lorne Hulbert, Tatsuya Kameda, Suzi K. Zimmerman, Kaoru Ono,

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Two experiments, using a mock civil trial format, addressed the question of how a common procedural mechanism, in this case a straw poll, might itself influence the preferences of group members and the consensus decisions of six-person groups faced with a quantitative judgment (in contrast to the more common choice among discrete alternatives). Experiment 1 found that mandated polling, in contrast to deliberation only, increased the number of hung juries, but also fostered larger damage awards in those groups that reached decisions. Results from Experiment 2 showed that mere polling sequence (ascending or descending order of magnitude within a poll) and timing of the vote (early or late in deliberation) interacted to influence member preferences, although only timing ultimately affected the verdict and final judgments of ex-members. Personal reactions of ex-members to their jury′s decision and consensus processes not only supported interpretations of procedural effects as depending upon norms engaged by task and context, but once more underscored the extra-task value of group work in terms of increased decision certainty and satisfaction.