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Toward a More General Theory of Regulation: Comment

1976; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 19; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/466866

1537-5285

Jack Hirshleifer,

Taxation and Compliance Studies

Previous articleNext article No AccessToward a More General Theory of Regulation: CommentJack HirshleiferJack HirshleiferPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 19, Number 2Aug., 1976Conference on the Economics of Politics and Regulation Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/466866 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 44Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1976 The University of Chicago Law SchoolPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Anupriya Khan, Satish Krishnan Moderating effects of business-systems corruption on corruption in basic national institutions and electronic government maturity: Insights from a dynamic panel data analysis, International Journal of Information Management 59 (Aug 2021): 102349.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2021.102349Andrew Pilny, Melissa Dobosh, Alex Yahja, Marshall Scott Poole, Aaron Campbell, Luisa Ruge-Jones, Jeff Proulx Team Coordination in Uncertain Environments: The Role of Processual Communication Networks, Human Communication Research 46, no.44 (May 2020): 385–411.https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqz020Anupriya Khan, Satish Krishnan Conceptualizing the impact of corruption in national institutions and national stakeholder service systems on e-government maturity, International Journal of Information Management 46 (Jun 2019): 23–36.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2018.11.014Satish Krishnan, Anupriya Khan Theorizing the Relationship of Corruption in National Institutions with E-Government Maturity, (Dec 2018): 177–193.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04315-5_13Kim R. 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