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Mass killing in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941–1945: a case for comparative research

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 8; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14623520600949981

1469-9494

Tomislav Dulić,

Italian Fascism and Post-war Society

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements I am indebted to a number of scholars for their valuable input during the writing of this article. I particularly wish to thank Kjell Magnusson and Roland Kostić at the Uppsala Programme for Holocaust Studies, Uppsala University, for their comments. I also wish to thank Cathie Carmichael and the anonymous peer reviewers for drawing my attention to those aspects that needed further elaboration. Notes 1 Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), p 67. 2 The Muslims became one of Yugoslavia's six constituent nations in the 1960s. During the war of the 1990s, Bošnjak became the official term for this nation. I will be using Muslim, since this denomination was used during the Second World War. 3 For more details on the theory and method, see Tomislav Dulić, Utopias of Nation: Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941–42 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 2005), pp 11ff. 4 Robert F. Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1992), pp 258ff. 5 Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage, 1993), p 43. 6 It has sometimes been difficult to ascertain whether a group posed a threat or not, even if such arguments were put forward by the perpetrators. See, for instance, the discussion on the Armenian "threat" in the Ottoman Empire in Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), pp 192ff.; Robert Melson, "Provocation or nationalism: a critical inquiry into the Armenian genocide of 1915," in R. Hovannisian, ed., The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1986), pp 71ff. 7 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Yale Agrarian Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p 5. 8 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3 Vols, Vol 3 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003; reprint, 3rd edn), p 1121. 9 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp 6f. Mann's idea is close to that of Barry Posen's "ethnic security dilemma," according to which mass killing and forced expulsions of civilians might occur as a result of insecurity and the emergence of "first strike advantages." The perhaps most important difference between his views and those of many other theories on mass violence lies in the argument that nationalism frequently is the result rather than the cause of conflict, while "ethnic cleansing" might occur even if it is not initially intended; Barry R. Posen, "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict," Survival, Vol 35, No 1, 1993, pp 27–47. 10 Consequently, I do not agree with Steven Katz's claim that genocide presupposes total intent, irrespectively of whether it is achieved; Stephen T. Katz, "The uniqueness of the Holocaust: the historical dimension," in A.S. Rosenbaum, ed., Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp 19–38, at p 34. 11 Henry Huttenbach has pointed out the need for distinguishing between achieved and aborted genocides, since without it "the exact nature of the crime is blurred and guilt to freely distributed, while the establishing of a category of actual genocides that can be studies as such becomes too inflated"; Henry Huttenbach, "Locating the Holocaust on the genocide spectrum: towards a methodology of definition and categorization," Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol 3, No 3, 1988, pp 289–303, at p 294. 12 I agree with Norman Naimark's distinction between genocides and ethnic cleansings, in which he posits that ethnic cleansings occur as a result of an aim to render a territory ethnically homogenous. However, the mass murders do not aim at substantial destruction, but are used in order to terrify the victims into leaving a certain territory; Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001). 13 Some scholars prefer to use absolute numbers. Charny, for instance, speaks of "substantial numbers" of killed individuals rather than the killing of a substantial part of a group, while Benjamin Valentino defines mass killing as the murder of at least 50,000 civilians during a period of five years. I believe both approaches are problematic since nations and ethnic groups vary immensely in size. Killing 30,000 individuals would completely destroy the Liechtensteiners, while affecting the Chinese nation to a very limited degree; cf. Israel W. Charny, "Toward a generic definition of genocide," in G. Andreopoulos, ed., The Conceptual and Historical Dimensions of Genocide (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp 64–93, at p 76; Benjamin Valentino, "Final solutions: the causes of mass killing and genocide," Security Studies, Vol 9, No 3, 2000, pp 1–59, 5f. 14 For some of the most important analyses dealing with the experiences of the Jews and escape attempts in Yugoslavia, see Ivo Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu (Zagreb: Novi liber, 2001), pp 492ff.; Dalia Ofer, Dead-End Journey: The Tragic Story of the Kladovo-Sabac Group (Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America, 1996); Milan Ristović, U potrazi za utočištem: Jugoslovenski Jevreji u bekstvu od Holokausta 1941–1945 (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1998). 15 AVII, ANDH (Archives of the Military-historical Institute, Belgrade, Archives of the Independent State of Croatia), kut. 233, reg. br. 28/7-2; NAV T-501 (National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, Record Group T-501), roll 264, fr. 216. 16 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 (henceforth: DGFP), Vol XII (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1962), doc. no 603, p 979. 17 This explains why Kosovo's northern parts, in which important bauxite mines were situated, remained a part of Serbia, while the economically less important parts of the province were ceded to a "Greater Albania" under Italian tutelage; Dragan S. Nenezić, Jugoslovenske oblasti pod Italijom (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut vojske Jugoslavije, 1999), pp 69f. 18 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije, Vol I, Borbe u Srbiji 1941. god (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut Jugoslovenske armije, 1949), doc. no 159. For more on the German counter-insurgency operations in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Jonathan E. Gumz, "Wehrmacht perceptions of mass violence in Croatia, 1941–1942," The Historical Journal, Vol 44, No 4, 2001, pp 1015–1038; Paul N. Hehn, The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II: German Counter-insurgency in Yugoslavia, 1941–1943, Vol LVII, East European Monographs (New York: East European Quarterly, 1979); Walter Manoschek, "Partisanenkrieg und Genozid: Die Wehrmacht in Serbien 1941," in W. Manoschek, ed., Die Wehrmacht im Rassenkrieg (Wien: Picus Verlag, 1996), pp 142–167. 19 Fein, Genocide, p 21. 20 Walter Manoschek, "Serbien ist judenfrei": Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42 (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1993). 21 See, for instance, Arthur Haeffner's report in which he mentioned that he could see no reason why the Serbian peasantry would be more prone to communism than the Croats were; Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije, Vol 1, Dokumenti nemačkog Rajha (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1973), doc. no 123. 22 Dragan Cvetković's figures show a sharp decline in civilian deaths for Serbs in 1943, while there was a simultaneous increase in ethnic Croatian and Partisan victims; Dragan Cvetković, "Stradali pripadnici Narodnooslobodilačke vojske Jugoslavije iz Hrvatske prema popisu Žrtve rata 1941–1945. iz 1964. godine: Analiza trenutnog stanja prema do sada izvršenoj reviziji," in H.-G. Fleck and I. Graovac, eds, Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara, Vol 6 (Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, 2002), pp 365–382, at p 372; Dragan Cvetković, "Stvarni gubici Hrvatske prema popisu Žrtve rata 1941–1945. iz 1964. godine: Analiza trenutnog stanja prema do sada izvršenoj reviziji," in H.-G. Fleck and I. Graovac, eds, Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara, Vol 5 (Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, 2002), pp 481–502, at p 487. 23 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, ser. D, Vol XIII (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1964), doc. no 250. 24 AVII, ANDH, kut. 234, reg. br. 55/1–4. Numerous Domobranstvo officers, who had no moral qualms about ordering retaliations against civilians, voiced similar disquiet and criticized the Ustaše for creating an unrest that had to be put down by the regular army at high cost in human lives; AVII, ANDH, kut. 84, reg. br. 21/3. 25 These locally mobilized paramilitaries were not part of the Ustaša Corps, and were formally disbanded on August 9, 1941. Nevertheless, they remained an informal part of the armed forces and their number periodically superseded that of the Ustaša Corps. In addition, many of the most prominent Ustaša officers had their own "Wild Ustaše" units; Damir Jug, Oružane snage NDH: sveukupni ustroj (Zagreb: Nova stvarnost & HINUS, 2004), pp 258, 260. 26 Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 1941–45, S. Vukčević, ed., Vol 1, Zločini na jugoslovenskim prostorima u I i II svetskom ratu (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1993), doc. no 84. 27 Ante Pavelić, Poglavnik govori (Zagreb: Naklada Glavnog ustaškog stana, 1941), p 44. 28 In a circular sent from the highest Ustaša authorities to the provincial administrators on July 30, it was stated that intellectuals, business owners, priests, teachers and other members of the upper social strata were not to be allowed to convert; Zločini, doc. no 169. At the time, the Ustaše had already completed the first deportation wave, which primarily affected the upper strata. 29 Hilberg, op cit, p 1065. 30 For a comparison to between the Nazi and Ustaša racial laws, see ibid, p 758. 31 Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt, Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830–1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1980), p 184. 32 Katolički tjednik, August 17, 1941, quoted in Viktor Novak, Magnum Crimen: Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj, 1986 edn (Beograd: Nova knjiga, 1946), p 604; Ante Pavelić, Die kroatische Frage, K.C. Von Loesch, ed. (Berlin: Institut für Grenz- und Auslandstudien, 1941), p 13. 33 Pavelić, op cit, p 13. 34 At the time, Bosnia and Herzegovina was inhabited by some 43.6% Serbs, 31% Muslims and 22.3% Croats; Žerjavić, op cit, p 135. 35 Hrvatski narod, July 31, 1941. 36 Hrvatski narod, July 7, 1941. 37 Hrvatska Krajina, no 18, May 28, 1941, transcribed in AJ 110-276 (Archives of Yugoslavia, State Commission for the Establishment of the War Crimes Perpetrated by the Occupants and their Collaborators within the Country), fol. 242, dos br. 1466. 38 AS, G-2 (Archives of Serbia, Belgrade, The Commissariat for Refugees and Resettlers in the Nedić Government), f. 4 (Banja Luka), statement by D. Mačkić, p 8. 39 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p 92. 40 Hrvatski narod, July 7, 1941. 41 Hrvatska Krajina, no 19, May 30, 1941, transcribed in AJ 110-276, fol. 241, dos br. 1466. 42 Ibid. 43 The role of the Ponova and some of the other institutions has been analysed; see Nada Kisić-Kolanović, "Podržavljenje imovine Židova u NDH," Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Vol 30, No 3, 1998, pp 429–453; Goldstein, Holokaust, pp 153ff., 173ff. 44 Antun Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, 3 Vols, Vol 2 (Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1986), p 1071. 45 NAV T-501, roll. 265, fr. 1387. 46 NAV T-501, roll 250, fr. 117. 47 See Vladimir Dedijer, Vatikan i Jasenovac (Beograd: Rad, 1987), pics no 23–27. 48 Fein, op cit, p 18. 49 Edmund Glaises von Horstenau, Ein General im Zwielicht: Die Erinnerungen Edmund Glaises von Horstenau, P. Broucek, ed., Vol 3 (Wien, Köln and Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1988), p 148. 50 Many Muslims reacted negatively against the persecutions, since many Roma had assimilated with the Muslim population. In August, a governmental commission in Sarajevo suggested that only the migrant or čergaši Roma be persecuted on racial grounds; HR HDA 223 (Croatian State Archives, Ministry of the Interior of the Independent State of Croatia), kut. 25, br. 21868; HR HDA 223, kut. 104, II-A br. 32661. See also Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, "Prilog proučavanju terora u tzv. NDH: Sudbina Roma 1941–1945," Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Vol 18, No 1, 1986, pp 29–42, at p 33; Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, Genocid nad Romima, S. Goldstein, ed., Biblioteka Kameni cvijet (Zagreb and Jasenovac: Javna ustanova spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2003), p 37. 51 Lengel-Krizman, "Prilog," p 33. 52 Lengel-Krizman, Genocid, p 44. The first known order to "assemble all Roma on the territory of all municipalities" for the transport to Jasenovac concentration camp was issued on May 19, 1942; Miletić, Jasenovac, Vol 1, doc. no 101. 53 Goldstein, Holokaust, p 97, n 416; Jere Jareb, ed., Eugen Dido Kvaternik: sječanja i zapažanja, 1925–1945. Prilozi za hrvatsku povijest (Zagreb: Nakladničko društvo Starčević, 1995), p 249. NAV T-501, roll 265, fr. 226. It is difficult to say whether Kvaternik actually meant what he said, since the statement was uttered in a fit of rage. 54 Milan Bulajić quotes the official Hrvatski narod for July 30; Milan Bulajić, Ustaški zločini genocida i suđenje Andriji Artukoviću 1986. godine, Vol 1 (Beograd: Izdavačka radna organizacija "Rad," 1988), p 210. I have not been able to find that statement in either Hrvatski narod or Narodne novine on that date or in any of the other issues for June, July and August. There is one reference to such a statement in a report by a private Yugoslav citizen to the Yugoslav government-in-exile. In this case, however, it is attributed to Interior Minister Andrija Artuković; AJ 103-27-171-180 (Archives of Yugoslavia, Government-in-exile in London), B. Šain-Miletić, Izveštaj o stanju u Jugoslaviji, p 3. 55 See Mann, op cit, p 296. 56 NAV T-501, roll 264, fr. 968. 57 NAV T-501, roll 268, fr. 82. 58 This was what Glaise von Horstenau believed; see ibid. 59 Zdravko Dizdar, Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941–1945 (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2002), p 23ff; Nusret Šehić, Četništvo u Bosni i Hercegovini (1918–1941) (Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 1971), pp 55f. 60 Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941–1945: The Chetniks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp 122f. 61 The conflict between the Partisans and Četniks resulted in clashes near the Serbian town of Užice in November 1941. The issue of who attacked whom has been widely discussed; see Lucien Karchmar, Draža Mihajlović and the Rise of the Četnik Movement, 1941–1942, 2 Vols (New York and London: Garland, 1987), p 245. 62 On November 11, 1941, Mihajlović had his first meeting with representatives of the Wehrmacht in the Serbian village of Divci. During this meeting, he asked for arms and ammunition to fight the Communists; cf. Tomasevich, The Chetniks, op cit, p 149; Milan Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941–1943 and the British Response (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1988), pp 188f.; Milan Lazić, Ravnogorski pokret: 1941–1945 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1997), p 53; Jovan Marjanović, ed., The Collaboration of D. Mihailović's Chetniks with the Enemy Forces of Occupation (Beograd: Arhivski pregled, 1976), doc. no 5; NAV T-314, roll 1457, frs. 1086–87, 1314–1321, 1335. 63 AVII Ča (Archives of the Military-historical Institute, Belgrade, Četnik Archives), k. 144, reg. br. 4/1–4. 64 As John Allcock points out, however, Garašanin's text did not become publicly known until the interwar period. Moreover, the document did not envisage any "cleansings," and it was stated that Muslims should be allowed to observe their religious traditions; see John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia (London: Hurst, 2000), pp 343ff. 65 AVII, Ča, kut. 12, reg. br. 32/2. On December 20, Mihajlović probably sent a similar letter to Đorđe Lašić, commander of the Montenegrin Četnik units. It has been questioned whether that document was actually written by Mihajlović. Even if it was not, however, there can be no question that it originated with the top leadership of the JVUO and Mihajlović was certainly privy to its content. 66 Ibid. 67 Dokumenti o izdajstvu Draže Mihajlovića (Beograd: Državna komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, 1945), doc. no 6, pp 24f. 68 AVII Ča, kut. 170, reg. br. 4/1–4; AVII Ča, kut. 231, reg. br. 1/5. Although antisemitism was not at the core of Četnik propaganda, one can find occasional negative remarks about Jews; AJ 110-735, fol. 275 (Arhiv Jugoslavije, fond 110: Državna komisija za utvrđivanje ratnih zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača i zemlji). 69 Zdravko Dizdar quotes Mihajlović's document from December 20, 1941 (see above, note 59), claiming that the Četnik leader had said that the Catholic peasantry should be converted to Orthodoxy, while the Muslims should be deported. He seems to have erred, however, since there is no such sentence in the original. Dizdar used a letter by a Četnik captain quoting Mihajlović and then himself advocating conversion. This error aside, Dizdar acknowledges that there were no directives to convert Muslims, although "conversions" and "marriages" to Muslim women were conducted in the vicinity of Foča in 1943. These aberrations, however, are something entirely different from a systematic policy introduced by the Četnik leadership, and there is nothing to suggest involvement by the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church; cf. Dizdar, Četnički zločini, p 298; Zdravko Dizdar and Mihail Sobolevski, eds, Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 1999), p 498; AVII, Ča, kut. 1, reg. br. 10/1. 70 Enver Redžić points out that the local Serbs in Herzegovina associated their tormentors not with Croats but with those Muslims who joined the Ustaša ranks and participated in the massacres. Since there few Croats in some of the most affected areas, the waves of massacres developed into something of a Serbian–Muslim affair locally; Enver Redžić, Muslimansko autonomaštvo i 13. SS divizija: autonomija Bosne i Herzegovine i Hitlerov Treći Rajh (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1987), p 18f.; Enver Redžić, Bosna i Herzegovina u drugom svjetskom ratu (Sarajevo: OKO, 1998), p 126. 71 AVII, Ča, kut. 12, reg. br. 31/2. 72 Dizdar, op cit, p 182ff. 73 Katolički tjednik, August 17, 1941, quoted in Novak, op cit, p 604. 74 In this context, one has to distinguish between prisons and various buildings, which were occasionally used by the Četniks as jails for communists and others, and what we usually refer to as "concentration camps." 75 Rudolph J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publishers, 1994), p 31. 76 Huttenbach, "Locating the Holocaust," p 296. 77 NAV T-501, roll 265, frs. 337f. 78 DGFP, doc. no 360. 79 Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Ustaše i NDH (Zagreb: SN Liber Školska knjiga, 1977), pp 176ff. The Ustaše accepted those who insisted on retaining their Serbian national denomination, but only gave citizenship rights to those who chose to define themselves as Croats. The rest, it was believed, would have to care for their own religious affairs without priests, until they gradually assimilated. 80 For more on the collaboration with the Italians, see Rade Petrović, "Počeci saradnje Jevđevića i Birčanina sa talijanskim okupatorom 1941. godine," Prilozi, Vol XVIII, 1982, pp 203–236. 81 Horstenau, op cit, p 169. 82 Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p 440. 83 Ivo Goldstein, "The basic characteristics of Croatian antifascism," in T. Dulić et al., eds, Balkan Currents: Essays in Honour of Kjell Magnusson, Vol 49, Uppsala Multiethnic Papers (Uppsala: Centre for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University, 2005), pp 17–31, at p 23. 84 Redžić, 1998, op cit, p 313. 85 Ibid, p 311. 86 Redžić, 1987, op cit, pp 17, 81ff. 87 The party did, however, view the Muslims as distinct from Serbs and Croats; Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p 132. 88 Lazić, op cit, p 204f. 89 AVII, Ča, kut. 170, reg. br. 10/3. 90 Lazić, op cit, pp 41f. 91 In order to assess the validity of the hypothesis that an addition of data would only have marginal effects on the dispersion of victims across categories, comparisons were also made between the extrapolations and the data in Žerjavić's tables. The results showed a surprisingly strong correlation between the two datasets. Žerjavić's calculations, for instance, yielded 37,000 Muslim, 62,000 Croatian and 217,000 Serbian civilian "victims of fascism," while the extrapolated data reached a death toll of 39,700, 63,500 and 230,000, respectively. A similar correlation was identified in the case of the Partisans, and the differences have to be accepted as being within a reasonable margin of error; cf. Vladimir Žerjavić, Population Losses in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Zagreb: Dom i svijet Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1997), pp 91, 95. For the data on which the calculations have been made, see Žrtve rata 1941–1945 (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1965), pp 16ff. 92 A similar calculation was done previously, although by then I refrained from first subtracting the victims of communism and instead only made the calculations on the basis of the available data from the 1964 survey; see Dulić, Utopias of Nation, pp 313f. 93 Bogoljub Kočović, Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Veritas Foundation Press, 1985), pp 62ff.; Žerjavić, op cit, p 150f. The figures include only present-day Croatia and Bosnia. Although Žerjavić's calculations may be somewhat low, I use them since they correlate well with the survey figures. The database contains 597,000 killed prisoners. Some 41–44% should be added to cover those that the commission calculated that had not been included. 94 Žerjavić, op cit, p 91. It is particularly problematic to calculate the magnitude of destruction of the Roma group. Suffering from social stigma, many of them probably defined themselves as Serbs or Muslims during and after the Second World War, which makes demographic calculations exceedingly difficult. Still, most available estimations indicate that a clear majority of those defined as migrant Roma by the NDH authorities were killed during the war. 95 The Ustaše killed 49%, the Germans 35% and the Italians 13% of those registered Croats for which the perpetrators are known. Cvetković's figure for victims of Četnik killings constituted a surprisingly low 1.7%, or 239 individuals; Cvetković, op cit, p 492. According to Igor Graovac's dissertation, in which the author has used a variety of sources to register all victims, the Četniks killed 2,905 Croatian citizens, out of which 65% were Croats and 33% Serbs. This means that the Serbs, who constituted 15% of the population in Croatia proper, were considerably overrepresented as victims also of Četnik terror. This is probably explained by the fact that the Serbs were overrepresented also as members of the NOP in Croatia; Igor Graovac, "Posljedice državotvorne ideje i nacionalno-integralističke ideologije četničkog pokreta na primjeru stradalih Hrvata i Srba od četnika tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata u Hrvatskoj," in H.-G. Fleck and I. Graovac, eds, Dijalog povjesničara, Vol 1 (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann-Stiftung, 2000), pp 207–224, at p 218. These figures are considerably lower than the calculations made by Žerjavić, who estimated some 20,000 victims of the Četniks, and resulted in a considerable scholarly debate. 96 According to Jaša Romano, 421 Jews died as members of the NOP, which means that the figure in the table is lower than the actual Jewish death toll; Jaša Romano, Jevreji Jugoslavije: žrtve genocida i učesnici narodnooslobodilačkog rata (Beograd: Savez jevrejskih opština Jugoslavije, 1980), p 303. 97 For more on "middleman minorities," see Walter P. Zenner, "Middleman minorities and genocide," in I Walliman and M.N. Dobkowski, eds, Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp 7–51. 98 The fact that the communists committed numerous atrocities during the revolutionary takeover at the end of the Second World War should of course be taken into account in an overall appraisal of their role during the war. Their killings were politically motivated and have therefore not been included in this particular analysis. For more on this issue and the estimation of the death tolls during the immediate postwar period, see Tomislav Dulić, "Tito's slaughterhouse: a critical analysis of Rummel's work on democide," Journal of Peace Research, Vol 41, No 1, 2004, pp 85–102. Also, see the debate between the author and Rummel on pp 103–105.