On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case
2010; Wiley; Volume: 80; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00324.x
ISSN1933-1592
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophical Ethics and Theory
ResumoPhilosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 80, Issue 2 p. 440-446 On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case CARL GINET, CARL GINET Cornell UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorDAVID PALMER, DAVID PALMER University of Tennessee, KnoxvilleSearch for more papers by this author CARL GINET, CARL GINET Cornell UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorDAVID PALMER, DAVID PALMER University of Tennessee, KnoxvilleSearch for more papers by this author First published: 15 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00324.xCitations: 3Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–839. Ginet, C. 1996. In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don’t find Frankfurt’s argument convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10: 403–17. Ginet, C. (2003). Reprint of Ginet 1996 with Addendum discussing Mele & Robb 1998. In M. McKenna & D Widerker [Eds.] Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate. Kane, R. (1985). Free will and values. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Mele, A. & Robb, D. 1998. Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. Philosophical Review 107: 97–112. Mele, A. & Robb, D. (2003). Bbs, magnets and seesaws: The metaphysics of Frankfurt-style cases. In M. McKenna & D Widerker [Eds.] Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate. Widerker, D. 1995. Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review 104: 247–261. Citing Literature Volume80, Issue2March 2010Pages 440-446 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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