A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement
1970; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 13; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/466698
ISSN1537-5285
Autores Tópico(s)Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessA Statistical Study of Antitrust EnforcementRichard A. PosnerRichard A. PosnerPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 13, Number 2Oct., 1970 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/466698 Views: 57Total views on this site Citations: 148Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Wawa W. Nkosi, Willem H. Boshoff Characteristics of Prosecuted Cartels and Cartel Enforcement in South Africa, Review of Industrial Organization 60, no.33 (Feb 2022): 327–360.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-022-09862-1Maryam Fathollahi, Jarrad Harford, Sandy Klasa Anticompetitive effects of horizontal acquisitions: The impact of within-industry product similarity, Journal of Financial Economics 144, no.22 (May 2022): 645–669.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.017William F. Shughart On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice, Public Choice 191, no.1-21-2 (Apr 2022): 1–19.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5Diego S. Cardoso, Mariusa M. Pitelli, Adelson M. Figueiredo An Econometric Analysis of the Brazilian Merger Policy, Review of Industrial Organization 59, no.11 (Mar 2021): 103–132.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-021-09812-3Firat Cengiz The conflict between market competition and worker solidarity: moving from consumer to a citizen welfare standard in competition law, Legal Studies 41, no.11 (Oct 2020): 73–90.https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2020.31Andreas Freitag, Catherine Roux, Christian Thöni COMMUNICATION AND MARKET SHARING: AN EXPERIMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF SOFT AND HARD INFORMATION, International Economic Review 62, no.11 (Sep 2020): 175–198.https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12480David K. Levine, Andrea Mattozzi, Salvatore Modica TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: WHY NOT CARTELS?, International Economic Review 62, no.11 (Oct 2020): 47–64.https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12487Francisco Eduardo Beneke Avila Determinants of the Investment Rate in the Economy and Their Relevance in Entry Analysis, (Jan 2021): 27–68.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62347-3_5Kai Hüschelrath Kartelle in der Europäischen Union: Überblick und empirische Evidenz, (Jun 2020): 63–102.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29139-6_3Jingyuan Ma Horizontal Restrictions, (May 2020): 53–80.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5105-5_4Mark Stelzner, Mayuri Chaturvedi , Cambridge Journal of Economics 44, no.44 ( 2020): 871.https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beaa004Patrick Newman Personnel is Policy: Regulatory Capture at the Federal Trade Commission, 1914–1929, Journal of Institutional Economics 15, no.66 (Jun 2019): 1037–1053.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137419000341Naomi R. Lamoreaux The Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil to Google, Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no.33 (Aug 2019): 94–117.https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.3.94Ari Hyytinen, Frode Steen, Otto Toivanen An Anatomy of Cartel Contracts, The Economic Journal 129, no.621621 (Jan 2019): 2155–2191.https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12633Eugene Kandel, Konstantin Kosenko, Randall Morck, Yishay Yafeh The great pyramids of America: A revised history of U.S. business groups, corporate ownership, and regulation, 1926–1950, Strategic Management Journal 40, no.55 (Dec 2018): 781–808.https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2992Igor Goncharov, Caspar David Peter Does Reporting Transparency Affect Industry Coordination? Evidence from the Duration of International Cartels, The Accounting Review 94, no.33 (Jul 2018): 149–175.https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52201Koki Arai Administrative Performance and Legitimacy: An Elaboration Likelihood Approach to Competition Authorities in Japan and the United States, (Jun 2019): 173–194.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8188-1_12Miguel A. Fonseca, Yan Li, Hans-Theo Normann Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence - experimental evidence, Southern Economic Journal 85, no.11 (Aug 2018): 255–275.https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12278Michael Hellwig, Kai Hüschelrath WHEN DO FIRMS LEAVE CARTELS? DETERMINANTS AND THE IMPACT ON CARTEL SURVIVAL, International Review of Law and Economics 54 (Jun 2018): 68–84.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2017.11.001Peter T. Dijkstra, Jonathan Frisch , De Economist 166, no.11 ( 2018): 111.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-017-9309-4Luke Garrod, Matthew Olczak Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries, International Journal of Industrial Organization 56 (Jan 2018): 1–25.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.10.006Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow Cartels, (Feb 2018): 1398–1401.https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1985Robert F. Schuldt, Jason E. Taylor , The Journal of Industrial Economics 66, no.11 ( 2018): 1.https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12155Richard N. Langlois Hunting the Big Five: Twenty-First Century Antitrust in Historical Perspective, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2018).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3124356Vivek Ghosal, D. Daniel Sokol The Rise and (Potential) Fall of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2018).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3162867D. Daniel Sokol Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2018).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3296127Tim Reuter Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination, Review of Industrial Organization 51, no.33 (Mar 2017): 291–313.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-017-9574-zMurillo Campello, Daniel Ferrés, and Gaizka Ormazabal Whistle-Blowers on the Board? The Role of Independent Directors in Cartel Prosecutions, The Journal of Law and Economics 60, no.22 (Oct 2017): 241–268.https://doi.org/10.1086/694826Michael Hellwig, Kai HHschelrath When Do Firms Leave Cartels? Determinants and the Impact on Cartel Survival, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2017).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2898155Daniel E. Ingberman, Asrat Tesfayesus The Law and Economics of Concealing Health and Safety Information, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2017).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940450Sharadha V Tilley, Brian Byrne, Joseph Coughlan An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Fines on Bank Reputation in the US and UK, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2017).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2980352Robert M. Feinberg Cartel Stability: Determinants and International Evidence, Review of Industrial Organization 48, no.44 (Feb 2016): 357–359.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9503-6Robert M. Feinberg, Hyunchul Kim, Minsoo Park The Determinants of Cartel Duration in Korea, Review of Industrial Organization 48, no.44 (Feb 2016): 433–448.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9505-4Vivek Ghosal, D. Daniel Sokol Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions, Review of Industrial Organization 48, no.44 (Apr 2016): 405–432.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9516-1Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow Price Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of US Price-Fixing Conspiracies, Review of Industrial Organization 48, no.44 (Apr 2016): 361–379.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9520-5Andrew D. Pressey, Markus Vanharanta Dark network tensions and illicit forbearance: Exploring paradox and instability in illegal cartels, Industrial Marketing Management 55 (May 2016): 35–49.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.02.009Ryan Lampe, Petra Moser Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation—Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New Deal, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 32, no.11 (Aug 2015): 1–36.https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewv014Sébastien Broos, Axel Gautier, Jorge Marcos Ramos, Nicolas Petit Analyse statistique des affaires d'ententes dans l'UE (2004-2014), Revue économique Vol. 67, no.HS1HS1 (Jan 2016): 79–94.https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.hs01.0079Catherine Roux, Christian Thöni Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 116 (Aug 2015): 83–93.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.018Svetlana Avdasheva, Dina Tsytsulina, Svetlana Golovanova, Yelena Sidorova Discovering the Miracle of Large Numbers of Antitrust Investigations in Russia: The Role of Competition Authority Incentives, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2588989Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow Price-Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of U.S. Price Fixing Conspiracies, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2691579Peter J. Boettke, Rosolino Antonio Candela Price Theory as Prophylactic Against Popular Fallacies, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710201Ajay Bhaskarabhatla, Enrico Pennings Defensive Disclosure of Patentable Inventions under Antitrust Enforcement, Industry and Innovation 21, no.7-87-8 (Dec 2014): 533–552.https://doi.org/10.1080/13662716.2014.987452Andrew D. Pressey, Markus Vanharanta, Alan J.P. Gilchrist Towards a typology of collusive industrial networks: Dark and shadow networks, Industrial Marketing Management 43, no.88 (Nov 2014): 1435–1450.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2014.08.001John A. Dove Antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general: institutional, legal and political considerations, Business and Politics 16, no.22 (Jan 2017): 291–312.https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2013-0032Anastasiya Redkina Using Remedies In Russian Merger Control, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2014).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2497420Timo Goeschl, Johannes Jarke The warnings puzzle: an upstream explanation, Journal of Regulatory Economics 44, no.33 (Jun 2013): 339–360.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-013-9223-xSunel Grimbeek, Steve Koch, Richard Grimbeek The Consistency of Merger Decisions at the South African Competition Commission, South African Journal of Economics 81, no.44 (Jun 2013): 561–580.https://doi.org/10.1111/saje.12005Stephen Davies, Oindrila De Ringleaders in Larger Number Asymmetric Cartels, The Economic Journal 123, no.572572 (Nov 2013): F524–F544.https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12062Mark Aldrich Tariffs and Trusts, Profiteers and Middlemen: Popular Explanations for the High Cost of Living, 1897-1920, History of Political Economy 45, no.44 (Nov 2013): 693–746.https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2369967Martin P. Shanahan, David K. Round, Kerrie A. Round Cartel Resilience in Australian Markets 1901–1967, Revue économique 64, no.66 (Jan 2013): 1011.https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.646.1011Miguel A. Fonseca, Hans-Theo Normann Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments, European Economic Review 56, no.88 (Nov 2012): 1759–1772.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.002Kai-Uwe Kühn HOW MARKET FRAGMENTATION CAN FACILITATE COLLUSION, Journal of the European Economic Association 10, no.55 (Aug 2012): 1116–1140.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01083.xEmmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier Les cartels en Europe, une analyse empirique, Revue française d'économie Volume XXVII, no.22 (Oct 2012): 187–226.https://doi.org/10.3917/rfe.122.0187Koki Arai Administrative Performance and Legitimacy, Public Performance & Management Review 36, no.11 (Aug 2012): 54–78.https://doi.org/10.2753/PMR1530-9576360103William H. Page Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2012).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061791Ajay Bhaskarabhatla, Enrico Pennings Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2012).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154558Jordi Gual, Núria Mas Industry Characteristics and Anti-Competitive Behavior: Evidence from the European Commission's Decisions, Review of Industrial Organization 39, no.33 (Apr 2011): 207–230.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9290-zChristopher S Decker, William Corcoran, David T Flynn Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes and the Lake Carriers Association, Eastern Economic Journal 37, no.44 (Feb 2011): 450–469.https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2010.2John K. Ashton, Andrew D. Pressey The regulatory challenge to branding: An interpretation of UK competition authority investigations 1950–2007, Journal of Marketing Management 27, no.9-109-10 (Aug 2011): 1027–1058.https://doi.org/10.1080/0267257X.2011.558386Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration, The Journal of Law and Economics 54, no.22 (Jul 2015): 455–492.https://doi.org/10.1086/657660Deron Overpeck Blindsiding: Theatre Owners, Political Action and Industrial Change in Hollywood, 1975-1985, (Apr 2011): 185–196.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444396416.ch10Vivek Ghosal Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics and Enforcement, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1020448Erik Brouwer, Fatih Cemil Ozbugday Measuring the Extent of European State Aid Control: An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission Decisions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1763285Miguel Alexandre Fonseca, Hans-Theo Normann Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion - The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1937803William F. Shughart, Fred S. McChesney Public choice theory and antitrust policy, Public Choice 142, no.3-43-4 (Oct 2009): 385–406.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9552-6Martin Carree, Andrea Günster, Maarten Pieter Schinkel European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions, Review of Industrial Organization 36, no.22 (Feb 2010): 97–131.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9237-9Oindrila De Analysis of Cartel Duration: Evidence from EC Prosecuted Cartels, International Journal of the Economics of Business 17, no.11 (Feb 2010): 33–65.https://doi.org/10.1080/13571510903516946Kenneth W. ShottsAlan E. Wiseman The Politics of Investigations and Regulatory Enforcement by Independent Agents and Cabinet Appointees, The Journal of Politics 72, no.11 (Jul 2015): 209–226.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990570Elgie McFayden Global Implications of White Collar Crime, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2010).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1530685Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2010).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1676968Erik Brouwer, Fatih Cemil Ozbugday Measuring the Extent of European State Aid Control: An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission Decisions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2010).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1690473Steffen Brenner An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program, International Journal of Industrial Organization 27, no.66 (Nov 2009): 639–645.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.02.007SOPHIE HARNAY, ALAIN MARCIANO POSNER, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM "LAW AND ECONOMICS" TO AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Journal of the History of Economic Thought 31, no.22 (Jun 2009): 215–232.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1053837209090208Yuliya V. Bolotova Cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70, no.1-21-2 (May 2009): 321–341.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.002Martin A. Carree, Andrea Guenster, Maarten Pieter Schinkel European Antitrust Policy 1957-2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2009).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1162145Boyan Jovanovic, Peter L. Rousseau Mergers as Reallocation, Review of Economics and Statistics 90, no.44 (Nov 2008): 765–776.https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.90.4.765B. M. Fernandez, I. Hashi, M. Jegers THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S MERGER REGULATION 2004: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4, no.33 (Sep 2008): 791–809.https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhn006John K. Ashton, Andrew D. Pressey Regulatory Perceptions of Marketing: Interpreting U.K. Competition Authority Investigations from 1950 to 2005, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 27, no.22 (Sep 2008): 156–164.https://doi.org/10.1509/jppm.27.2.156Christopher S. P. Magee, Stephen P. Magee The United States is a Small Country in World Trade, Review of International Economics 17 (Jul 2008): ???–???.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00763.xPatrice Bougette, Stéphane Turolla Market structures, political surroundings, and merger remedies: an empirical investigation of the EC's decisions, European Journal of Law and Economics 25, no.22 (Jan 2008): 125–150.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-007-9042-6Marcos Avalos, Rafael E. De Hoyos An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy, Review of Industrial Organization 32, no.22 (Jun 2008): 113–130.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-008-9168-xMagnus Söderberg Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector, European Journal of Law and Economics 25, no.11 (Dec 2007): 79–94.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-007-9040-8Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow Cartels, (Dec 2016): 1–4.https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1985-1Yuliya Bolotova, John M. Connor Cartel Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2008).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1116421John M. Connor The United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division's Cartel Enforcement: Appraisal and Proposals, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2008).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1130204John K. Ashton, Andrew D. Pressey The Regulatory Challenge to Branding: An Interpretation of UK Competition Authority Investigations 1950-2007, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2008).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1331407Alain Marciano Value and exchange in law and economics: Buchanan versus posner, The Review of Austrian Economics 20, no.2-32-3 (Mar 2007): 187–200.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-007-0018-0 Jason E. Taylor Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel Performance: An Industry‐Level Analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act Taylor, The Journal of Law and Economics 50, no.33 (Jul 2015): 597–624.https://doi.org/10.1086/519808Makoto Hanazono, Huanxing Yang COLLUSION, FLUCTUATING DEMAND, AND PRICE RIGIDITY, International Economic Review 48, no.22 (May 2007): 483–515.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00435.xCarson W. Bays The Determinants of Tying Litigation, 1961–2001, International Advances in Economic Research 13, no.11 (Dec 2006): 81–96.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11294-006-9063-xMarc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright, Jean Tirole Chapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control, (Jan 2007): 217–239.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82008-0Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph A. Clougherty, Pedro P. Barros Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1009135Magnus Söderberg Uncertainty and Regulatory Outcome in the Swedish Electricity Distribution Sector, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1018605Anthony Uccellini The Effect of Disclosure Regulation on M&A Activity: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1032798Christoph Engel Giving the German Cartel Office the Power of Divestiture - The Conformity of the Reform with Constitutional Law, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1075046John K. Ashton, Andrew Pressey The Regulatory Perception of the Marketing Function: An Interpretation of UK Competition Authority Investigations 1950-2005, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.964014Eric J. Shea, Raj S. Chari Policy Formulation, Implementation and Feedback in EU Merger Control, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2006).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.925649Patrice Bougette, Stéphane Turolla Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2006).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.931160Kai-Uwe Kuhn How Market Fragmentation Can Facilitate Collusion, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2006).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.939172Alain Marciano Value and Exchange in Law and Economics: Buchanan versus Posner, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2006).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.945367Switgard Feuerstein Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 5, no.3-43-4 (Nov 2005): 163–198.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-005-4868-5Shaker A. Zahra, Richard L. Priem, Abdul A. Rasheed The Antecedents and Consequences of Top Management Fraud, Journal of Management 31, no.66 (Dec 2005): 803–828.https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206305279598Mats A. Bergman, Maria Jakobsson, Carlos Razo An econometric analysis of the European Commission's merger decisions, International Journal of Industrial Organization 23, no.9-109-10 (Dec 2005): 717–737.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.08.006JOSEPH A. CLOUGHERTY INDUSTRY TRADE BALANCE AND DOMESTIC MERGER POLICY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM U.S. MERGER POLICY FOR MANUFACTURING SECTORS, Contemporary Economic Policy 23, no.33 (Jul 2005): 404–415.https://doi.org/10.1093/cep/byi030Tomaso Duso Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry, Public Choice 122, no.3-43-4 (Mar 2005): 251–276.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-3293-y Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis Cole and Ohanian, Journal of Political Economy 112, no.44 (Jul 2015): 779–816.https://doi.org/10.1086/421169Geoffrey Alan Williams, Alistair Lindsay, Emanuela Lecchi Power and Reach in European Antitrust Cases, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2003).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.905209Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow What Determines Cartel Success?, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2002).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.299415Andrew Dick Cartels and Tacit Collusion, (Jan 2017): 206–211.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_44Saı̈d Souam Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines, International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, no.1-21-2 (Jan 2001): 1–26.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00007-7Vivek Ghosal, Joseph Gallo The cyclical behavior of the Department of Justice's antitrust enforcement activity, International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, no.1-21-2 (Jan 2001): 27–54.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00013-2Chibuike Ugochukwu Uche The theory of regulation: A review article, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 9, no.11 (Jan 2001): 67–80.https://doi.org/10.1108/eb025063Richard H. K. Vietor Government Regulation of Business, (Aug 2000): 969–1012.https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521553087.017Marie McKendall, Carol Sánchez, Paul Sicilian CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE ILLEGALITY: THE EFFECTS OF BOARD STRUCTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS, The International Journal of Organizational Analysis 7, no.33 (Mar 1999): 201–223.https://doi.org/10.1108/eb028900Sally S. Simpson, Christopher S. Koper The changing of the guard: Top management characteristics, organizational strain, and antitrust offending, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 13, no.44 (Dec 1997): 373–404.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02221047 Barbara McCutcheon Do Meetings in Smoke‐Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion? McCutcheon, Journal of Political Economy 105, no.22 (Jul 2015): 330–350.https://doi.org/10.1086/262075M. Albert Vachris Federal antitrust enforcement: A principal-agent perspective, Public Choice 88, no.3-43-4 (Sep 1996): 223–238.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153231 Andrew R. Dick When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, The Journal of Law and Economics 39, no.11 (Oct 2015): 241–283.https://doi.org/10.1086/467349Scott E. Masten Old school ties: financial aid coordination and the governance of higher education, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 28, no.11 (Sep 1995): 23–47.https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(95)00018-7KITTY CALAVITA, HENRY N. PONTELL SAVINGS AND LOAN FRAUD AS ORGANIZED CRIME: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL TYPOLOGY OF CORPORATE ILLEGALITY*, Criminology 31, no.44 (Nov 1993): 519–548.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1993.tb01140.xTHOMAS W. HAZLETT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN ACT RE-EXAMINED, Economic Inquiry 30, no.22 (Apr 1992): 263–276.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01657.xMark A. Cohen The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing, International Review of Law and Economics 12, no.11 (Mar 1992): 13–30.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(92)90003-A Pauline M. Ippolito Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, The Journal of Law and Economics 34, no.2, Part 12, Part 1 (Oct 2015): 263–294.https://doi.org/10.1086/467226 Michael S. Lewis-Beck , and Peverill Squire The Transformation of the American State: The New Era-New Deal Test, The Journal of Politics 53, no.11 (Oct 2015): 106–121.https://doi.org/10.2307/2131723Gary W. Bowman, Erwin A. Blackstone Low price conspiracy: Trade regulation and the case of Japanese electronics, Atlantic Economic Journal 18, no.44 (Dec 1990): 59–67.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02299020 Malcolm B. Coate , Richard S. Higgins , and Fred S. Mc Chesney Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, The Journal of Law and Economics 33, no.22 (Oct 2015): 463–482.https://doi.org/10.1086/467214Neil Gunningham Moving the Goalposts: Financial Market Regulation in Hong Kong and the Crash of October 1987, Law Social Inquiry 15, no.11 (Jan 1990): 1–48.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1990.tb00274.xJON M. JOYCE EFFECT OF FIRM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN PRICE FIXING, Contemporary Economic Policy 7, no.44 (Oct 1989): 19–35.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1989.tb00573.xMARK A. COHEN THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, Contemporary Economic Policy 7, no.44 (Oct 1989): 36–46.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1989.tb00574.xDONALD W. SCOTT POLICING CORPORATE COLLUSION*, Criminology 27, no.33 (Aug 1989): 559–587.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb01046.xDonald J. Boudreaux, William F. Shughart The effects of monetary instability on the extent of vertical integration, Atlantic Economic Journal 17, no.22 (Jun 1989): 1–10.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02304814Bruce Yandle Antitrust actions and the budgeting process, Public Choice 59, no.33 (Dec 1988): 263–275.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118540Joseph C. Gallo, Jos L. Craycraft, Shantanu Dutta Incarceration and fines: An empirical study of antitrust sanctions, Review of Industrial Organization 3, no.22 (Jun 1986): 38–66.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02230837Elizabeth Sanders Industrial Concentration, Sectional Competition, and Antitrust Politics in America, 1880–1980, Studies in American Political Development 1 (Dec 2008): 142–214.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X00000353 William J. Baumol , and Janusz A. Ordover Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, The Journal of Law and Economics 28, no.22 (Oct 2015): 247–265.https://doi.org/10.1086/467083 George Bittlingmayer Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, The Journal of Law and Economics 28, no.11 (Oct 2015): 77–118.https://doi.org/10.1086/467076Jameson W. Doig, Douglas E. Phillips, Tycho Manson Deterring illegal behavior by officials of complex organizations, Criminal Justice Ethics 3, no.11 (Sep 2010): 27–56.https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.1984.9991742Kenneth Robinson Public Information and "Electronic Publishing" Services, Journal of Communication 32, no.44 (Dec 1982): 103–113.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1982.tb02523.x Michael Kent Block , Frederick Carl Nold , and Joseph Gregory Sidak The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, Journal of Political Economy 89, no.33 (Oct 2015): 429–445.https://doi.org/10.1086/260979Charles C. Cox Monopoly Explanations of the Great Depression and Public Policies Toward Business, (Jan 1981): 174–207.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8135-5_9K. Tiedemann Antitrust Law and Criminal Law Policy in Western Europe, (Jan 1980): 39–56.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04175-6_3James E. Anderson Economic Regulatory Policies: A Selected Bibliography, Policy Studies Journal 7, no.44 (Jun 1979): 833–844.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1979.tb01385.xE. T. Grether Competition Policy in the United States: Looking Ahead, California Management Review 16, no.44 (Jul 1974): 60–67.https://doi.org/10.2307/41164530 Gerhard Casper , and Richard A. Posner A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, The Journal of Legal Studies 3, no.22 (Oct 2015): 339–375.https://doi.org/10.1086/467517Peter J. Curwen Monopoly Policy, (Jan 1974): 194–240.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15524-8_7 Richard A. Posner The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, The Journal of Legal Studies 1, no.22 (Sep 2015): 305–347.https://doi.org/10.1086/467487Daniel Slottje ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, (): 311–318.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1049-2585(04)12013-9
Referência(s)