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I—Christopher Peacocke: Descartes Defended

2012; Oxford University Press; Volume: 86; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00210.x

1467-8349

Christopher Peacocke,

Classical Philosophy and Thought

Drawing upon a conception of the metaphysics of conscious states and of first-person content, we can argue that Descartes's transition ‘Cogito ergo sum’ is both sound and one he is entitled to make. We can nevertheless formulate a version of Lichtenberg's objection that can still be raised after Bernard Williams's discussion. I argue that this form of Lichtenberg's revenge can also be undermined. In doing so it helps to compare the metaphysics of subjects, worlds and times. The arguments also apply to Descartes's ‘second Cogito’, that it is one and the same subject that thinks, wills, imagines.