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Transfer pricing in a dynamic marketing-operations interface

2011; Elsevier BV; Volume: 216; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.042

1872-6860

G. M. Erickson,

Economic theories and models

A transfer price mechanism is proposed to coordinate the strategies of the marketing and operations functional areas operating in a dynamic interface environment in a decentralized firm. Marketing and operations are strategic decision-makers in a differential game, in which marketing has price and advertising and operations has production as control variables, and advertising goodwill and production backlog are state variables. A constant transfer price is entered into the objective functionals for marketing and operations, and subgame perfect feedback strategies are derived for price, advertising, and production as functions of the state variables. The feedback strategies allow a solution for the dynamic system involving goodwill and backlog, and the total payoff to the firm, the sum of the payoffs to marketing and operations, is determined as a function of the transfer price. Finally, for certain parameter conditions an interior maximum of the payoff function is achieved, and the optimal transfer price is identified.