Does EMU Promote Labor‐Market Reforms?
1998; Wiley; Volume: 51; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1467-6435.1998.tb01434.x
ISSN1467-6435
AutoresNorbert Berthold, Rainer Fehn,
Tópico(s)Social Policy and Reform Studies
ResumoKyklosVolume 51, Issue 4 p. 509-536 Does EMU Promote Labor-Market Reforms? Norbert Berthold, Norbert BertholdSearch for more papers by this authorRainer Fehn, Rainer Fehn Prof. Dr., and Dr., Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-University Wurzburg. Sanderring 2, D-97070 Würzburg, Germany. We thank in particular Thomas Krüger, and also Martin Donges. Jög Hilpert. and Eric Thode for helpful comments without implicating them.Search for more papers by this author Norbert Berthold, Norbert BertholdSearch for more papers by this authorRainer Fehn, Rainer Fehn Prof. Dr., and Dr., Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-University Wurzburg. Sanderring 2, D-97070 Würzburg, Germany. We thank in particular Thomas Krüger, and also Martin Donges. Jög Hilpert. and Eric Thode for helpful comments without implicating them.Search for more papers by this author First published: 05 May 2007 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1998.tb01434.xCitations: 11 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Agell, J., L. Calmfors and G. Jonsson (1996). Fiscal Policy when Monetary Policy is Tied to the Mast. European Economic Review: 40: 1413–1440. Andersen, T. (1997). Fiscal Policy in the EMU and Outside, Swedish Economic Policy Review. 4: 235–275. Artis, M. and B. 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