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EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER COLLECTIVE-RISK DILEMMAS

2011; World Scientific; Volume: 22; Issue: supp01 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1142/s0218202511400045

1793-6314

Francisco C. Santos, Vítor V. Vasconcelos, Marta D. Santos, Pedro Neves, Jorge M. Pacheco,

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Preventing global warming requires overall cooperation. Contributions will depend on the risk of future losses, which plays a key role in decision-making. Here, we discuss an evolutionary game theoretical model in which decisions within small groups under high risk and stringent requirements toward success significantly raise the chances of coordinating to save the planet's climate, thus escaping the tragedy of the commons. We discuss both deterministic dynamics in infinite populations, and stochastic dynamics in finite populations.