Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 2; Issue: 2-3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/19362200903361937

1939-2214

Paul D. Williams,

Political Conflict and Governance

ABSTRACT ABSTRACT Between 2003 and 2008 the African Union deployed peace operations involving approximately 15,000 soldiers to four states: Burundi, Sudan, the Comoros, and Somalia. This represented a huge change of tempo from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. It also raises important questions about how successful these operations have been, what challenges they raise for the union's peacekeepers, and whether this tempo of operations is sustainable. This article addresses these questions by providing an overview of the African Union's peace operations and then reflecting on some of the general conclusions that can be drawn from the organization's first five years of peacekeeping. KEYWORDS: African UnionpeacekeepingBurundithe ComorosSomaliaDarfurSudan Acknowledgments I would like to thank Brook Beshah, Benedikt Franke, David Shinn, Ian Taylor, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of this special issue for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article. Notes 1. These took place in Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia-Eritrea, Rwanda, and Western Sahara. 2. Mark Malan, "Africa: Building Institutions on the Run," in Peace Operations, eds. Donald Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 89. 3. This is discussed in more detail in the article by Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto also in this special issue (pp. 82–96). 4. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act permits the union to conduct humanitarian interventions in its member states in "grave circumstances," such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 5. See Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah, Burundi on the Brink, 1993–1995 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2000). 6. For details, see Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2005). 7. According to respected analyst Jan van Eck, the Arusha process became "one of the major sources of dispute and contention." Van Eck, "We Can't Guarantee Their Safety," Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), March 3, 2003. 8. The protection force was originally intended to be a multinational force with troops from Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa. The other contingents, however, did not arrive, claiming that the security situation remained too precarious. 9. See United Nations Security Council, "4406th Meeting," (S/PV.4399, November 8, 2001), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N01/626/02/PDF/N0162602.pdf?OpenElement, 2. 10. Although both Belgium and France briefly raised the prospect of sending peacekeepers to Burundi, their proposals came to nothing. 11. See, for example, United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1375 (2001)," (S/RES 1375, October 29, 2001), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/606/53/PDF/N0160653.pdf?OpenElement; United Nations Security Council, "4406th Meeting," 4–5; United Nations Security Council, "4417th Meeting" (S/PV.4417, November 15, 2001), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N01/638/64/PDF/N0163864.pdf?OpenElement, 2. 12. Quoted in United Nations Security Council, "4655th Meeting" (S/PV.4655, December 4, 2002), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N02/722/33/PDF/N0272233.pdf?OpenElement, 4. 13. See Communiqué of the Ninety-first Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 2, 2003. 14. Both contingents received crucial bilateral funding from the UK and the United States. Denmark, Germany, and Italy also made contributions to AMIB. 15. The force comprised 866 troops from Ethiopia, 228 from Mozambique, 1,508 from South Africa, and 43 military observers from Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, and Tunisia. Ethiopia later indicated a willingness to expand its contingent to 1,300. See United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi" (S/2003/1146, December 4, 2003), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/634/93/PDF/N0363493.pdf?OpenElement, 7. 16. Liesl Louw, "On the Streets of Bunia and Burundi," eAfrica, (July 2003): 12–13. 17. The Pretoria Protocols were signed on October 8 and November 2, 2003, respectively. They set out commitments regarding political, defense, and security power sharing. 18. See Human Rights Watch, Everyday Victims: Civilians in Burundi's War (A1520, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), available: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/12/21/everyday-victims 19. "Zuma's Other Hotspot: Two Rebel Factions Hold the SA-Backed Peace Process to Ransom,"Africa Confidential 44, no. 16 (2003): 6. 20. Quoted in "Burundi Peace Agreement," Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social, and Cultural Series 40, no. 11 (2003): 15532B. 21. Festus Agoagye, "AMIB: Lessons Learned from the First AU Peacekeeping Operation," Conflict Trends 2 (2004): 13. 22. United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi," 6. 23. Agoagye, "AMIB," 14. 24. For more detail see Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War (London: Zed, 2008); Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (London: Hurst, 2008). 25. International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004 (S/2005/60, New York: United Nations, 2005). 26. Malan, "Africa," 97. 27. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué" (PSC/PR.Comm.[XXVIII], Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union April 28, 2005), paragraph 3. 28. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Darfur Region of the Sudan" (PSC/PR/2 [XXVIII], Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, April 28, 2005), paragraph 103. 29. AMIS thus exhibited all of the characteristics of "wider peacekeeping" operations. See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity, forthcoming), chapter 8. 30. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué" (PSC/PR/Comm.[XIII]), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, July 27, 2004), paragraph 8. 31. "Rwandan Troops Start AU Mission in Darfur," ABC News, August 15, 2004, available: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2004/08/15/1177007.htm. 32. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué" (PSC/PR/Comm.[XVII], Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, October 20, 2004). 33. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué" (PSC/PR/2[XLV], Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, January 12, 2006), available: http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/ps/PSC_2004_2007/pdfs/2006/2006_45_ C1E.pdf, paragraph 105v. 34. United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur" (S/2006/591, July 28, 2006), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/447/27/PDF/N0644727.pdf?OpenElement, paragraph 29. 35. See The Darfur Peace Agreement: A Tough Job for Peacekeepers? (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), available: http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/StimsonCenter_DarfurPeaceAgreement.pdf. 36. "AU reacts to ICG report on Darfur peace deal," Sudan Tribune, June 25, 2006. 37. UNMIS was deployed to Sudan in 2005 to assist in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the civil war between the government and rebels in the south of the country. 38. For an earlier assessment see Paul D. Williams, "Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan," International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006): 168–183. 39. Cited in United Nations Security Council, "Monthly Report of the UN Secretary-General on Darfur" (S/2005/467, July 18, 2005), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/423/17/PDF/N0542317.pdf?OpenElement, 17. 40. Ibid, 11. 41. The islands are also widely known as Nzwani and Mwali respectively. 42. This account draws from Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 109–110; Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara 2007 (36th ed., London: Taylor & Francis, 2006), 281–282. 43. MAES included civilian and uniformed personnel from South Africa, Senegal, the Sudan, and Tanzania as well as financial assistance from the League of Arab States. 44. See African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué" (PSC/PR/Comm[XCV], Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, October 10, 2007). 45. Led by South African foreign minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the delegation also included representatives from Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles and Tanzania. 46. Chrysantus Ayangafac cited in Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social, and Cultural (March 1–31, 2008): 17464A. 47. Cited in ibid., 17464A-B. 48. For a more detailed analysis of this mission see Paul D. Williams, "Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission in Somalia," International Peacekeeping 16, no. 4 (2009): 514–530. 49. The TFG emerged from Somalia's National Peace and Reconciliation Conferences, which took place in Kenya under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development from 2002 to 2004. The TFG relocated from Kenya, first to the Somali town of Jowhar and then to Baidoa in June 2005. 50. Sally Healy, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa (London: Chatham House, December 2008), p.22. 51. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué" (PSC/PR/Comm.[XXIX], Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, May 12 2005). 52. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué" (PSC/Min/Comm.[XXXIV–(i)], Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, July 3, 2005). 53. The Islamic Courts had begun operating in Somalia in the 1990s with the primary aim of providing law and order within clan zones, mainly in south Mogadishu. The courts represented a "broad mosque," bringing together individuals from moderate and extreme ends of the Islamic spectrum. The courts had come to power after ousting the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), a conglomerate of warlords supported by the United States ostensibly to hunt down Islamic terrorists. See Healy, Lost Opportunities, 23–24. 54. Given that Ethiopia was clearly a party to the conflict in Somalia, its representative should have withdrawn from the PSC's deliberations on the subject after the briefing session. Article 8.9 of the PSC Protocol states, "Any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not participate either in the discussion or the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation. Such Member shall be invited to present its case to the Peace and Security Council as appropriate, and shall, thereafter, withdraw from proceedings." 55. African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué" (PSC/PR/Comm.[LXIX], Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union January 19, 2007). 56. Ibid, paragraph 9. 57. See AU Press Release, "AU Mission in Somalia Agreement Signed" (March 6, 2007), available: http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/news/press%20releases/AU%20Mission%20in%20Somalia%20Agreement%20signed.htm. 58. UK Parliament House of Commons, "Written Answers," Daily Hansard, June 15, 2007, column 1377W, available: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070615/text/70615w0010.htm. The UK was one of the sponsors of Security Council Resolution 1744. 59. "Somalia: 'We'll Fight Back if Attacked,' AU Troops Say," IRIN News, March 7, 2007. 60. During 2007 the United States provided AMISOM with assistance worth $78.7 million. This included satellite communications equipment and contracting DynCorp International to help move supplies and people and supply AMISOM with tents, vehicles, and generators. United States Mission to the African Union, "US Mission to the AU: AMISOM/Somalia Fact Sheet," http://www.usau.usmission.gov/fact_sheet.html (accessed September 16, 2008); Chris Tomlinson, "US Hires Military Contractor to Back Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia," Associated Press, March 7, 2007. The United Kingdom provided AMISOM with planning and logistical support at the AU PSC's Peace Support Operations Division in Addis Ababa and £1.3m to Uganda. UK Parliament House of Commons, "Written Answers," Daily Hansard, June 15, 2007, column 1378W, available: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070615/text/70615w0011.htm. Between 2007 and May 2009, the EU provided €40m to AMISOM, while in June 2007 NATO agreed to provide strategic airlift for AMISOM contributors. In January 2009, UN Security Council Resolution 1863 authorized the creation of a trust fund to marshal voluntary contributions from UN member states to support AMISOM. 61. I am grateful to David Shinn for bringing this information to my attention. 62. Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare (ENOUGH Strategy Paper, September 2008), available: http://www.enoughproject.org, 7, 10. 63. Yemen has also been accused of supporting the insurgency. 64. Such perceptions were reinforced by the fact that some U.S. special forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops in Somalia in December 2006. In addition January 2007, witnessed two U.S. air strikes against al-Qa'ida suspects in Somalia. Nevertheless, Washington did not simply subcontract Ethiopia to fight its "war on terror" in Somalia. As Menkhaus has noted, U.S. officials urged Ethiopia not to occupy Mogadishu, warning it of a quagmire scenario, but this advice went unheeded. Menkhaus, Somalia, 2. 65. Ibid., 3, 5. 66. "Somalia Peacekeepers 'Not Viable'," BBC News Online, November 9, 2007, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7086367.stm. 67. Menkhaus, Somalia, 12. 68. The agreement called for a cessation of hostilities, deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, and withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. 69. "Ethiopia PM Attacks UN on Somalia," BBC News Online, December 20, 2007, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7152997.stm. 70. Other African states deserving honorable mention for their contribution to UN peacekeeping are Benin and Morocco. 71. "Prodi Report," that is, "Report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations" (UN doc. A/63/666-S/2008/813, 31 December 2008), paragraphs 11, 15, 16. 72. Compare this to the some 22,000 staff who work within the European Commission. Capacity Survey: Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security (Brussels: UNU-CRIS, 2008), 22, 77. This is also despite the fact that the 2003 AU Summit approved 53 posts for the Peace and Security Department, few of which have been filled. Prodi Report, para. 48. 73. Malan, "Africa," 104–107. 74. See Prodi Report, paragraphs 27, 82. 75. This phrase was coined by Christopher Hill to analyze the EU's attempts to develop a common foreign and security policy. See Christopher Hill, "The Capability-expectations Gap or Conceptualising Europe's International Role," Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 3 (1993): 305–328.