Keeping Identity at a distance: Explaining France's new legal restrictions on the Islamic headscarf
2006; Routledge; Volume: 29; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01419870500465355
ISSN1466-4356
Autores Tópico(s)Historical Gender and Feminism Studies
ResumoAbstract Abstract Since 1989, France has endured repeated, contentious debates about the 'Islamic' headscarf. In February 2004, French legislators approved a new law prohibiting students from wearing conspicuous 'religious signs' in public schools. Contrary to some observers' assumptions, this measure was not caused mainly by new efforts to combat terrorism or by pro-Christian prejudice. Explaining France's decision to pass this surprising new legislation requires attention to both historical continuities of French political thinking and the changing French and international context. French republican understandings of citizenship and secularism have long made the headscarves issue peculiarly sensitive in France. However, the new law marks a clear departure from previous French policy. Explaining that rupture requires attention to more immediate social and political factors, most importantly: dissatisfaction with the previous policy; effective mobilization of public sympathy by new feminist groups; concern about rising anti-Semitism; and, somewhat paradoxically, developments in international human rights law. Keywords: FranceMuslimsveilsecularismschoolsfeminism I would like to thank the Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Mondialisation, Citoyenneté et Démocratie, directed by Jules Duchastel at the Université du Québec à Montréal, for supporting the research and writing of this article. I am grateful to the Chaire's research associates, other participants at its public lecture series, and to this journal's two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Notes 1. France's Muslim population, Europe's largest, is estimated at approximately five million. Wholly reliable figures are lacking, however, since France prohibits the collecting of census data on religion. A 1994 survey by Le Monde found that 27 per cent of Muslims in France were 'believing and practising' (Caldwell 2000 Caldwell , Christopher 2000 'The crescent and the tricolor' , The Atlantic Online , vol. 286 , no. 5 [Google Scholar]). 2. Surveys of CSA, Ifop, and BVA before the law was passed in the Assembly found anywhere between 57 per cent and 72 per cent in favour (8 December 2003, Libération). 3. In the words of Commission member Ghislaine Hudson, 'Le fait de demander que l'école soit un milieu protégé des influences religieuses et politique, parce que c'est un lieu de formation d'esprit, ne vise pas à exclure mais à s'intégrer et donc à s'émanciper.' (Quoted in 11 December 2003, Le Monde.) 4. Here my analysis closely follows that of Pierre Birnbaum. (See 13 December 2003, Libération.) All translations from French sources are my own unless otherwise noted. 5. Results reported in Elle, 15 December 2003. Also see the very diverse reactions to the proposed law on the part of Muslim women questioned in "Si c'est ça, je ne me sens plus française", 18 December 2003, Libération. 6. Important pro-secular groups opposing the law included the Ligue de l'enseignement, Ligue des droits de l'homme, Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amité entre les peuples (MRAP), and Fédération des conseils de parents d'élève (FCPE). 7. It is unfortunately impossible on the basis of this work to put any percentages to these different possibilities; for that, a more representative study with a larger sample would be required. 8. Bellil's book was released on 9 October, just five days after the murder of Sohane Benziane. On Bellil's role in NPNS, see Mouedden 2004. 9. I refer here to Bauberot's oral presentation at Acfas rather than the text of the paper. 10. Cf. Kepel (1994 Kepel, Gilles. 1994. À l'Ouest d'Allah, Paris: Seuil. [Google Scholar])'s much subtler, and earlier, account of the connection between veiled students and international Islamic currents. 11. I would like to thank one of the journal's anonymous referees for bringing the possibility of making this connection to my attention. 12. The full title of the article was 'Fighting Words — French Move Fast to Expel Foreigners Espousing Violence — Nation Targets Several Imams From a Muslim Populace Poorly Integrated in Society — Trying to Pre-Empt Terrorism'. 13. Le Monde (21 August 2004) reported the number of deportations during this period as only seven, that is, half the number of allegedly dangerous 'Islamists' deported by Interior Minister Charles Pasqua a decade ago. 14. To drift (dériver) has a more ominous connotation in French. Being at risk of drifting is like being on 'the slippery slope'. 15. Note that this analysis again attests to the current political influence of the causal claims advanced in the draft report on anti-Semitism, despite the European Commission's official disclaimers regarding those conclusions. 16. The UMP subsequently took these efforts to associate itself with the fight against anti-Semitism, and with Licra, even further, unexpectedly inviting Patrick Gaubert to head the UMP's list for the 2004 European elections in Île-de-France. Additional informationNotes on contributorsElaine R. ThomasELAINE R. THOMAS is Assistant Professor of Political Studies at Bard College
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