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China's Evolving Views of the Korean–American Alliance, 1953–2012

2013; Routledge; Volume: 23; Issue: 87 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10670564.2013.843882

1469-9400

Jae Ho Chung,

Asian Industrial and Economic Development

AbstractThis article reconstructs an ideational trajectory in which China's views of the Korean–American alliance evolved during the last 60 years. The article first surveys China's general policy toward alliance and alliance-making. The article then traces the evolutionary path of Chinese views in the following four periods: (1) the Cold War era (1950s–1960s); (2) transformative years (early 1970s–mid-1990s); (3) the period of a strained alliance (late 1990s–late 2000s); and (4) an era of great reversal (late 2000s–present). Principally, the article suggests that China's view of the Korean–American alliance was intense antagonism during the Cold War era, although it was significantly watered down during the transformative years of Sino–South Korean rapprochement. With the normalization of relations between Beijing and Seoul in 1992 and a decade of progressive rule (1998–2007) in South Korea, China's view encompassed some wishful thinking about a gradually diluted alliance. The strong comeback of the conservatives in South Korean politics since 2008, however, shattered such optimism and re-awoke Beijing to some cold realities. China's view of the Korea–American alliance may grow more negative in tandem with US–China relations, irrespective of the official rhetoric of sovereignty regarding alliance and alliance-making. Notes 1. Pertinent literature has in recent years formed a genre of its own. See, for instance, Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds, Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999); David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, ed., China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Shiping Tang, Mingjiang Li and Amitav Acharya, eds, Living with China: Regional States and China through Crises and Turning Points (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Jae Ho Chung, ‘East Asia responds to the rise of China: patterns and variations’, Pacific Affairs 82(4), (2009/2010), pp. 657–675; and Herbert S. Yee, ed., China's Rise—Threat or Opportunity? (London: Routledge, 2011). 2. Unlike Australia and Japan, Korea's security dilemma among great powers has long been a chronic problem. See Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895–1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); and Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea–China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 3. See Li Qingsi, ‘US plays Korean card to perfection’, China Daily, (30 June 2010); ‘US has to pay for provoking China’, Global Times, (6 July 2010); ‘South Korea should rethink joint drill’, Global Times, (8 July 2010); and ‘Meiguo duihua zhengce bianlema?’ [‘Has America's China policy changed?’], Huangqiu zazhi [Global Magazine], (9 August 2010). 4. One important study, though not widely circulated, covers Beijing's perception of the Korean–American alliance from the Korean War years up to the early 1990s. See Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, Against Us or With Us? The Chinese Perspective of America's Alliances with Japan and Korea (Stanford, CA: Institute for International Studies, 1998). 5. For China's formal position on alliances in general, see Stuart Harris and Richard N. Cooper, ‘The US–Japan alliance’, in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds, America's Asian Alliances (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 47–48. 6. China's military alliance with the Soviet Union was ‘practically’ terminated in 1960 but, legally speaking, lasted until 1980 since the treaty was effective for 30 years and there was no formal act of abrogation before 1980. See Article 6 of the Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. 7. Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan 1956–1966—zhongsu guanxi huiyilu [The Ten-Year Debate: Recollections of the Sino–Soviet Relationship] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 1, pp. 510–533; and Yang Kuisong, ‘Changes in Mao Zedong's attitude toward the Indochina War’, CWIHP Working Papers 34, (2002), pp. 1–43. 8.Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1982] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 372; and Hu Yaobang, ‘Zhongguo duli zizhu duiwaizhengce de shizhi’ [‘The nature of China's self-reliant independent foreign policy’], Renmin ribao [People's Daily], (19 May 1984). 9. Niu Weigan, ‘Lun lengzhan yiliu de meihan tongmeng’ [‘On the US–Korea alliance inherited from the Cold War’], Junshi lishi yanjiu [Studies of Military History] 2, (2009), pp. 116–123. Also see You Ji, ‘China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience’, Journal of Contemporary China 10(28), (2001), pp. 387–398; and Christopher Twomey, ‘Explaining Chinese foreign policy toward North Korea: navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of proliferation and instability’, Journal of Contemporary China 17(56), (2008), pp. 401–423.10. See Jae Ho Chung and Myeong-hae Choi, ‘Uncomfortable allies or uncertain neighbors? Making sense of China–North Korea relations, 1949–2009’, Pacific Review 26(3), (2013), p. 252.11. For a discussion of this transition, see Qi Pengfei, Zhongguo gongchandang yu dangdai zhongguo waijiao, 1949–2009 [The Chinese Communist Party and Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2010), pp. 108–125.12. Zhang Jianhua, ed., Jiejue zhongguo zaidu mianlin de jinyao wenti [Resolving the Urgent Problems that China is Facing Again] (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 2000), pp. 508–519; Avery Goldstein, ‘The diplomatic face of China's grand strategy: a rising power's emerging choice’, The China Quarterly 168, (2001), pp. 835–864; and Lu Lu, ‘Zhongguo waijiao zhanlue zhong “huoban zhanlue” de lishi yanbian ji xianshi tantao’ [‘Historical changes and contemporary meanings of partnership strategy in China's diplomatic strategy’], Chuancheng [Inheritance] 8, (2007), pp. 24–26.13. Wang and Wu, Against Us or With Us?, p. 10; and Wang Fan, ‘Lengzhan hou meiguo yatai lianmeng zhanlue de tiaozheng’ [‘Post-Cold War readjustments of America's alliance strategy in the Asia–Pacific’], Waijiao xueyuan xuebao [Academic Bulletin of the Foreign Affairs College] 2, (2002), p. 32.14. Wang Chuanjian, ‘Cong shuangchong ezhi dao shuangchong guizhi’ [‘From double containment to double regulation’], Meiguo yanjiu [American Studies] 2, (2002), p. 36; and Hou Shifu and Shen Qingxi, ‘Ershi shiji qishi niandai de meihan tongmeng’ [‘The US–Korea alliance during the 1970s’], Hebei ligong daxue xuebao [Academic Bulletin of Hebei Polytechnic University] 3, (2006), pp. 41–43.15. Zhang Yushan, ‘Xindiyuan zhengzhi huanjing xiade hanmei tongmeng guanxi’ [‘The Korea–US alliance under the new geopolitical environments’], Yafei congheng [Surveying Asia and Africa] 5, (2006), pp. 41–42.16. Wang and Wu, Against Us or With Us?, note 78. Also see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1992), p. 45; and Aileen San-Pablo Baviera, ‘The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 57(2), (2003), p. 350.17. Wang and Wu, Against Us or With Us?, p. 35. This view of the Japan–US alliance has changed considerably since the early 2000s. See Wu Xinbo, ‘The end of the silver lining: a Chinese view of the US–Japanese alliance’, The Washington Quarterly 29(1), (2005), pp. 119–130.18. Sung-po Chu, ‘Peking's relations with South and North Korea in the 1980s’, Issues and Studies 22(11), (1986), pp. 70–71.19. Jae Ho Chung, ‘Korean strategic thought toward China: a first cut’, in Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun and Shinhwa Lee, eds, Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 153–178; and Shen Dingchang, Hanguo waijiao yu meiguo [Korea's Foreign Relations and the United States] (Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008), ch. 6.20. Wang and Wu, Against Us or With Us?, p. 34.21. The issue of the Korea–US alliance was not even on the agenda when Seoul and Beijing negotiated for diplomatic normalization in 1992. South Korea regarded it solely as a domain of sovereignty and China then viewed it as a non-imminent issue. See Chung, Between Ally and Partner, ch. 6.22. See Wang Fan, ‘Meihan tongmeng ji weilai zouxiang’ [‘The US–Korea alliance and its future prospect’], Waijiao xueyuan xuebao [Academic Bulletin of the Foreign Affairs College] 2, (2001), p. 65; and Yan Jing, Chushi hanguo [Assigned to Be the Ambassador to Korea] (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 2004), p. 17.23. Samuel S. Kim, ‘Inter-Korean relations in Northeast Asian geopolitics’, in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim and Stephen Kotkin, eds, Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 170–171.24. William Watts, Next Generation Leaders in the Republic of Korea: Opinion Survey Reports and Analysis (Washington, DC: Potomac Associates, April 2002), p. 12.25.Dong-A Ilbo, (19 April 2004).26. Chung-in Moon and Taehwan Kim, ‘South Korea's international relations: challenges to developmental realism?’, in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 271.27. A 2005 survey conducted by the Mansfield Foundation and Kyung Hyang Sinmun [Kyung Hyang Daily], pointed to a nearly unanimous agreement among the expert respondents that the US–Korea alliance was undergoing profound changes. See http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/pubs/pub_pdfs/khsm_summary.pdf (last accessed 18 December 2005).28. Li Dunqiu, ‘Lu Wuxuan—zuo junhengzhe’ [‘Roh Moo-Hyun to perform as Northeast Asia's balancer’], Shijie zhishi [World Affairs] 11, (2005), pp. 30–33.29.Dong-A Ilbo, (21 January 2006); and Chosun Ilbo, (2 and 3 February 2006).30. Lin Jing, ‘Hangguo—Hai yaobuyao hanmei xiemeng?’ [‘Does Korea still need this blood alliance with the US?’], Shijie zhishi [World Affairs] 13, (2005), p. 32. Also see Li Zhijun, ‘Chu zai shizilukou de meihan tongmeng’ [‘The US–Korea alliance at the crossroads’], Guoji wenti yanjiu [Studies of International Relations] 5, (2005), p. 49.31. Li Zhijun, ‘Chu zai shizilukou de meihan tongmeng’, p. 53.32. Cui Zhiying, ‘Hanmei tongmeng guanxi de xinbianhua ji weilai zouxiang’ [‘New changes and future prospect for the Korea–US alliance relationship’], Dangdai hangguo [Contemporary Korea] 4, (2006), p. 23.33. Li Jun, ‘Zhuhan meijun “zhanlue linghuoxing” de neihan ji yingxiang’ [‘The implications of the strategic flexibility of the American forces stationed in Korea’], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] 4, (2006), p. 52.34. Yu Yan, ‘Qianxi zhanhou meihan junshi tongmeng de yanbian’ [‘Analyzing the changes of the post-war US–Korea military alliance’], Yantai shifan xueyuan xuebao [Bulletin of Yantai Normal College] 2, (2006), p. 14; and Xia Liping, ‘Lun hanguo he bukuosan zhengce yu meihan lianmeng zhuanxing’ [‘Korea's non-proliferation policy and the transformation of the Korea–US alliance’], Dangdai yatai [Contemporary Asia–Pacific] 9, (2007), pp. 8–9.35. Yang Hongmei, ‘Meihan tongmeng tiaozheng de dongli’ [‘The locomotive for readjusting the US–Korea alliance’], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] 8, (2005), pp. 24–25, 45; Zhang Yushan, ‘Xindiyuan zhengzhi huanjing xiade hanmei tongmeng guanxi’, p. 44; Wang Weimin, ‘Chijiu de bujunheng: zhanhou meiri meihan tongmeng bijiao yanjiu’ [‘Lasting imbalance—a comparative study of the post-war US–Japan and US–Korea alliances’], Shixue jikan [Journal of Historical Research] 5, (2006), pp. 49–50; and Zhang Weiwei, ‘9–11 yilai rimei tongmeng yu meihan tongmeng de chayixing’ [‘The post-9/11 differences between the Japan–US and US–Korea alliances’], Riben xuekan [Japan Studies] 1, (2007), pp. 33, 38.36. For instance, see http://cihai.org; http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-12/19/content_664530_6.htm; and http://news.sina.com.cn/w/sd/2010-10-26/094521353546.shtml.37. Han Xiandong, ‘Zhuhan meijun yu hanmei tongmeng’ [‘The American forces in South Korea and the Korea–US alliance’], Dangdai yatai [Contemporary Asia–Pacific] 11, (2004), p. 32; Wang Weimin, ‘Meihan tongmeng zaidingyi: yizhong lianmeng lilun de shijiao’ [‘Redefining the Korea–US alliance: from an alliance theory perspective’], Dangdai yatai [Contemporary Asia–Pacific] 3, (2006), p. 14; and Guo Xiangang, ‘Hanmei tongmeng xunqiu xindingwei’ [‘The Korea–US alliance seeking for a new latitude’], Guoji wenti yanjiu [Studies of International Relations] 3, (2006), p. 30.38. See Chung, Between Ally and Partner, ch. 8.39.Dong-A Ilbo, (13 April 2005).40. Bae Ki-chan, Korea—dasi saengjon eui gilo e soda [Korea, Again, at the Crossroads for Survival] (Seoul: Wisdom House, 2005), pp. 426–428.41.Hankyoreh Sinmun, (21 April 2008).42. Nirav Patel and Lindsay Ford, ‘The future of the US–ROK alliance: global perspective’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21(4), (2009), pp. 402–403.43. Given that China established the same ‘strategic cooperative partnership’ with India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, it is not clear where South Korea shares common grounds with these three nations.44. Up to 2012, South Korea–China cooperation on the issues of North Korean contingencies and the North Korean nuclear weapons program has been more rhetorical than substantive as far as the ultimate goal of de-nuclearization is concerned.45. As the Chinese refer to it, ‘the Seoul–Beijing relationship is healthy in general terms but carries some “dark currents” under it’. See Zhan Xiaohong, Donglin mianmianguan—toushi hanguo [Faces of China's Eastern Neighbor—Looking into Korea] (Jinan: Shandong daxuechubanshe, 2010), p. 43. Some Chinese even dubbed the Sino–South Korean dynamics as ‘strategic distancing’ (zhanluede shuyuan).46. ‘China to be “impartial” on South Korean warship sinking: Premier’, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-06/02/c_13328200.htm; China Daily, (30 June 2010); and Time Magazine, (13 August 2010).47.Chosun Ilbo, (10 December 2010); JoongAng Sunday, (13 December 2010); and Kim Jiyoon and Woo Jung-yup, Yonpyongdo pogyok satae gwanlyon gingeup yoron jos bogoseo [Report on the Survey Regarding the Yonpyong Shelling Incident] (Seoul: The Asian Institute for Policy Studies, November 2010), p. 18.48. See Xia Liping, ‘Lun meihan tongmeng de xiufu yu kuozhan’ [‘On the revival and expansion of the US–Korea alliance’], Meiguo wenti yanjiu [American Studies] 1, (2008), pp. 71–81; Wang Rongrong and Liu Qiang, ‘Meihan tongmeng: Chaoyue de liubian qushi’ [‘The US–Korea alliance: beyond the changing trends’], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum on World Economy and Politics] 4, (2009), p. 58; Liu Boran, ‘Meihan lianmeng de zhuanxing ji weilai de fazhan qushi’ [‘The transformation of the US–Korea alliance and its future trends’], Neimenggu minzu daxue xuebao [Academic Bulletin of Inner Mongolian Nationality University] 3, (2009), p. 14; and Zhou Hui, ‘Chaoyue chuantong: Meihan qingli dazhao xinxing zhanlue tongmeng guanxi’ [‘Beyond the tradition: the US and Korea strive to produce a new type of alliance relationship’], Xiandai junshi [Contemporary Military Affairs] 5, (2010), pp. 16–19.49. See Wang Weimin and Li Xin, ‘Meihan tongmeng zaidingyi yu hanguo de zhanlue xuanze—jincheng yu zhenglun’ [‘The redefinition of the US–Korea alliance and Korea's strategic choices: processes and debates’], Dangdai yatai [Contemporary Asia–Pacific] 2, (2011), p. 115.50. Zhou Yingfeng, ‘Zhuhan meijun tiaozheng ji duiwo yingxiang fenxi’ [‘Analyzing the readjustment of the American forces in Korea and its implications for China’], Heilongjiang shizhi [Historical Gazette of Heilongjiang] 20, (2009), pp. 11–12; Han Xiandong, ‘Liyi chayi, zhanlue fenchi he meihan tongmeng guanxi de zaitiaozheng’ [‘Interest divergence, strategic differences, and readjustment of the US–Korea alliance relationship’], Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum] 1, (2010), pp. 28–29; Mitchell B. Reiss, ‘Drifting apart? The US–ROK alliance at risk’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21(1), (March 2009), p. 27; and Michael McDevitt, ‘The maritime relationship’, in Scott Snyder, ed., The US–South Korea Alliance: Meeting New Security Challenges (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012), p. 34.51. Niu Weigan, ‘Lun lengzhan yiliu de meihan tongmeng’, pp. 117–118; Wang and Liu, ‘Meihan tongmeng’, pp. 52, 54, 55; Dong Xiangrong, ‘Buduicheng tongmeng yu hanguo de fanmeizhuyi’ [‘The asymmetrical alliance and Korea's anti-Americanism’], Dangdai yatai [Contemporary Asia–Pacific] 6, (2009), pp. 133–146; and Mao Jikang, ‘Zhongguo de jueqi yu hanguo de dongbeiya zhanlue xuanze’ [‘The rise of China and Korea's strategic choice in Northeast Asia’], Dangdai hangguo [Contemporary Korea] 3, (2009), p. 19.52. The transfer of peacetime operational control of South Korean armed forces back to Seoul was decided in 1991 and carried out in 1994, although wartime operational control is still retained by the Combined Forces Command.53. Niu Weigan, ‘Lun lengzhan yiliu de meihan tongmeng’, p. 117; and Han Xiandong, ‘Liyi chayi, zhanlue fenchi he meihan tongmeng guanxi de zaitiaozheng’, pp. 26, 28.54.Huanqiu shibao, (29 June 2010).55. Zhou Hui, ‘Chaoyue chuantong’, p. 19; and Zhan Xiaohong, Donglin mianmianguan, pp. 44, 222. Also see ‘China lectures US on economy’, Financial Times, 4 December 2008; and Li Hongmei (editor of People's Daily), ‘Uncle Sam too senile to lead Asia’, People's Daily, (9 October 2010).56. Mao Jikang, ‘Zhongguo de jueqi yu hanguo de dongbeiya zhanlue xuanze’, pp. 17–18; Keyu Gong, ‘The Korea–US alliance from a Chinese perspective’, Asian Perspective 36(2), (2012), pp. 310–327; and Weimin Wang and Hua Xin, ‘Redefinition of the US–ROK alliance and implications for Sino–ROK relations: a Chinese perspective’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 24(3), (2012), pp. 285–302.57. Gao Di and Yang Guang, ‘Lun xiao bushi zhengfu yilai de chaohe wenti yu meihan guanxi’ [‘The North Korean nuclear problem and US–Korea relation since the Junior Bush administration’], Dongyue luncong [Journal of Eastern Mountains] 2, (2010), p. 161.58. Niu Weigan, ‘Lun lengzhan yiliu de meihan tongmeng’, pp. 119–120; and Editorial of Huanqiu shibao, (23 December 2010).59. Zhou Yingfeng, ‘Zhuhan meijun tiaozheng ji duiwo yingxiang fenxi’, p. 12; and Ren Xiao, ‘Between adapting and shaping: China's role in Asian regional cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary China 18(62), (2009), pp. 303–320.60. If China opposed America's alliances and foreign bases as a matter of principle during the 1980s and 1990s, its opposition has become more substantive and operational in the twenty-first century.61. See, for instance, Cao Shengsheng and Xia Yuqing, ‘“Quanqiu gongyu” chengwei xinshi de meiguo baquanzhuyi lilun’ [‘“The world as public arena” is becoming America's new hegemonic theory’], Taipingyang xuebao [The Pacific Journal] 9, (September 2011), pp. 24–32.62. Even though the Korea–US alliance is not likely to have China listed as its explicit target, the simultaneous consolidation of the Korea–US and Japan–US alliances since 2010 is probably alarming and threatening enough to China to reposition herself. See, for instance, Ralph A. Cossa, ‘The US–ROK alliance: future strategic role’, American Foreign Policy Interests 27, (2005), pp. 198–199; Chen Jianbo and Zhang Jingquan, ‘Chaoxian bandao xinweiji yu meiguo dongbeiya tongmengtixi xinbianhua’ [‘The new crisis on the Korean Peninsula and new changes in America's alliance system in Northeast Asia’], Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum] 4, (2011), pp. 21–26; Zhang Weiwei, ‘Meiri meihan tongmeng de tongbu qianghua ji qi yingxiang’ [‘The simultaneous consolidation of the US–Japan and US–Korea alliances and its influence’], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhe luntan [World Economic and Politics Forum] 3, (2011), pp. 4–5; and ‘Asian security needs upgrade not alliances’ (Editor's Note), Global Times, (26 July 2012).63. Some signs of change are discernible in 2013 although they do not yet amount to vital evidence for strategic adjustment—rather than tactical flexibility—on the part of China. See, for instance, Simon Shen, ‘The hidden face of comradeship: popular Chinese consensus on the DPRK and its implications for Beijing's policy’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(75), (2012), pp. 427–443; ‘China should not fear North Korean disputes’, Global Times, (6 February 2013); Hua Yiwen, ‘Bandao wenti: gei siguo shuo sijuhua’ [‘The Korean Peninsula issue: four words to the four countries concerned’], Renmin ribao [People's Daily], (10 April 2013); and Jane Perlez, ‘North Korean leader, young and defiant, strains ties with China’, New York Times, (13 April 2013).64. See Wang and Li, ‘Meihan tongmeng zaidingyi yu hanguo de zhanlue xuanze’, pp. 110, 112; and Chen Jianbo and Zhang Jingquan, ‘Chaoxian bandao xinweiji yu meiguo dongbeiya tongmengtixi xinbianhua’, pp. 24–25.65.Chosun Ilbo, (27 December 2010; 5 January 2011); and Joong-Ang Ilbo, (22 July 2011).66. A Gallup survey of 2011 on nine nations in Asia finds that 57% of South Korean respondents support US leadership while the figure for Chinese leadership in only 30% [Chosun Ilbo, (22 November 2011)]. Also see Wang Xiaoling, Zhongguoren xinmu zhongde hanguo xingxiang [The Image of Korea in the Minds of Chinese] (Beijing: Zhongguo minzu chubanshe, 2009), pp. 374, 378, 438.67. Jae Ho Chung, ‘Korean views of Korea–China relations: evolving perceptions and upcoming challenges’, Asian Perspective 36(2), (2012), pp. 225–226.68. Whether the amicable summit between Park Keun-hye and Xi Jinping in June 2013 could provide a watershed in Sino–South Korean relations remains to be seen.69. Song Xingxing, ‘Meihan tongmeng guanxi de yanbian he qianjing’ [‘Changes and prospects for the US–Korea alliance relationship’], Shijie congheng [Contemporary World] 7, (2010), p. 51.70. Wang and Li, ‘Meihan tongmeng zaidingyi yu hanguo de zhanlue xuanze’, p. 123; and Shen Dingchang, Hanguo waijiao yu meiguo, p. 56.