Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 49; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00396330701437777

1468-2699

Dalia Dassa Kaye, Frederic Wehrey,

Islamic Studies and History

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Much has been written in the past few years about Iranian motivations for pursuing nuclear technology and the diplomacy to stop this pursuit. See Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (eds), Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); Ray Takeyh, 'Iran's Nuclear Calculations', World Policy Journal, vol. 20, no. 2, Summer 2003; Ray Takeyh, 'Iran Builds the Bomb', Survival, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004, pp. 51–64; Michael Eisenstadt, 'Living with a Nuclear Iran?', Survival, vol. 41, no. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 124–48; Geoffrey Kemp, Michael Eisenstadt, Farideh Farhi and Nasser Hadian, Iran's Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives (Washington DC: The Nixon Center, March 2004); Geoffrey Kemp, The U.S. and Iran: The Nuclear Dilemma: Next Steps (Washington DC: The Nixon Center, 2004). 2. For other works addressing Arab and regional perceptions of a nuclear Iran, see Karim Sadjapour, 'The Nuclear Players', Journal of International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 2, Spring–Summer 2007, pp. 125–34; Richard L. Russell, 'Peering Over the Horizon: Arab Threat Perception and Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran', Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center, 5 February 2005, http://www.npec-web.org/projects/Iran/Russell.pdf; Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, McNair Paper 69 (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2005); Simon Henderson, 'The Elephant in the Gulf: The Arab States and Iran's Nuclear Program', Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 1065, 21 December 2005, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2424; Emile el-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge (Washington DC: The Stimson Center, May 2006), available at http://www.stimson.org. 3. In the Western press, Princeton historian Bernard Lewis has called attention to the apocalyptic thinking of the Iranian regime. Bernard Lewis, 'August 22: Does Iran Have Something In Store?', The Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2006. For a Shia text that argues that Iran's nuclear weapon is to be used by the Mahdi during his apocalyptic confrontation with the Antichrist, see 'Abd Muhammad Hassan, Iqtirab al-Thuhur (The Coming of the Appearance) (Beirut: Dar al-Mahaja al-Baida, 2006), pp. 102–105. Some analysts, however, have noted that Ahmadinejad's use of apocalyptic rhetoric and references to the return of the Mahdi are calculated political theatre – part of his manoeuvring to undermine factions of the Shia clerical establishment in Iran to further consolidate his own power base and remove potential challengers to his authority. Ironically, the Authors' conversations with retired Iranian diplomats and think-tank scholars in Oman in June 2006 revealed that Ahmadinejad is actually ridiculed by many of his allies in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps because of his apocalyptic rhetoric and his efforts to build a shrine to the Mahdi's return. 4. Aluf Benn, 'In Meeting with Olmert, Bush Calls for Isolating Iran', Ha'aretz, 13 November 2006. 5. 'Israel's Deputy DefMin Interviewed on Iran, Palestinians, Regional Issues', Jerusalem Post, 10 November 2006. 6. Authors' interview with senior Israeli official, Tel Aviv, 4 December 2005. 7. See, for example, Ephraim Sneh's remarks at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Weinberg Founders Conference 2006 (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org). Sneh is a former deputy defence minister and current head of the Labor Party in the Knesset. 8. Several Israeli security analysts expressed these views to one of the authors during a roundtable discussion at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, 4 December 2005. For a discussion countering the suggestion that Iran is not deterrable (while acknowledging that regime factionalism can make a stable deterrent relationship difficult), see Eisenstadt, 'Living with a Nuclear Iran?', esp. pp. 134–7. 9. See Ephraim Kam, A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done, Memorandum 88 (Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies, February 2007). 10. Authors' interview with Omani diplomat, Muscat, 6 February 2006. 11. Authors' interview with Omani analyst, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Muscat, 5 February 2006. 12. Authors' interview with Kuwaiti diplomat, Kuwait City, 12 February 2006. 13. 'GCC-IAEA Agree to Study Nuclear Power', United Press International, 23 February 2007. 14. Sharmila Devi, 'Jordan Considers Nuclear Programme,' Financial Times, 20 January 2007. Also see Yoav Stern, 'Jordan Announces Plans to Build Nuclear Power Plant by 2015', Haaretz, 2 April 2007. 15. One Israeli analyst paints a far more pessimistic picture in terms of the proliferation dynamic in response to a nuclear Iran, suggesting that Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Turkey and possibly Libya would follow, leading to the unravelling of the NPT and IAEA safeguards system. See Gerald Steinberg, 'Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments', Appendix C in Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, McNair Paper 69 (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2005), pp. 71–84. 16. Authors' interview with senior UAE Foreign Ministry official, Abu Dhabi, 4 February 2006. 17. Authors' interview with Kuwaiti think-tank scholar, Kuwait City, 13 February 2006. The confidential letter (dated 29 June 2005) is reprinted on the Gulf Research Center web site http://www.grc.ae in its Dossier of Official Documents and Statements (original source listed as Al Hayat, 2 January 2006), along with a strongly worded response from the State of Kuwait (original source listed as Al Hayat, 2 January 2006). 18. Authors' interview with former Egyptian ambassador, Cairo, 5 December 2005. Jamal Mubarak's recent promotion of an Egyptian nuclear-energy programme has further spurred debate in this direction, leading to a supportive media reaction suggesting a nuclear programme could reverse Egypt's declining regional role. See Egyptian Media on Nuclear Initiative, FEA20060929028222 OSC Report in Arabic, English 29 September 2006. 19. For Saudi Arabia's nuclear calculations, see Gawdat Bahgat, 'Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Saudi Arabia', The Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 421–43; Richard L. Russell, 'A Saudi Nuclear Option?', Survival, vol. 43, no. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 69–80; and Akaki Dvali, 'Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?', Center for Nonproliferation Studies Issue Brief, Monterey Institute of International Studies, March 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_40a.html. 20. Authors' interview with senior Saudi diplomat, 2 April 2006. 21. Author's interview with senior Omani diplomat, Muscat, 6 February 2006. 22. Ian Lesser, 'Turkey, Iran and Nuclear Risks', Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 2, Summer 2004; also in Sokolski and Clawson, Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, pp. 89–112. 23. Authors' interview with retired Israeli general, Washington DC, 8 December 2005. 24. Steinberg, 'Walking the Tightrope', p. 79. 25. Authors' interview with senior Omani diplomat, Muscat, 6 February 2006. 26. Authors' interview with Omani scholar and government adviser, Muscat, 6 February 2006. 27. Authors' interview with senior UAE military commander, Abu Dhabi, 9 February 2006. 28. Ibid. 29. For more on the Shia populations in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and their efforts at integration, see Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi'a in the Modern Arab World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); 'Leaders Cautious in the Face of Resurgent Shia Self Confidence,' Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 29, no. 751, 11 February 2005; International Crisis Group, The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia, Middle East Report no. 45 (Brussels: ICG, 2005); International Crisis Group, Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge, Middle East Report no. 40 (Brussels: ICG, 2005). 30. Authors' interviews with Shia clerics and activists, Manama, Bahrain, November 2006. 31. Authors' interviews in Saudi Arabia, March 2007. 32. Saudi Shi'ites constitute 10–15% of the population and suffer from economic marginalisation, lack of political representation, and religious and cultural discrimination. Toby Jones, 'Saudi Arabia's Not So New Anti-Shiism', Middle East Report, no. 242, Spring 2007, pp. 29–32. 33. The most prominent Saudi Shia cleric, Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, has been a major voice in pushing for Shia demands in the context of broader, national reforms in the kingdom. His most recent book emphasises the compatibility of Saudi Shia identity with citizenship and loyalty in the kingdom. See Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, Al-Madhab wa al-Watan (Sect and Homeland) (Beirut: Arab Foundation for Studies and Publishing, 2006). 34. Authors' interviews in Qatif, al-Ahsa, and Dammam, Saudi Arabia, March 2007. 35. Authors' interviews in Manama and Riyadh, November 2006 and March 2007. Also, Hassan M. Fattah and Rasheed Abou al-Samh, 'Saudi Shiites Fear Gains Could Be Lost', New York Times, 5 February 2007. 36. Author interview with Jordanian analyst, Amman, Jordan, 15 January 2007. 37. Author interview with intelligence officer, Amman, Jordan, 15 January 2007. 38. Author interview, Amman, Jordan, 17 January 2007. 39. Authors' interview with retired Jordanian major-general,Amman, 30 November 2005, and with Jordanian official, Amman, 1 December 2005. 40. Authors' interview with Kuwaiti researcher, Kuwait City, 13 February 2006. 41. Authors' interview with senior Kuwaiti military officer, 12 February 2006. 42. Authors' interview with Kuwaiti military and diplomatic officials, Kuwait City, 11–13 February 2006. 43. Several analysts have argued that the Revolutionary Guard's presumed control over both an eventual nuclear-weapons arsenal and Iran's overseas terrorist network increases the risk for aggression and miscalculation. As Scott Sagan has noted, 'To have your nuclear guardians and your terrorist supporter organizations be one and the same is a recipe for disaster'. For the broader debate about the possibility of living with a nuclear Iran, see Scott Sagan, Kenneth Waltz and Richard K. Betts, 'A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?', Journal of International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 2, Spring–Summer 2007, p. 141; Barry Posen, 'A Nuclear-Armed Iran A Difficult But Not Impossible Policy Problem', The Century Foundation, 6 December 2006, available at http://www.tcf.org; Barry Posen, 'We Can Live With a Nuclear Iran', Audit of Conventional Wisdom Series, MIT Center for International Studies, March 2006, http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_03_06_Posen.pdf. 44. Authors' interviews with senior Israeli official and senior analyst, Tel Aviv, 4 December 2005. Senior Israeli analysts at the Jaffee Center also expressed such concerns during a meeting with the author, Tel Aviv, 4 December 2005. 45. Authors' interview with senior Israeli official, Tel Aviv, 4 December 2005. 46. Authors' meeting with Israeli security analysts, Tel Aviv, 4 December 2005. 47. Hassan M. Fattah, 'Saudi King Condemns US Occupation of Iraq', New York Times, 28 March 2007; the foreign minister's 20 September 2005 speech is available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8908/fight_against_extremism_and_the_search_for_peace_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html. 48. See the well-known op-ed by former government adviser Nawaf Obeid 'Stepping Into Iraq', The Washington Post, 29 November 2006. Saudi think-tank scholars and intelligence officers emphasised to the authors in March 2007 that the kingdom was fully capable of using Iraqi tribes as proxies against Iran, but that they had so far desisted from providing substantial material and financial support. 49. Megan K. Stack, 'Hands-Off? Saudis Wring Theirs Over Iraq', Los Angeles Times, 24 May 2006. Recent Saudi criticism of Hizbullah's attack on Israel is an interesting indicator of the current state of Saudi–Iranian tensions. In the past, Hizbullah chief Hassan Nasrallah has received strong rhetorical support from Riyadh, but in the current climate he has been portrayed as irresponsible and a stooge of Iran. See Hassan M. Fattah, 'Blame By Some Arab Leaders for Fighters', New York Times, 17 July 2006. 50. Saudi National Security Assessment Project, Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security (Riyadh: SNAP, 2006). 51. Authors' interview with senior Kuwaiti diplomat, Kuwait City, 12 February 2006. 52. Ibid. 53. Authors' interview with UAE Foreign Ministry official, 4 February 2006. 54. Authors' interviews in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, February 2006. 55. See, for example, Jonathan Wright, 'Many Arabs Favor Nuclear Iran, Even With Weapons', Reuters, 18 April 2006. 56. Authors' meetings with Turkish analysts, Washington DC, 8 December 2005. 57. Authors' interview with a retired Jordanian major-general, Amman, 30 November 2005. 58. Authors' interview with Jordanian official, Amman, 1 December 2005. 59. Those are the countries where Israel is in the greatest contact with Iran. Authors' interview with retired Israeli general, Washington DC, 8 December 2005. 60. Authors' interview with senior retired military commander, Muscat, Oman, 6 February 2006. 61. Authors' interview with retired Kuwaiti diplomat, Kuwait City, 12 February 2006. 62. Dan Morrison, 'Persian Populist Wins Arab Embrace', Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2006. 63. An example of this tactic is found in an article in the conservative Iranian daily Jomhouri-ye Eslami, 'An Eternal Curse on the Muftis of the Saudi Court and the Pharaoh of Egypt, excerpted in Middle East Media Research Institute Special Dispatch Series no. 1216, 28 July 2006. 64. See http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/23FC4C32-29E9-486C-9EF2-B8E62A0EE5BE.htm. The authors would like to thank Nadia Oweidat for the translation of this programme. 65. Some question whether US extended deterrence to Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt is even a credible option. See Kathleen J. McInnis, 'Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East', Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 169–86. 66. See for example Ron Prossor, 'Israel's Atlantic Dimension', Jerusalem Post, 24 February 2005; 'Re-Energizing US–Israeli Special Relations', address by Dr Eran Lerman at the 5th Herzliyya Conference, 15 December 2004; 'Upgrading Relations with NATO', address by Oded Eran at the 5th Herzliyya Conference, 15 December 2004; and Ronald D. Asmus, 'Contain Iran: Admit Israel to NATO', Washington Post, 21 February 2006, p. A15. 67. We thank Roger Molander and Rich Mesic for this characterisation. 68. See, for example, Anthony Shadid, 'With Iran Ascendant, U.S. Is Seen at Fault; Arab Allies in Region Feeling Pressure', Washington Post, 30 January 2007 and Michael Slackman and Hassan M. Fattah, 'In Public View, Saudis Counter Iran in Region', New York Times, 6 February 2007, p. 1. Iranians have of course taken note of US efforts to establish an anti-Iranian coalition, and at least some official voices are suggesting an alternative, more inclusive, regional security approach. See Javad Zarif, 'How Not to Inflame Iraq', New York Times, 8 February 2007. 69. For Iranian views on multilateral security cooperation, see the recent 10-point proposal for a Persian Gulf Security Cooperation Council by the former secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, Hassan Ruhani. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, 'Iran Unveils a Persian Gulf Security Plan', Asia Times, 14 April 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ID14Ak04.html. For other Iranian views, see Kaveh Afrasiabi and Abbas Maleki, 'Iran's Foreign Policy After 11 September', Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 9, no. 2, Winter–Spring 2003, pp. 263–4; Center for Strategic Research, Foreign Policy Research Division, Expediency Council, 'Negarinaye keshvarhaye Arabi nesbat be Iran dar fazaye Jadide Mantaghei' (Arab countries' concerns about Iran in the light of the new environment in the region), 2006, http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?abtid=04&&semid=68; Mahmoud Dehghani, 'Naghsh-e Aragh-e Jadid dar tartibat-e amniyati-e mantaghe-e Khalij-e Fars' (The role of the new Iraq in the security orders in the Persian Gulf), Center for Strategic Research, Foreign Policy Research Division, Expediency Council, 2003, http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?abtid=07&&semid=306. The authors thank Sara Hajiamiri for this translation and analysis. 70. This process was called the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group, one of five multilateral groups established after the 1991 Madrid conference to address the regional dimensions of the Arab–Israeli conflict. For detailed accounts of the group see Dalia Dassa Kaye, Beyond the Handshake (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Michael Yaffe, 'An Overview of the Middle East Peace Process Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security', in Fred Tanner (ed.), Confidence-building and Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East (Malta: University of Malta, 1994); and Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Fact Sheet, 'Middle East Peace Process Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group', 21 July 2001, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/4271.htm. For a discussion considering the renewal of a similar process see Peter Jones, 'Arms Control in the Middle East: is it Time to Renew ACRS?', Disarmament Forum, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, no. 2, 2005, available at http://www.unidir.org. 71. Author meetings with government officials and security experts in Jordan, Egypt and Israel during a December 2005 trip supports this point. There is still great scepticism about the value and feasibility of regional security cooperation. 72. On this point, see 'Conference Report', Middle East Policy, vol. 11, no. 3, Fall 2004. 73. These discussions appear to be following the Iraq Study Group recommendations to add a regional dimension to solutions for stabilising Iraq. See James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 2006). Additional informationNotes on contributorsDalia Dassa KayeDalia Dassa Kaye is a Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.Frederic M. WehreyFrederic M. Wehrey is an International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation.