The Federal Politics of Importing Spent Nuclear Fuel: Inter‐branch Bargaining and Oversight in the New Russia
2004; Routledge; Volume: 56; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/0966813042000220449
ISSN1465-3427
Autores Tópico(s)Political Conflict and Governance
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes The author thanks Christina Chuen and Nikolai Sokov for their insight and Nadia Marinova for her research assistance. This legislation provided for the import, temporary storage, reprocessing and repatriation of foreign origin material withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation. See especially Charles Ziegler & Henry B. Lyon, ‘The Politics of Nuclear Waste in Russia’, Problems of Post‐Communism, 49, 4, July/August 2002, pp. 33–42. Lisa L. Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 3–19. For a critique of the Russian programme for importing spent nuclear fuel see especially commentary on the Bellona website, www.bellona.no. Under Putin's reform new members of the Federation Council are appointed by both regional executive and legislature leaders. In addition, the governors are deprived of limited immunity from criminal prosecution and the material perks that they once enjoyed as federal officials. For discussion see especially Matthew Hyde, ‘Putin’s Federal Reforms and their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia', Europe‐Asia Studies, 53, 5, 2001, pp. 727–731; and Steven Solnick, ‘Putin and the Provinces’, in Erin Powers (ed.), Harvard University Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series (PONARS), Memo no. 115, 2000. The term ‘soft subversion’ comes from Hyde, ‘Putin’s Federal Reforms and their Implications for Presidential Power', p. 737; see also Moskovskii komsomolets, 21 January 2003. Because delegates to the new Federation Council are subject to recall by their regional patrons, they confront strong political incentives to uphold regional interests in reviewing federal legislation. As professional delegates, members of the new Federation Council provide regional leaders with full‐time representation in Moscow, something they lacked in the previous Council. Thus, depriving the governors of seats in the Council neither ensured a harmonious legislative process nor stripped regional leaders of powers to bloc proposals sponsored by federal executive offices; see Robert Orrtung & Peter Reddaway, ‘Russian State‐Building: The Regional Dimension’, in Russia Initiative: Reports of the Four Task Forces (New York, Carnegie Corporation of New York, May 2000), p. 100, www.ceip.org. In contrast, others argue that the very remoteness of the new membership weakens regional representation in the new upper chamber. Because most of the new appointees are neither from the regions they represent nor travel regularly to them, and tend to be Moscow insiders foisted upon regional leaders by the ‘strong recommendation’ of the Kremlin, the new members are conspicuously divorced from the regions; see Novaya gazeta, 5 November 2001. Thomas E. Graham, Russia's Decline and Uncertain Recovery (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 45–58; and Eugene Huskey, ‘Political Leadership and the Center‐Periphery Struggle: Putin’s Administrative Reforms', in Archie Brown & Lilya Shevtsova (eds), Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia's Transition (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), pp. 126–134. See especially Gordon M. Hahn, ‘Putin’s Federal Revolution: The Administrative and Judicial Reform of Russian Federalism', East European Constitutional Review, 10, 1, Winter 2001. Ortung & Reddaway, ‘Russian State‐Building: The Regional Dimension’, p. 101. Martin, Democratic Commitments, p. 8. For an overview see especially Gary Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 102–158; Terry M. Moe, ‘The New Economics of Organization’, American Journal of Political Science, 28, 4, November 1984, pp. 738–777; and John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, ‘Principals and Agents: An Overview’, in John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, Harvard Business School, 2001), pp. 1–35. Katherine Stoner‐Weiss, ‘Soviet Solutions to Post‐Soviet Problems: Has Vladimir Putin Really Strengthened the Federal Center’, PONARS, Policy Memo Series no. 283, October 2002. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms’, American Journal of Political Science, 28, 1, February 1984, pp. 165–179; and Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, ‘Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3, 2, Fall 1987, pp. 243–277. Alexander Sokolowski, ‘Bankrupt Government: Intra‐Executive Relations and the Politics of Budgetary Irresponsibility in El’tsin's Russia', Europe‐Asia studies, 53, 4, 2001, pp. 541–572. For a review of the nuclear industry's hierarchical structure see especially Thomas B. Cochran, Robert Norris & Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 31–69; and Igor Khripunov, ‘Minatom and its Mechanisms for Controlling Russia’s Nuclear Facilities', unpublished paper prepared for the workshop on ‘Russian Nuclear Regionalism and Challenges to US. Nonproliferation Assistance Programs’, Washington, DC, 5 April 2002. Joel M. Ostrow, ‘Conflict Mangement in Russia’s Federal Institutions', Post‐Soviet Affairs, 18, 1, 2001, pp. 50–58; and Thomas F. Remington, ‘Putin and the Duma’, Post‐Soviet Affairs, 17, 4, 2001, pp. 287, 293–306. Sokolowski, ‘Bankrupt Government: Intra‐Executive Relations and the Politics of Budgetary Irresponsibility in El’tsin's Russia', pp. 542–544. Martin, Democratic Commitments, p. 13. Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 168. This pressure is institutionally compelling, not dependent on the personality of the chief executive. Note distinction with Ostrow, ‘Conflict Management in Russia’s Federal Institutions', pp. 59–65. Martin, Democratic Commitments, p. 43, and Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York, Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 3–63. Because of the gap in time between when a legislative bargain is struck and when it is implemented, inter‐branch compromises lack credibility in the absence of ex post legislative oversight. Ibid; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, ‘Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control’; and D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 22–38. Sokolowski, ‘Bankrupt Government: Intra‐Executive Relations and the Politics of Budgetary Irresponsibility in El’tsin's Russia', pp. 543–545. McCubbins & Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms’, p. 166; and Kiewiet & McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation, p. 32. Graham, Russia's Decline and Uncertain Recovery, pp. 45–58; Peter Reddaway, ‘Is Putin’s Power More Formal Than Real', Post‐Soviet Affairs, 18, 1, 2002, pp. 31–40; Ostrow, ‘Conflict Management in Russia’s Federal Institutions', pp. 60–63; and Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia, pp. 43–97. Sokolowski, ‘Bankrupt Government: Intra‐Executive Relations and the Politics of Budgetary Irresponsibility in El’tsin's Russia', pp. 543–545. McCubbins & Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms’, p. 166; and Kiewiet & McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation, p. 32. Ibid., pp. 34–37. Ibid. Minatom placed growing emphasis on internal restructuring, as well as on developing plutonium‐burning fast breeder reactors. The plan was also projected to reduce the amount of oil production diverted from lucrative foreign exports and to compensate for domestic shortfalls in energy production resulting from the predatory practices of the national electrical grid monopoly; see Igor Khripunov, ‘MINATOM: Time for Crucial Decisions’, Problems of Post‐Communism, 48, 4, July/August 2001, p. 52; and Izvestiya, 17 November 2000. The Iranian deal also envisioned fresh fuel sales, feasibility studies for three more reactors, development of a uranium mine and construction of a uranium enrichment facility and an isotope enrichment facility. Minatom was also intent on modernising and supplying Soviet‐designed VVER‐440 reactors built in Eastern Europe and fleshing out the signed agreement with Syria to cooperate in the ‘peaceful use’ of nuclear energy; see Khripunov, ‘MINATOM: Time for Crucial Decisions’, pp. 53–54. For example, the nuclear industries of Taiwan, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, South Korea and Japan expressed initial interest in proposals for shipping spent nuclear fuel to Russia; see Cristina Chuen, ‘Russia: Spent Fuel Import Project Overview’, Nuclear Threat Initiative Country Profile (February 2003), www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/reactor/waste/snf.htm. Kiril Kurganov, ‘In the Center of Attention on 22 December: Minister of Atomic Energy’, Radio Mayak, 22 December 2000, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), CEP20010102000111, 22 December 2000. Additional sums were expected to flow from the subsequent reprocessing and re‐export for use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Ibid., p. 52 Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, Technical–Economic Basis for the Law of the Russian Federation ‘On the proposed amendment to article 50 of the Law of the RSFSR on environmental protection’, 1999, www.bellona.no. Ibid. Mikhail Kozyrev, ‘The Nuclear Temptation’, Vedomosti, 21 November 2000, p. 2, translated in FBIS‐SOV CEP 20001121000385, 21 November 2000. The supply of Russian origin spent nuclear fuel was expected to expand to 35,000 tons by 2025. Izvestiya, 24 September 1999. Ziegler & Lyon, ‘The Politics of Nuclear Waste in Russia’, p. 35; and ‘Commentary by Alexey Yablokov’, Bellona, 12 December 2000, www.bellona.no. ‘The transfer of spent nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation for immediate storage’, Position Paper, Bellona, August 1999, http://www.bellona.no; and Tobias Muenchmeyer & Shaun Burnie, Russia Importing Nuclear Waste for Final Disposal and Reprocessing: A Greenpeace Critique of Minatom Nuclear Law Change and Nuclear Proliferation Trust Proposal, 9 March 2000, www.bellona.no. Strana.ru, 8 June 2001. Regions with nuclear reactors include Saratov, Sverdlovsk, Chukotka, Tver, Murmansk, Kursk, Leningrad, Voronezh (under construction), Smolensk, Rostov (under construction), Kostroma (under construction) and Bashkortostan (under construction). Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 June 2001. Transit regions pose a special problem in this regard, as they wield de facto and de jure authority to create supervisory bodies to oversee the transport of fissile material across their territory, granting them practical control over Minatom's ability to carry out import deals. Prospective transit regions include Belgorod, Irkutsk, Krasnodar, Nenetsk, Tatarstan, Rostov, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Tula and Vologodansk. Novaya gazeta, 25 June 2001. The governor of Novgorod also stated publicly on numerous occasions that he categorically opposed Minatom's initial proposal and that he would not vote for the original bill if considered by the Federation Council; see Interfax, 21 April 2001. Newsletter of the Agency of Information Cooperation, February 2001, published by Ecological Union (an Anti‐nuclear Group from the Urals). Interfax, 6 June 2001. Ann MacLachlan, ‘Minatom Proposal to Allow Import of Foreign Spent Fuel Moves to Duma’, Nuclear Fuel, 25, 21, 16 October 2000, www.mhenergy.com. As lamented by one of the organisers of the petition and former presidential advisor, Alexei Yablokov: ‘If we had collected 5 million signatures, they would just have thrown out that many more’; see Masha Gessen, ‘The Nuclear Wasteland: Russia’s Plan to Import Spent Nuclear Fuel Risks Making a Bad Decision Worse', US News and World Report, 26 February 2001. A similar episode occurred in Krasnoyarsk krai, as the local election commission nullified the petition for a regional referendum by rejecting 40,000 signatures and demanding ‘more information’ from the signatories. See Ziegler & Lyon, ‘The Politics of Nuclear Waste in Russia’, p. 36. Cited in Chuen, ‘Russia: Spent Fuel Import Project Overview’, p. 4. Interfax, 15 June 2001. The conspicuous silence and subsequent support for the legislation by regional representatives in both the Duma and Federation Council were noted in local papers throughout Russia at the time; see especially Vechernii Novosibirsk, 8 June 2001. A detailed breakdown of factional voting and stenographic minutes of the Duma plenary deliberations on each amendment can be located at www.ldpr.ru/State_dumainside/2001_06–25/golos. ‘Nuclear waste import postponed’, Bellona, 22 February 2000, www.bellona.no. According to the chairman of Ekozashchita!, among the regional legislatures that opposed the government's amendments were Sakhalin, Volgograd, Sverdlovsk, Saratov and Karelia; see Vlada Melkova, ‘Money Over (Nuclear) Matter’, The Russia Journal, 27 January 2001. On the most divisive issue, the amendment to Article 50, 23.5% of the Communist Party members cast a negative vote in the second reading (versus 2.3% in the first), as did 23.9% of the OVR members (versus none in the first round); see stenographic record at www.Idpr.ru/State_dumainside/2001_06–25/golos. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 April 2000. Stenographic record at www.ldpr.ru/State_dumainside/2001_06–25/golos; see also the breakdown of factional and individual voting of Duma members located at www.yabloko.ru/Press/Votes/2001/0606nucl.htm. Stenographic record at www.ldpr.ru/State_dumainside/2001_06–25/golos. Many senior members of the Yabloko faction, although willing to toe the formal factional line, were not pleased with the extreme position taken by the leadership against the legislation. Instead, they did not reject the government's programme out of hand and worked hard to broker a compromise that would impose serious and ‘constructive’ oversight of Minatom's financial and programmatic obligations (interview by author with a senior member of the Yabloko faction in the Duma, Moscow, Russia, 18 November 2002). Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 June 2001. Critics of Minatom's proposal in the Federal Council fought an up‐hill battle from the beginning, as the majority of the council were members of the pro‐government bloc, Federatsiya, and the governor‐led Union of Nuclear Territories and Enterprises mobilised public outreach meetings across the country in support of the legislation. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 February 2001; Izvestiya, 16 May 2001; and Interfax, 7 June 2001. Moskovskii komsomolets, 13 June 2001. The movement opened 46 offices across Russia. Minatom's sophistication at addressing the ‘greens’ on their own terms was noted by international environmentalists; see Vladislav Nikiforov, ‘Minatom Launches NGO to Fight Envirogroups’, Bellona (no date), www.bellona.no. See for example deals cited in Strana.ru, 7 June 2001; Ann MacLachlan, ‘Russian Government Calls on Regions to Weigh in on Spent Fuel Import Project’, Nuclear Fuel, 25, 8, 17 April 2000, www.mhenergy.com; Saratovskovskii arbat, 13 June 2001; and Igor Kudrik, ‘Russian Regions to Decide on Fuel Imports’, Bellona, 11 April 2001, www.bellona.no. Moskovskii komsomolets, 13 June 2001; and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 August 2001. The minister's visit to Krasnoyarsk krai was especially important, given that the speaker of the regional assembly voted against Minatom's proposed amendments in the Federation Council. The minister's return to the region shortly after the vote was widely interpreted as indicating Minatom's respect for the speaker and its lingering concerns about building a constituency in the regional legislature to win over his support. RBC News, 7 June 2001. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 May 2001; see also Duma plenary discussion of the independent expert testimony during the third reading located at www.ldpr.ru/State_dumainside/2001_06–25/golos. Interfax, 23 November 2002. ‘Minatom Wins a Victory in the State Duma’, Jamestown Monitor, VII, 76, 19 April 2001. On Putin's environmental pretensions see Ziegler & Lyon, ‘The Politics of Nuclear Waste in Russia’, pp. 36–37. See comments by Robert Nigmatulin in the stenographic record, available at www.ldpr.ru/State_dumainside/2001_06–25/golos. Interfax, 11 July 2001; and Kommersant, 12 July 2001. The committee held its first meeting in October 2003. It was announced then that the secretary of the commission was Aleksandr Vatulin, director general of the Bovchar Institute, a scientific centre involved in reprocessing work; see Ann MacLachlan, ‘Russia Spent Fuel Import Panel Meets, Finds No Projects to Discuss’, Nuclear Fuel, 28, 23, 10 November 2003, p. 11. Itar‐Tass, 11 July 2001; and Ann MacLachlan, ‘Agreement on Reprocessing Necessary for Spent Fuel Deals, Duma Official Says’, NuclearFuel, 27, 19, 16 September 2002, www.mhenergy.com. Interfax, 8 June 2001. For example, the Chairman of the Commission for Emergency Situations in the Southern Federal District made ensuring the safe transit of imported spent nuclear fuel across the territory a top priority; see Strana.ru, 26 March 2002. Novaya gazeta, 4 August 2002. For Putin's initial response see Charles Digges, ‘Mystery Proposal Could Subjugate Minatom to Three Government Bodies’, Bellona News Story, 30 July 2002, www.bellona.no. The Russian government subsequently reiterated a commitment to upholding the legislative bargain with the approval in July 2003 of supporting regulations to govern future spent fuel imports. The official announcement reiterated expectations that at least 75% of the profits would constitute ‘priority financing’ for regional and environmental projects (Interfax, 15 July 2003). Moscow News, 26 June 2002. According to GAN calculations, Russia cannot safely handle 20,000 tons of foreign spent nuclear fuel in addition to the 20,000 tons of waste produced by its own nuclear power plants. The problem was compounded by the 100 submarines that were awaiting dismantlement, each of which contained 20–80 tons of spent nuclear fuel; see Izvestiya, 28 December 2001. Izvestiya, 28 December 2001. In December 2001 GAN announced that ‘serious cracks were repeatedly discovered in rail cars used to ship spent nuclear fuel and in the welded joints of the transport packaging used to ship spent nuclear fuel. The violations were discovered only after the transportation of the nuclear waste was completed’. Although this involved shipments of Russian spent nuclear fuel under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, Vishnevsky drew direct inferences for the same technologies and practices associated with the Minatom import programme; see commentary in Charles Digges, ‘Minatom’s Stary‐Eyed Import Plans Defy Safety Imperatives and Russian Sense', Bellona News Story, 25 July 2002, www.bellona.no. Trud, 15 January 2003; and ‘Broad Overview of 2002 Gosatomnadzor Activities and Achievements’, www.gan.ru. 20 February 2003, translated in FBIS‐SOV CEP 20030528000229, 20 February 2003. Although impressed with GAN oversight, environmentalists questioned Minatom's motives for acceding to the regulatory body's decision. First, they interpreted it as a ploy to acquire additional resources for constructing a new nuclear power plant that could ‘vaporise’ the contaminated water in the region. Second, they suspected that Minatom intended to use the GAN ruling to woo Washington for consent for Russia's future import of American origin spent nuclear fuel. Because Washington stipulated a preference for long‐term storage over reprocessing, environmentalists assumed that GAN and Minatom colluded to close Mayak's reprocessing facility in order to demonstrate that Russia had no intent to reprocess American‐origin spent nuclear fuel. This, however, disregards the acrimony between GAN and Minatom, Minatom's stated commitment to reprocessing, the legal prohibition on burial of nuclear waste in Russia and the US fixation on tying consent to Minatom's cessation of nuclear cooperation with Iran; see Novaya Gazeta, 16 January 2003. For background on GAN's new management team see especially Charles Digges, ‘Malyshev Makes His First Public Statement Amid Mixed Reviews From His Colleagues’, Bellona News Story, 24 July 2003, www.bellona.no. Khripunov, ‘MINATOM: Time for Crucial Decisions’, pp. 56–57. Isolated and administratively outflanked by Minatom, Vishnevsky's principled opposition to the spent fuel programme and withholding of certification of the Mayak facility reportedly cost him his job in summer 2003; see Sergei Ivashko, ‘Ministry of Atomic Energy Deprives Itself of Oversight’, www.MoscowGazeta.ru. 2 July 2003, as translated in FBIS‐SOV CEP 20030704000010, 2 July 2003. Kommersant, 12 July 2001. See discussion in Charles Digges, ‘Ambivalent Krasnoyarsk Court Kicks Big Decision to Moscow’, Bellona News Story, 1 July 2001, www.bellona.no. Interfax, 27 October 2003. Greenpeace also mounted public campaigns to expose the shipping routes that were slated to be used for importing spent nuclear fuel, and together with local NGOs spearheaded the organisation of a petition signed by the leaders of 90 environmental groups that advocated tighter regulation of the programme; see Interfax, 25 November 2003; and ‘Chelyabinsk Oblast: The Nuclear Safety Movement Defends Gosatomnadzor’, Regnum‐VolgaInform, 28 January 2003, translated in FBIS‐SOV CEP 20030313000324, 28 January 2003. Minatom originally charged only $620 per kilo for the 41 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel imported from Bulgaria, in contrast to the $1000 per kilo promised as the market standard for foreign imports. As a result of this discrepancy, several regional administrations and non‐governmental organisations directly petitioned the Federal Prosecutor to ensure reimbursement of an additional $15 million from the deal. In addition, the stipulation to disclose transit routes exposed hazards and compelled Minatom to conduct public dialogues with numerous regions in attempts to explore alternative options; see Moskovskii komsomolets, 19 October 2001; Izvestiya, 22 January 2002; and Interfax, 10 July 2003. The Hungarians petitioned the Russian government three times to extend an exemption on the repatriation of nuclear waste. Prior to the last attempt, Budapest reportedly sought to induce a concession by accepting the Russian nuclear fuel company's tender for repairing the damaged Paks reactor; see Interfax, 26 February 2002; Interfax, 21 May 2002; Moskovskii komsomolets, 17 March 2003; and ‘Environmental Group Concerned Over Russian–Hungarian Nuclear Deal’, Ekho Moskvy, 10 September 2003, translated in FBIS‐SOV CEP 20030910000242, 10 September 2003. ‘Turkey Takes a Stand Against Russian Nuclear Waste Imports’, Jamestown Monitor, 27 July 2001. Michael Knapik, Mark Hibbs & Ann MacLachlan, ‘US Open to Nuclear Pact With Conditions on International Spent Fuel Storage in Russia’, Nuclear Fuel, 26, 12, 11 June 2001, www.mhenergy.com. In particular, Rumyantsev stated explicitly that Washington's reticence in approving the Russian plan cost Moscow a very lucrative contract with Slovenia in 2003 (Kommersant, 4 November 2003). Izvestiya, 5 July 2002; Charles Digges, ‘Russia Says US Proposing to Send Spent Fuel if Moscow Gives Up on Bushehr’, Bellona News Story, 16 October 2002, www.bellona.no; and Ann MacLachlan, ‘Bushehr Spent Fuel Accord Said to be Advancing as US Seeks Russian Exit’, Nuclear Fuel 27, 22, 28 October 2002, p. 3, www.mhenergy.com Itar‐Tass, 16 January 2003. Although the IAEA does not have formal competency to assess spent fuel contracts, it monitors such transactions as part of its regular inspections on the Iranian nuclear programme. Also, although a preliminary agreement was signed between Russia and Iran in December 2002, the two sides failed to reach final agreement by the end of 2003, due largely to the international imbroglio over Iran's undisclosed enrichment and reprocessing activities; see Itar‐Tass, 10 December 2003. On the distinction between Minatom's parochial commercial objectives in cooperation with Iran and Putin's pro‐Western global strategy see especially Celleste Wallander, ‘Russia’s Interest in Trading with the Axis of Evil', PONARS, Policy Memo Series no. 248, October 2002, www.csis.org. Foreign Ministry officials, for example, were especially concerned that Iran's strong preference for delivering irregular shipments of spent nuclear fuel to Russia would result in the stockpiling of large quantities of material that would be ripe for diversion to an illicit Iranian nuclear weapons programme; see Elena Suponina, ‘Iran and Uranium: A Dangerous Rhyme’, Politkom.ru, 28 October 2003, translated in FBIS‐SOV CEP20031029000205, 28 October 2003; Simon Saradzhyan, ‘Iranian Demand Holds Up Bushehr’, Moscow Times, 11 September 2003, p. 1; and Igor Kudrik, ‘Russia to Buy Back Spent Nuclear Fuel Burnt in Iranian Reactor’, Bellona, 24 April 2003. Ziegler & Lyon, ‘The Politics of Nuclear Waste in Russia’, pp. 40–41. The signing of the agreement on Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation empowered the inter‐parliamentary working group to oversee the disbursement of 62 million euros for safety issues tied to radioactive waste management in north‐west Russia; see ‘Inter‐Parliamentary Working Group’, Bellona News Report, 10 October 2002, www.bellona.no; and Charles Digges, ‘Bulgaria Signs Spent Nuclear Fuel Housecleaning Deal with Russia’, Bellona News Report, 13 August 2002, www.bellona.no. Sam Vaknin, ‘Surviving on Nuclear Waste’, United Press International, 22 November 2002. Ibid.; see also Marat Yermukanov, ‘Nuclear Waste Disposal Scheme Sets Off Wave of Protests in Kazakhstan’, Central Asia‐Caucasus Analyst Field Report, 15 January 2003, www.cacianalyst.org/2003‐01–15/20030115_Kazakhstan_Nuclear_Waste.htm. Charles Digges, ‘Bush and Putin Likely to Discuss Spent Fuel Import to Russia’, and ‘The Nonproliferation Trust Project’, Bellona News Report, 22 April 2002, www.bellona.no; and Ekspert, 23 September 2002. This provoked a lively debate in Russia over liability and title to the imported spent nuclear fuel; see especially discussion in Cheun, ‘Russia: Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Overview’. Izvestiya, 16 April 2002; and Kommersant, 9 December 2002. Interfax, 26 December 2002. These expectations stand in contrast to initial projections of landing foreign contracts as early as the third quarter of 2002; see Moskovskii komsomolets, 23 October 2001; and Mike Nartker, ‘Russia Proposes Creating International Spent Nuclear Fuel Centers’, Global Security Newswire, 7 November 2003.
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