Discussion: Hypothetico-Deductivism is Hopeless
1980; Cambridge University Press; Volume: 47; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/288935
ISSN1539-767X
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and Theoretical Science
ResumoAn attractive and apparently indestructible idea about confirmation is that a hypothesis h is confirmed by evidence e if h is a logical consequence of e , or of h and the right sort of other stuff. This idea was advanced in various ways by Ayer (1936), Hempel (1965), Carnap (1959), and still recurs constantly in discussions of confirmation; recently for example, in Schlesinger (1976) and Horwich (1978). The typical modern version of the idea goes like this: a sentence h is confirmed by a sentence e with respect to a theory T if e is true and h & T is consistent and h & T entails e (hereafter, h & T ⊢ e ) but T does not entail e (hereafter, T ⊬ e ).
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