Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Preserving Hope in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 49; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00396330701437793

1468-2699

Christopher S. Chivvis,

Health and Conflict Studies

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements The author would like to thank individuals at the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, Interaction, International Crisis Group, the European Commission, the US Department of State, the US Agency for International Development, World Bank and elsewhere for their generous help in preparing this article. Notes 1 This figure is based on the portion of EU military spending under the Security and Defence Policy, not as a measurement of bilateral spending. 2 The figure is based on a estimate of mortality rates in the DRC compared with other countries in the region, and includes far more than those killed directly by fighting. See Richard Brennan and Anna Husarka, ‘Inside Congo, An Unspeakable Toll’, Washington Post, 16 July 2006, p. B03. 3 For a recent account of the Belgian rule of the Congo see Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998). 4 On the previous UN intervention in the Congo see James Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), pp. 5–27. 5 For a depiction of Zaire under Mobutu see Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo (New York: Harper Collins, 2001). 6 United Nations Security Council, ‘Meeting Record: Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/PV.4092, 24 January 2000, p. 4. 7 United Nations, Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/650, 16 August 2004, paragraph 24. 8 United Nations, Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/211, 21 February 2003, paragraph 28. 9 For a brief history of the Congolese police see International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report no. 104 (Brussels: ICG, 2006), pp. 4–5. 10 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Report 2003 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2004), p. 132. 11 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘UN Inter-agency Mission Visits DR Congo to Look into Internal Displacement Challenges’, press release, 21 February 2003. See also UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region (Nairobi: UN OCHA, 2002). 12 xfam estimate for 2001. Oxfam, No End in Sight: The Human Tragedy of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Oxford: OXFAM, 2001), p. 3. 13 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Report 2003, p. 132. 14 On the effect of the nation's resource wars on the humanitarian situation see Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005). 15 US Department of State, ‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2002’, 31 March 2003, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18177.htm. 16 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Report 2003, p. 132. 17 UN Development Programme, Human Development Report: 2006 (New York: UNDP, 2006), p. 291. 18 World Bank, Transitional Support Strategy for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Report no. 27751 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2004), p. 5. 19 Mobutu ended his rule with hyperinflation, which reached 23,000% in 1994. During the brief peace in 1998 inflation fell to 23%, but surged again to 550% in 2001. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006. In 2000, the DRC had external debts of close to $12 billion. Gross domestic product was a meager $4.3bn. World Bank, World Development Indicators Database. 20 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2003, https://www.cia.gov/cia/download2003.htm. 21 Jason Stearns and Michela Wrong, ‘Struggle for a Functioning Congo’, Financial Times, 4 August 2006. 22 For an outline of such a model see James Dobbins et al., The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007). 23 UNSCR 1279. UN involvement was incremental. UNSCR 1279 established MONUC, and increased the number of UN personnel in the DRC from less than 100 to 500. UNSCR 1291 (2000) further increased the number to 5,537. Chapter VII of the UN Charter refers to the use of force, and peace operations mandated with reference to it are usually characterised as ‘peace enforcement’ rather than ‘peacekeeping’ missions. Peace enforcement missions may thus engage in military operations against parties who disrupt the peace. By contrast, peacekeeping missions operating under Chapter VI are normally permitted to use force only for self-protection. 24 For an account see Henri Boshoff, ‘Overview of MONUC's Military Strategy and Concept of Operations’, in M. Malan and J. Gomes Porto (eds), Challenges Of Peace Implementation : The UN Mission In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), pp. 140–41. 25 United Nations, Third Special Report, para. 62. 26 Carrol Faubert, Case Study : Democratic Republic of Congo (New York: UNDP, 2006), pp. 12, 32. 27 World Bank, Transitional Support Strategy, p. 15. 28 ‘Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, EU Bulletin, 6/2003, point 1.6.134. The concept of a ‘Framework Nation’ was introduced at the WEU Council of Ministers on 13 May 1997 and endorsed on 24 July 2002. 29 It has been noted that EU aircraft such as the Hercules C-130 and C-160 might have been used, but were not because this would have slowed down a mission in which the developing crisis made rapid deployment a high priority. See Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Practical Approach, Report of the Political Committee of the West European Union, A/1913 (Paris: WEU, 2005), para. 84, available at http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents. 30 Agence France-Presse, ‘L'opération Artémis à Bunia’, 29 August 2003. 31 Ibid. Figures differ on precise troop levels, presumably because of different reference dates. 2,000 troops were involved, of which 1,700 were French, according to the French Mission to the EU, ‘Brief Guide to European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)’, p. 32. According to James Miskel and Richard Norton, the total troop size was 1,500, of which 900 were French. James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, ‘The Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Civil Wars, vol. 6, no. 4, Winter 2003, p. 8. 32 The most complete account of the mission's operations is Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: the Shape of Things to Come’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 11, no.3, Autumn 2004, pp. 508–25. 33 EU ‘Situation dans l'est de la république démocratique du Congo’, Brussels, 27 June 2003. 34 Miskel and Norton, ‘The Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo’. 35 Alpha Sow, ‘Achievements of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force and Future Scenarios,’ in Malan and Porto, Challenges of Peace Implementation. 36 Miskel and Norton, ‘The Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo’. 37 UNSCR 1493 (2003). 38 Tanguy Berthemet, ‘RD Congo’, Le Figaro, 28 June 2003. 39 UNSCR 493 (2003). 40 United Nations, Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/167, 15 March 2005. 41 UNSCR 1565 (2004). 42 ‘Maj. Gen. Cammaert: In Order to Keep the Peace You Sometimes have to Enforce It’, press release, MONUC, 16 February 2007, http://www.monuc.org/News.aspxnewsId=13878. 43 United Nations, Seventeenth Report; United Nations, Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/506, 2 August 2005; United Nations, Twenty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2006/390, 13 June 2006; ‘FNI Militia Leader Peter Karim Surrenders to DRC Government’, press release, MONUC, 9 April 2007, http://www.monuc.org/News.aspxnewsId=14322. 44 United Nations, Nineteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/603, 26 September 2005; United Nations, Twenty-first Report; United Nations, Twenty-second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2006/759, 21 September 2006. 45 Belgium later participated along with the South Africans in the integration of the 3rd integrated battalion. International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, pp. 19–20. 46 United Nations, Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/1034, 31 December 2004. 47 On these issues see International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, esp. p. 20. 48 European Council, ‘The European Union's Engagement towards Stability and Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, 23 May 2005, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Background-23.5.05.en.pdf. 49 United Nations, Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/566, 27 May 2003, paragraph 40. 50 The unit, which comprised 30 members and had a budget of €4.3m in 2005, participated as part of the Security and Defence Policy. It was the first civil mission of EDSP. ‘L'Union européenne lance une mission de police à Kinshasa en République démocratique du Congo (RDC) (EUPOL – “KINSHASA”)’, press release, Council of the European Union, 15855/04 (Presse 349), 9 December 2004. 51 United Nations, Seventeenth Report, paragraph 44. 52 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Appeal 2007 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2006), p. 101. 53 Published information on mortality rates only goes up to mid 2004, when rates were still higher than those in other parts of the region. See Benjamin Coghlan et al., ‘Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a Nationwide Survey’, The Lancet, vol. 367, 2006, pp. 44–51. 54 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2007/68, 6 February 2007. 55 United Nations, Third Special Report, pp. 1–3. 56 Ibid., p. 3. 57 United Nations, Eighteenth Report,p. 2. 58 United Nations, Twentieth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2005/832, 28 December 2005, p. 3.; United Nations, Twenty-first Report, p. 2. 59 UNSCR 1671 (2006); Council Joint Action, 2006/319/CFSP. 60 ‘EUFOR Reaches Full Capacity in the DRC’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 August 2006. 61 ‘EU Troops Arriving Can Use Force If Need Be – Force Commander’, Africa News, 26 June 2006. 62 ‘Calm in Kinshasa as Negotiations End Two Days of Violence’, Africa News, 23 August 2006. 63 I. William Zartman, ‘Recovery in the DRC: the Wars of the Zairean Succession’, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, unpublished manuscript, p. 7. 64 When the DRC reaches its ‘completion point’ its debt will be reduced from approximately $13bn to $1.5bn over the course of the next two decades. ‘IMF and World Bank Support US$10 Billion in Debt Service Relief for the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, press release no. 03/127, IMF, 28 July 2003. 65 The EU contributed €106m. European Commission, Annual Report 2004 on the European Community's Development Policy and External Assistance (Brussels: European Commission, 2004), p. 171. 66 International Monetary Fund, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Staff-Monitored Program: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding (Washington DC: IMF, 29 June 2006). 67 Ibid., p. 12. 68 For a complete description of the projects undertaken in 2004–05, see World Bank, Transitional Support Strategy. 69 European Commission, Annual Report 2003 on the European Community's Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance in 2002, sec. 8.4, pp. 196–208, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/reports/2003_0496_en.pdf. 70 Interview with World Bank official, January 2007. 71 World Bank, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo at a Glance’, http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/zar_aag.pdf. 72 World Bank, ‘Congo, Dem. Republic, Data Profile’, at http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=ZAR. 73 See Stearns and Wrong, ‘Struggle for a Functioning Congo’. 74 Global Rights, S.O.S. Justice: Quelle justice pour les populations vulnérables à l'Est de la RDC (Washington DC: Global Rights, 2005), pp. 2–3. 75 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Democratic Republic of the Congo, CCPR/C/COD/CO/3 (New York: UN OHCHR, 26 April 2006). 76 International Crisis Group, Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in the Congo, Africa Report no. 104 (Washington DC: ICG, 2006), p. 1. 77 World Bank, Doing Business 2007: How to Reform (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/Doing_Business_2007_Country_pages.pdf. 78 World Bank, Report on the Status of Projects in Execution – FY06 SOPE Region: Africa (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006), pp. 132–44. 79 In this sense, the successful withdrawal of European forces at the end of their mandate (with only a short extension) bolstered the case for this kind of operation in the future. On this point see Bruno Neveux, ‘Vers une Union opérationnelle Artemis’, Défense Nationale, May 2004, pp. 11–24. 80 OECD statistics show over $1bn in ODA in 2004 and 2005 and a much higher figure – over $5bn – for 2003, the year in which the debt package was organised. See http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspxDatasetCode=TABLE%202A. 81 On this see Dobbins et al., The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building; Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation Building. Additional informationNotes on contributorsChristopher S. ChivvisChristopher S. Chivvis is a TAPIR Fellow with the RAND Corporation, the Institut français des relations internationales, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. This essay was drawn from a chapter in the forthcoming RAND Corporation study Europe’s Role in Nation Building, the third volume in the RAND History of Nation Building series.