Artigo Revisado por pares

‘A world which is not yet’: Peasants, civil society and the state

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 3-4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/03066150701802918

ISSN

1743-9361

Autores

Tom Brass,

Tópico(s)

Organic Food and Agriculture

Resumo

Abstract Historically, the construction of democracy and 'civil society' has been linked by both the political left and right to struggles over property, the market and the State. What conservatives and neoliberals feared, and socialists hoped for, was that'pure democracy' would enable peasants and workers to capture the State, and thus use the latter to transform existing property and exchange relations. Having relied on the strong State to maintain its socio-economic privileges, the political right first opposed and then endorsed (representative) democracy, thereby combining a populist'from above' attempt to generate the support of workers and peasants with the idea of a strong capitalist State. Positioning'civil society' within the capitalist system, modernization theory sought the incorporation of peasants and workers into the bourgeois polity without, however, challenging existing traditional rural culture. The latter was the identity subsequently mobilized by'new' populist postmodernism to construct a concept of a locally-based agrarian'civil society' outside and against the capitalist State. Resisting – but no longer attempting to capture or control – the State, this form of 'civil society' seeks merely to establish or re-establish local and systemically non-specific forms of democracy. This, it is argued here, replicates the historical project not of the left but of conservatism and neoliberalism, and as such is politically disempowering for peasants and workers. Notes 1 The words are those of Fred Bramley (1874–1925), cited by Winifred Horrabin in a review, published in the Daily Worker, of the book Ten Days That Shook the World, by John Reed 1926 Reed, John. 1926. Ten Days that Shook the World, London: The Communist Party of Great Britain. [Google Scholar]. 2 The photo is reproduced in Womack 1968: 206ff.] and Casasola 1985 Casasola, Agustín Victor. 1985. ¡Tierra y Libertad! Photographs of Mexico 1900–1935, from the Casasola Archive, Oxford: Museum of Modern Art. [Google Scholar]: 60]. 3 Part of the 'cultural turn' that has bedevilled development studies over the past quarter of a century, the still fashionable 'new' populist postmodernism condemns the universals associated with history/progress and Enlightenment discourse as 'foundational', is anti-rationalist, anti-development, anti-science, and espouses nationalism. Its analytical framework conjures up nothing so much as the description by Samuel Butler in Erewhon of 'The Colleges of Unreason'. Not only did the latter institutions possess 'professorships of Inconsistency and Evasion', where one of the objects of study was 'the Completer Obliteration of the Past', but '[o]ne man was refused a degree for being too often and too seriously in the right, while a few days before I came, a whole batch had been plucked for insufficient distrust of the printed matter'[Butler, 1932 Butler, Samuel. 1932 [1872]. Erewhon and Erewhon Revisited, London and Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd.. [Google Scholar]: 131–32, 133, 134]. Something akin to postmodern aporia is hinted at: 'I ventured feebly to say that I did not see how progress could be made in any art or science, or indeed in anything at all, without more or less self-seeking, and hence unamiability. "Of course it cannot," said the Professor, "and therefore we object to progress." After which there was no more to be said.' 4 The theme of ideological consistency – the adherence to an underlying set of principles consistent with a given political philosophy – is one held by those on both right and left. Hence the following observation by the influential right-wing political theorist, Julius Evola 2002 Evola, Julius. 2002. Men Among the Ruins: Postwar Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist, Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions. [Google Scholar]: 115]: 'For the authentic revolutionary conservative, what really counts is to be faithful not to past forms and institutions, but rather to principles of which such forms and institutions have been particular expressions adequate for a specific period of time and in a specific geographical area… Tradition, in its essence, is something simultaneously meta-historical and dynamic: it is an overall ordering force, in the service of principles that have the chrism of superior legitimacy (we may even call them "principles from above"). This force acts through the generations, in continuity of spirit and inspiration, through institutions, laws and social orders that may even display a remarkable variety and diversity.' From the other end of the political spectrum, the importance of adhering to underlying principles was confirmed by Trotsky 1936 Trotsky, Leon. 1936. The Third International After Lenin, New York: Pioneer Publishers. [Google Scholar]: 141, original emphasis]: 'It was not flexibility that served (nor should it serve today) as the basic trait of Bolshevism but rather granite hardness. It was precisely of this quality, for which its enemies and opponents reproached it, that Bolshevism was always justly proud.' Agreeing about the importance of principle does not, of course, mean agreement as to what those principles advocate. 5 An exception concerns the conditions justifying the expropriation of a landlord class. Such a policy was advocated by neoliberals at the end of the nineteenth century and modernization theorists mid-way through the twentieth on the grounds that national economic development (= capitalism) required this. It is important to note that the object of expropriation was in these situations limited to unproductive landlords – that is to say, taking land from large proprietors who did not (or would not) cultivate it and handing it over to peasants who would. This approach, in which one set of individual property rights gives way to another set of the same, must be distinguished politically from a Marxist programme, where all land (not just unproductive holdings) is confiscated by the State, which then becomes its sole owner. The object is the furtherance not of capitalism but of socialism. Similarly, property thus acquired is then made available not to enhance individual units of what are instances of peasant economy, but rather collective enterprises owned/controlled by the State. 6 Denying the relevance any longer of a left/right political distinction was a mantra uttered by many academic supporters of Tony Blair and New Labour. An influential example is Giddens 1994 Giddens, Anthony. 1994. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Poitics, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. [Google Scholar], for whom the rejection of this difference gave rise to his espousal of a 'Third Way' that transcended political distinctions between left and right. What he forgets, or – more probably – does not know, is that the 'Third Way' concept has long been an emplacement of reactionary discourse. For those on the political right, therefore, the notion of a third way – one that is neither capitalist nor socialist – has been a mobilizing ideology informing nationalist opposition not just to international socialism but also to international capitalism. The latter is held as much to blame as the former for undermining the traditional components of a specifically national culture valued and defended by the political right. That this is still the case is evident from mid-1970s Italy, where according to Rao 2006 Rao, Nicola. 2006. La fiamma e la celtica: Sessant'anni di neofascismo da Salò ai centri sociali de destra, Milan: Sperling & Kupfer Editori. [Google Scholar]: 267] the slogan of Italian neofascists was 'Né destra, né sinistra, Terza Posizione'. That is, 'neither right, nor left, but a Third Way', which is precisely what Giddens himself currently advocates. This is not to say that Giddens is a fellow-traveller of the political right – rather obviously he is not. It is to say, however, that he has unwittingly reproduced what is in fact a central tenet of rightwing discourse (for evidence of which, see Fiore and Adinolfi 2006), not least because – appearances to the contrary notwithstanding – the history of political theory is for him a closed book. 7 Hence the reference in the title to 'a world which is not yet'. The latter expression is taken from comments made by Jack Common 1992 Common, Jack. 1992/[1933]. Fake Left, London: Working Press. [Google Scholar]: 3, 5] during the 1930s: 'The socialist has the special problem of holding onto his vision of a world which is not yet, while maintaining himself in an environment which makes vision a handicap and tempts him to abandon it. What is behind the socialist parties and what assures their final victory is this vision of a new world; what ruins them all is that they must prove practical utility in the present capitalist day if they are to live at all. … Hence we have in this country a nominal Left which is incapable of supplying ideas of a revolutionising character, Marxist and revolutionary though it is in its literature and in a literary way'. 8 This is clear from the view expressed by Evola 2002 Evola, Julius. 2002. Men Among the Ruins: Postwar Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist, Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions. [Google Scholar]: 127] that the 'gap between the political idea of the State and the physical idea of "society" is found … in the opposition that exists between State and nation. The notions of nation, fatherland, and people …essentially belong to the naturalistic and biological plane and not the political one'. In much the same vein, a member of the French right [Barrès, 1970b Barrès, Maurice. 1970b [1902]. "'Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme'". Edited by: McClelland, J. S. [1970] [Google Scholar]: 193] argued at the beginning of the twentieth century that '[n]o Frenchman would ever intend to meddle with the State. But the State that has suffered from the lack of a national consciousness would be mad to neglect that sense of its own identity which every one of our regions has preserved.' For a similar interpretation of the State/nation link held by another influential right-wing theorist, Carl Schmitt, see below. 9 In contrast to 'representative democracy', where voters in effect lose the capacity to control the person mandated the minute the vote is cast, the concept 'pure democracy' broadly speaking refers to a continuing ability on the part of those who mandate to exercise direct control over policy and political programmes. Unlike the mass of voters, individuals elected to represent them in a capitalist system can be and are either bought off or co-opted. This is especially true of the leadership of peasant movements, political parties that espouse parliamentary socialism or social democracy, and trade unions. 10 The concept of the nation as prefiguring the State, the latter taking its legal legitimacy from the former, underwrote much of the Catholic/nationalist/conservative theory developed during the 1920s and 1930s by Carl Schmitt about the political necessity of a strong State. Formulated as a reaction to working class mobilization during the 1919 German revolution, his view was that in law sovereignty derives ultimately not from what is written in the constitution but from whoever invokes a state of emergency – termed by him 'the state of exception'– when government is itself challenged 'from below'[Bendersky, 1983 Bendersky, Joseph W. 1983. Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: 37]. The argument that '[n]orms or laws cannot be sovereign because they cannot decide when a state of exception exists, nor how to counteract it' amounted to a legal justification of a rightwing coup d'état ('who rules is right') by a 'sovereign'– the monarch, president or a strong leader – to restore stability/order in the name of 'the people' and (thus) in the interests of the nation [Bendersky, 1983 Bendersky, Joseph W. 1983. Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: 25, 58, 122, 224]. Supported by a matrix of high-sounding but (when depoliticized) sociologically meaningless concepts – such as the 'friend–enemy' polarity (freund und feind) and the 'enemy within' (staatsfeind) – Schmitt conferred ideological legitimacy on the capture of State power in Germany during 1933 by the Nazi regime [Bendersky, 1983 Bendersky, Joseph W. 1983. Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: 88, 90]. Not only did Schmitt declare 'the one-party state to be the state of the twentieth century and … a step toward achieving the unity of the German people', therefore, but he also 'asserted that the Führer had the right, in moments of extreme danger to the nation, to act as the supreme judge, distinguish friend from enemy, and take appropriate measures' [Bendersky, 1983 Bendersky, Joseph W. 1983. Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: 204, 216]. Significantly, all the legal arguments deployed by Schmitt to justify a coup d'état resulting in a strong State constitute a defence of what Trotsky 1975 Trotsky, Leon. 1975 [1934]. The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd.. [Google Scholar]: 451ff.] categorized as 'Bonapartism'. 11 On this point Furniss 1965 Furniss, Edgar S. 1965 [1920]. The Position of the Labourer in a System of Nationalism: A Study in the Labour Theories of the Later English Mercantilists, New York: Augustus M. Kelley. [Google Scholar]: 3–4] notes that 'there is another side to Mercantilism; underlying its international doctrines is a vast body of theory and policy dealing with the domestic economy of the nation and designed as a basis upon which to erect the outstanding structure of foreign policy. This phase of Mercantilism [1660–1775] is of interest because it illustrates the reaction of nationalism upon the class relationships and the life conditions of the people within the nation. It deals primarily with the position of the labourer in the economic organization of the country: with the formation of his rights and duties; with a statement of principles which should govern his standard of living; and, to a smaller extent, with a discussion of how much his wages will, or ought to, be.' 12 For details of this, see Furniss 1965 Furniss, Edgar S. 1965 [1920]. The Position of the Labourer in a System of Nationalism: A Study in the Labour Theories of the Later English Mercantilists, New York: Augustus M. Kelley. [Google Scholar]: 75ff., 96ff.] and Rubin 1979 Rubin, Isaac Ilyich. 1979 [1929]. A History of Economic Thought (translated and edited by Donald Filtzer), London: Ink Links. [Google Scholar]: 35ff.]. 13 '[D]uring the eighteenth century,' observes Furniss 1965 Furniss, Edgar S. 1965 [1920]. The Position of the Labourer in a System of Nationalism: A Study in the Labour Theories of the Later English Mercantilists, New York: Augustus M. Kelley. [Google Scholar]: 151–2], 'the Justice of the Peace began more and more to assume the position of local autocrat … Decrees frequently partook of the nature of ordinances or laws appertaining to matters of minor importance in the Justice's district. This assumption of legislative function by the Justices made it possible for them to interfere in the social life of the labouring classes, by decreeing that amusements of various kinds would be punished by them as nuisances. Behind these decrees is frequently to be seen the class opinions we have been examining: the belief, namely, that the poor of the country should be obliged to live a life of toil. The fair, the gathering at the alehouse, were denoted as nuisances and suppressed as such, not alone, nor principally, because they bred riot and disturbance but also because they appeared most obviously to relax the industry of the labouring body and entice the workingman away from the "drudgery to which he was born".' On primitive accumulation in England, see Marx 1976 Marx, Karl. 1976 [1867]. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy – Volume 1, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. [Google Scholar]: 873ff.]. 14 For the concept 'pure democracy', see Canning 1820 Canning, George. 1820. Speech of the Rt. Hon. George Canning delivered at the Liverpool Dinner, given in Celebration of his Re-election, 18th March, 1820, London: The Guardian Office. 268 Strand, opposite St. Clement's Church [Google Scholar]: 21–22], who objected because it would 'sweep away every other branch of the constitution that might attempt to oppose or control it.' It is also clear that what he understood by 'the constitution' was not an accepted form of and set of precepts for government but rather the existing ruling class – the monarchy, church, and aristocratic landowners [Canning, 1820 Canning, George. 1820. Speech of the Rt. Hon. George Canning delivered at the Liverpool Dinner, given in Celebration of his Re-election, 18th March, 1820, London: The Guardian Office. 268 Strand, opposite St. Clement's Church [Google Scholar]: 21, 32]. Invoking the precedent whereby a popular assembly –'when once that House of Commons should become a direct deputation, speaking the people's will, and that will the rule of Government'– abolished the monarchy during the 1640s Civil War, Canning 1820 Canning, George. 1820. Speech of the Rt. Hon. George Canning delivered at the Liverpool Dinner, given in Celebration of his Re-election, 18th March, 1820, London: The Guardian Office. 268 Strand, opposite St. Clement's Church [Google Scholar]: 23–24] warned that 'pure democracy' would make it impossible for those with property to resist expropriation by those without ('But to presume to reject an act of the deputies of the whole nation! – by what assumption of right could three or four hundred great proprietors set themselves against the national will?). 15 Hence the fears listed by Canning 1820 Canning, George. 1820. Speech of the Rt. Hon. George Canning delivered at the Liverpool Dinner, given in Celebration of his Re-election, 18th March, 1820, London: The Guardian Office. 268 Strand, opposite St. Clement's Church [Google Scholar]: 6–7] as those felt by the 'respectable' elements following the protests that culminated in the 1819 Peterloo massacre, when 'there was not a man of property who did not tremble for his possessions … there was not a man of retired and peaceable habits, who did not tremble for the tranquillity and security of his home … there was not a man of orderly and religious principles, who did not fear that these principles were about to be cut from under the feet of succeeding generations'. 16 That 'pure democracy' would eventually lead to an attack on existing property rights, a situation that would result in their transformation, was a connection explicitly made by Canning at that conjuncture. 'I hold it frantic to suppose, that from the election of members of Parliament you can altogether exclude, by any contrivance, even if it were desirable to do so, the influence of property, rank, talents, family, connection, and whatever else in the Radical Language of the day is considered as intimidation or corruption,' he [Canning, 1820 Canning, George. 1820. Speech of the Rt. Hon. George Canning delivered at the Liverpool Dinner, given in Celebration of his Re-election, 18th March, 1820, London: The Guardian Office. 268 Strand, opposite St. Clement's Church [Google Scholar]: 28] accepted, 'unless you have found some expedient for disarming property of influence, without (what I hope we are not yet ripe for) the abolition of property itself'. 17 Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822–88) was a conservative historian of jurisprudence, and Albert Schäffle (1831–1903) a political economist and conservative politician. Both were politically influential in their respective contexts. Although notionally supportive of 'popular government', the success of democracy in America was nevertheless attributed by Maine 1885 Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. 1885. Popular Government, London: John Murray, Albermarle Street. [Google Scholar]: xi] to 'have arisen rather from skilfully applying the curb to popular impulses than from giving them the rein.' The United States is extolled much rather for its laissez faire and Social Darwinist policies [Maine, 1885 Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. 1885. Popular Government, London: John Murray, Albermarle Street. [Google Scholar]: 50–52]: 'The United States have justly been called the home of the disinherited of the earth … There could be no grosser delusion than to suppose this result to have been attained by democratic legislation. It has really been obtained through the sifting out of the strongest by natural selection … All this beneficent prosperity is the fruit of recognising the principle of population, and the one remedy for its excess in perpetual emigration. It all reposes on the sacredness of contract and the stability of private property, the first the implement, and the last the reward, of success in the universal competition. These however, are all the principles and institutions which the British friends of the "artisan" and "agricultural labourer" seem not a little inclined to treat as their ancestors did agricultural and industrial machinery. The American are still of opinion that more is to be got for human happiness by private energy than by public legislation'. Complaining that 'Social Democracy owes its political influence to the introduction of universal suffrage, to the now possible procession of the myriad battalions of labour to the ballot box', Schäffle 1892 Schäffle, A. 1892. The Impossibility of Social Democracy, London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.. [Google Scholar]: xiii–xiv] warned that German socialism was 'working zealously to win for itself still greater power by the weapon of universal suffrage: it is carrying on a campaign now in the country districts, and has declared war more fiercely than ever against its chief competitor for power by universal suffrage, namely, the Catholic Church.' He continued [Schäffle, 1892 Schäffle, A. 1892. The Impossibility of Social Democracy, London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.. [Google Scholar]: 126–27]: 'I have desired to see a share of political life given to all adult and honest males. But I am also convinced that the political will of a nation needs yet other agents, and must be supplied with counter-poises; that a complete State-Organism can never result from the fluctuating decisions of the majority expressed through universal suffrage alone, and without being associated with any such efficient counterpoise; that the inevitable issue of disregarding this would be that most terrible and desolating of all despotisms, I mean mob-rule.' 18 According to Maine 1885 Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. 1885. Popular Government, London: John Murray, Albermarle Street. [Google Scholar]: 24], in France '[t]he mob, which in 1848 overturned the government of the younger Bourbons … had also a leaning to Socialism; and the frightful popular insurrection of June 1848 was entirely Socialistic.' The 'mob' is further characterized [Maine, 1885 Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. 1885. Popular Government, London: John Murray, Albermarle Street. [Google Scholar]: 24] as politically 'irreconcileable', in the sense of being composed of plebeians who 'refuse to submit their opinions to the arbitration of any government', which licenses in turn the categorization of such agency as beyond the law (='illegal'). Violent suppression by the military, at the behest of the State, of the 'mob' that is 'entirely Socialistic' is thus deemed legitimate. That fear of a 'from below' challenge to existing property relations, as a result of being able to rule via the State, was at the root of the conservative objection to 'popular government' is clear from the following: 'What is to be the nature of the legislation,' asks Maine 1885 Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. 1885. Popular Government, London: John Murray, Albermarle Street. [Google Scholar]: 44–45], 'by which the lot of the artisan and of the agricultural labourer is to be not merely altered for the better, but exchanged for whatever station and fortune they may think it possible to confer on themselves by their own supreme authority?'. He answers his own question thus [Maine, 1885 Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. 1885. Popular Government, London: John Murray, Albermarle Street. [Google Scholar]: 45]: 'the belief that government can indefinitely increase human happiness, undoubtedly suggests the opinion, that the stock of good things in the world is practically unlimited in quantity, that it is (so to speak) contained in a vast storehouse or granary, and that out of this it is now doled out in unequal shares and unfair portions… Yet nothing is more certain, than that the mental picture which enchains the enthusiasts for benevolent democratic government is altogether false, and that, if the mass of mankind were to make an attempt at redividing the common stock of good things, they would resemble, not a number of claimants insisting on the fair division of a fund, but a mutinous crew'. His conclusion [Maine, 1885 Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. 1885. Popular Government, London: John Murray, Albermarle Street. [Google Scholar]: 49] demonstrates a willingness – similar to that of neo-liberals currently – to countenance the use of coercion to drive 'a mutinous crew'– artisans and agricultural labourers who dare challenge existing patterns of wealth, division of labour, and political authority – back to work: 'No later than the end of the last century, large portions of the French peasantry ceased to cultivate their land, and large numbers of French artisans declined to work, in despair at the vast requisitions of the Revolutionary Government during the Reign of Terror; and, as might be expected, the penal law had to be called in to compel their return to their ordinary occupations.' 19 According to William Graham Sumner [Fine, 1956 Fine, Sidney. 1956. Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought, 1865–1901, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. [Google Scholar]: 86], therefore, 'a democratic state is in more danger of … interfering with property rights than any other type of state because it is so sure of itself and so ready to undertake anything. Rights, especially property rights, are safe only when protected against the exercise of all arbitrary power.' 20 W.H. Mallock (1849–1923), Walter Lippmann (1889–1974) and Albert Jay Nock (1870–1945) were all writers who gave voice to conservative views. For the objection to 'pure democracy', see Mallock 1924 Mallock, W. H. 1924. Democracy: The Limits of Pure Democracy, London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd.. [Google Scholar], and on his importance for conservative ideology, see O'Sullivan 1975 O'Sullivan, Noël. 1975. Conservatism, London: J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd.. [Google Scholar]: 116–18] and Eccleshall, Geoghegan, Jay, and Wilford 1986 Eccleshall, Robert, Geoghegan, Vincent, Jay, Richard and Wilford, Rick. 1986. Political Ideologies, London: Hutchinson. [Google Scholar]: 103–4]. In a similar vein, Lippmann 1955 Lippman, Walter. 1955. The Public Philosophy, London: Hamish Hamilton. [Google Scholar]: 34, 41] summarizes his earlier argument [Lippmann, 1922 Lippmann, Walter. 1922. Public Opinion, New York: Harcourt Brace and Company. [Google Scholar] thus: 'The Western liberal democracies are a declining power in human affairs. I argue that this is due to a derangement of the functions of their governments which disables them in coping with the mounting disorder. … The conundrum springs from the fact that while The People as a corporate body are the true owners of the sovereign power, The people, as an aggregate of voters, have diverse, conflicting self-centred interests and opinions. A plurality of them cannot be counted upon to represent the corporate nation.' Described as 'one of the founders of the renaissance of the political right in America [who provided] a grounding for later developments in conservatism and libertarianism,' Albert Jay Nock 1991 Nock, Albert Jay. 1991. The State of the Union: Essays in Social Criticism (edited by Charles H. Hamilton), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.. [Google Scholar]: xxiii, 272] lamented that the 'State was organized in this country [the USA] with power to do all kinds of things for the people, and the people in their short-sighted stupidity, have been adding to that power ever since' (original emphasis). 21 As the example of Seldon 1990 Seldon, Arthur. 1990. Capitalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. [Google Scholar] indicates, Marxism remained a target of laissez faire conservative discourse even after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 22 See Nock 1991 Nock, Albert Jay. 1991. The State of the Union: Essays in Social Criticism (edited by Charles H. Hamilton), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.. [Google Scholar]: 228]. Invoking not just the Physiocrats but also Marx, he [Nock, 1991 Nock, Albert Jay. 1991. The State of the Union: Essays in Social Criticism (edited by Charles H. Hamilton), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.. [Google Scholar]: 222ff.] characterizes every known historical form of the State as an institution simply for 'economic exploitation'. 'There is no State of which we have a record,' he [Nock, 1991 Nock, Albert Jay. 1991. The State of the Union: Essays in Social Criticism (edited by Charles H. Hamilton), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.. [Google Scholar]: 223] maintains, 'that does not present the phenomenon of two distinct economic classes which have interests directly opposed; a relatively small, owning and exploiting class which lives by appropriating without compensation the labour-products of a relatively large, propertyless and dependent class.' 23 The chief architect of this conservative shift, em

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