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Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures: True and False Pleasures in Plato's Philebus

1985; Brill; Volume: 30; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1163/156852885x00039

1568-5284

Dorothea Frede,

Medieval and Classical Philosophy

Everyone who is moderately familiar with Plato's dialogues will have the impression that pleasure according to Plato is a mixed blessing; often enough he refuses to regard it as a good let alone the good for mankind. It is easy to see the reason for this critical attitude: Pleasure (often paired with desire hdone kai epithymia cf. Phdr.273d; Rep. 328d; 429d; 555d; 574a; Gorg.484d et pass.) is what lures the soul away from the straight and narrow path of virtue and entwines it with all sorts of conflicts and confusions. Pleasure is therefore often treated by Plato as a necessary evil; necessary because of our vegetative and material needs (cf. Tim.62-64; Rep.581e), an evil because it opens the soul to all sorts of dangerous and uncontrollable desires (I may merely refer to the unruly horse in Phdr.253c-255a, the anarchy of desires in the Rep.438dff; 562aff; 58le, and the discussion of the mortal part of the human soul at the beginning of the Phdo.64cff).