The Nature of Spanish Government after Philip II
1963; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 26; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1540-6563.1963.tb00234.x
ISSN1540-6563
Autores Tópico(s)Political Systems and Governance
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1. Some quantitative indication should perhaps be made in general terms about the materials underlying this essay. The most important are documents at the Archivo General de Simancas; of the twenty‐odd thousand folios in recent or current research, most are relevant to the present topic. The Biblioteca National de Madrid is much less rich in materials; of about 2,500 folios used, many are relevant. Of the materials used from the archives of the Spanish Netherlands now in various collections at the Archives Gänärales du Royaume de Belgique, especially in the Papiers d'Etat et de l'Audiencc and the Secrätairerie d'Etat et de guerre, some fifteen or twenty thousand folios would illustrate some aspect of the present article's thesis. The same is true of a few thousand folios of the material used at the British Museum; at the Public Record Office the most relevant are the "State Papers, Spain" for the period. Comprehensive citation would be too cumbersome to attempt; specific documents or groups of documents are referred to in the notes which follow in regard to particular points and to the general burden of the essay.2. Garrett Mattingly, The Defeat of the Spanish Armada (London, 1959), 75–76.3. Simon Contarini, "Relazione," printed in Spanish translation under the title "Relacion que hizo ä la Republica de Venecia Simon Contareni [sic], al fin del aöo de 1605, de la embajada que habia hecho in Espaöa," in Luis Cabrera de Cördoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la Corte de Espaöa desde 1599 hasta 1614 (Madrid. 1857), 563.4. Leopold von Ranke's ironic view of Baltasar Porreöo's pious eulogy of a royal saint is certainly merited, but as far as the truth of the king's religious preoccupations goes, Porreföo's offense is surely only gross exaggeration, not complete incorrectness. See Baltasar Porreöo, Dichos y hechos de el Seöor Rey Philipe III el Bueno, Potentissimo y Glorioso Monarca de las Espaöas y de las Indias [1628], printed in Juan Isidro Yäöez (pseud, of Juan Isidro Fajardo y Monroy), Memorias para la historia de Don Filipe III de Espaöa (Madrid, 1723), 222–246;and Leopold von Ranke, L'Espagne sous Charles‐Quint, Philippe II et Philippe III ou les Osmanlis et la monarchie espagnole, tr. J. B. Haiber (Paris, 1845), 140 ff.5. Ciriaco Pärez Bustamente, Felipe HI. Semblanza de una monarca y profiles de una privama (Madrid, 1950), 7.6. Antonio Cänovas del Castillo, Estudios del reinado de Filipe IV, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1888), I, 258. The term privanza in this sense does not have merely the general meaning of "favor" but refers specifically to the "favoriteship" as a quasi‐official position in the king's government. A contemporary could say, e.g., that So‐and‐so occupied the privanza.7. Space and other considerations have required the elimination from this essay of a discussion of the position of the privado and the nature of the privanza in Spanish government in the period, in support of the assertion that the real political power lay elsewhere than in the hands of the "favorite." Such a discussion, and documentation, appear in ch. V of my The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598‐1621, to be published by Columbia University Press in January 1964, in which the present subject is treated (with a different approach and with different emphases). For present purposes it may be sufficient to note that the privado received his power (and continuance) from the king; that the functions of the privanza were essentially the delegated functions of the crown; that the kings were not especially strong nor the crown especially active in the reigns of Philip III and Philip IV; and that the privanza, as an informal but traditionally recognized institution exercising powers and performing functions delegated by the king, inevitably was subject to the monarchy's own limitations in the period. (More extensive citation in detail of various specific documents which support the main burden of this essay may also be seen, passim, in the above mentioned book.)8. Cänovas del Castillo, Historia de la decadencia de Espaöa desde el adventimiento de Felipe III al Trono hasta la muerte de Carlos II, 2nd ed. (Madrid, 1910), 60; his lists of councils are at the places cited here and above, n. 6.9. Comparison of the material handled by these councils and by the Council of State shows this clearly. Joseph Cuvelier states the same thing (in this case in reference to the Council of Flanders) in his preface to Henri Lonchay, Joseph Cuvelier and Joseph Lefèvre, eds., Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur les affatres des Pays‐Bas au XVII' siècle, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1923‐1937), 1, viii.10. Confirmation of which, in some aspect, may be had by reference to almost any conciliar documents of the period at the Archivo General de Simancas, Secretaria de Estado. Similarly, almost any council records in the large Estado collection are examples of the procedure described below. No particular single documents, of course, provide adequate illustration of this general procedure or this description of it; because the procedure was consistently followed, citation of larger groups of documents giving a broader view of the system can be made almost at random. Among those relevant to some of the more important events of the time, and especially to affairs with England (which have been my special concern), one may cite, e.g., legajos 844–845, 2557–2561, and 2849.11. See, e.g., Cabrera de Cöordoba, Relaciones, 494 (entry of September 22, 1612, there having been a delay in the formal changeover). Ciriza's former papers were taken over by Arostequi's brother Martin.12. This very useful continuity in office was interrupted in 1621 when, in the political turmoil following Philip Ill's death, Ciriza was switched briefly to other affairs.13. Petitions of this sort streamed into Madrid in large quantities (from all over, not just the Netherlands), and payment this far in arrears was amazingly common; some of Parma's veterans were still seeking the payment due or expected for their services at a surprisingly late date, and after death their widows and heirs continued. These petitions appear at the rate of dozens per year in the archives of the Spanish‐staffed secretariat in the Netherlands, the Secrätairerie d'Etat et de guerre (which corresponded almost exclusively in Spanish but was generally known by its French title) for the years of the joint reign of Albert and Isabella, 1598‐1621 (Ibid., 176–185) and the governorship of Isabella after Albert's death, 1621‐1633 (Ibid., 186–207); copies of another 50 to 90 per year handled directly by Albert's Secretario dc Camara, Antonio Suärez de Arguello, 1610‐1621, are in Ibid, 518. The relationship between Spain and the Spanish Netherlands in this period is dealt with in my "Belgian 'Autonomy' under the Archdukes, 1598‐1621," appearing currently in the Journal of Modern History.14. The treasury could of course be empty in effect though not in strict fact, with some cash on hand but with pressing debts equal to or in excess of that amount. A much used alternative was payment by royal warrant, comparable to English Privy Seals, but this was a most unsatisfactory expedient as the cash shortage which led to their use served also to make impossible early redemption of the warrants by the treasury. As a result the recipient usually sold the warrant on the discount market, at a loss that was usually some seventy‐five per cent (the expense and delay of collecting – one could expect it to take two or three years – made the usual rate of discount 4 to 1 in the purchase of this doubtful paper). Consequently, the Spanish crown suffered the resentment of large numbers of people, some Times important ones, all over Europe, who could complain with some justice that they had been paid only a quarter of the value owed them; since the treasury eventually had to redeem the warrants at face value, the desirability of this system is more than doubtful. See, e.g., Gondomar to Ciriza, March 13, 1619, printed in Documents inäditos para la historia de Espaöa, new series, vols. I‐IV: Correspondencia oficial de Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuöa, Conde de Gondomar, ed. Antonio Ballesteros Beretta (Madrid, 1936‐1945), II, 126–127. On the "notorious" Spaniard making this observation see my "Gondomar: Ambassador to James I," forthcoming in the Historical Journal.15. This hypothetical example is fairly typical; the specific case of this sort which led to the Treaty of Madrid of April 25, 1621, is dealt with in some detail in ch. XIII‐XVI (esp. ch. XVI) of the book mentioned above, n. 7.Additional informationNotes on contributorsCharles H. CarterThe author is Associate Professor of Histor) at the Tulane University of Louisiana. He was granted his Ph.D. by Columbia University (1961). At the time this article went to press he had articles on "Belgium Autonomy. 1598‐1621" and on "Gondomar" in the process of publication by the Journal of Modern History and the Historical Journal and a book on The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598‐1625 scheduled for publication early next year.
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