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The dynamics of transnational railway governance in Europe during the long nineteenth century

2011; Routledge; Volume: 27; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/07341512.2011.604169

1477-2620

Johan Schot, H. Buiter, Irene Anastasiadou,

Central European national history

Abstract Despite fierce international rivalries and commercial competition among companies, regions, and states in Europe, a transnational community of managers and engineers was able to promote interoperability of railways across national frontiers in the long nineteenth century. If at first they collaborated informally and ad hoc, around 1850 their activities became institutionalized. The main aim of this article is to explore the origins, working method, and spatial reach of their newly established institutions, of which the Verein Deutscher Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen (Association of German Railway Companies) is the most important. We argue that through its method of technification (or de-politicization), the Verein became a key transnational player in promoting collaboration and interoperability across national frontiers. Together with other railway organizations, including their engineers, the Verein contributed to creating a European transnational space – one that was not fully controlled by national governments and that paved the way for new forms of infrastructural Europeanism. Keywords: railwaysEuropeanizationtechnocratic internationalismgovernance Acknowledgements We owe thanks to many individuals and institutions. The research itself was sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and the European Science Foundation (ESF). One of the authors (Schot) worked on it in favorable circumstances at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences. We are grateful for comments on early versions of an anonymous reviewer, Alec Badenoch, Hans-Liudger Dienel, Christian Henrich-Franke, Dagmara, Jajeśniak-Quast, Arne Kaijser, Wolfram Kaiser, Vincent Lagendijk, Suzanne Lommers, Frank Schipper, Ruth Oldenziel, Martin Schivelbusch, Isabelle Tölle and Erik van der Vleuten, as well as the audience of the fourth Tensions of Europe conference in Sofia, 17–20 June 2010. Notes 1. This history is based on the records of the Dutch Rhenish Railway Company 1847–62, available at the Municipal Archives Utrecht, inventory nos 431–3, 59, and 90–112 and on the records of the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at the National Archives in The Hague, inventory no. 3221; see also Beijen, Geschiedkundige herinnering aan de Nederlandsche Rhijnspoorwegmaatschappij and Ameshoff, De Nederlandsche Rhijn-Spoorweg. 2. Letter of the General Council of the Dutch Rhenish Railway Company to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 28 July 1847. Municipal Archives Utrecht. Archive of the Dutch Rhenish Railways, inventory no. 901, arch. no. 432. 3. The decision to give in to the Prussian government was made in 1851 by the new liberal minister of Internal Affairs, J.R. Thorbecke. He considered a cross-border rail connection with Prussia very important and was more willing to spend government capital on its realization than his conservative predecessors. Letters of the Minister of Internal Affairs to the president of the Dutch Rhenish Railway Company, 27 January 1851, 6 March 1851, Municipal Archives Utrecht, Archive of the Dutch Rhenish Railway, inventory no. 901, arch. no. 432. Fortunately, the length of the Dutch rail network at the time was very limited. Besides the Amsterdam–Arnhem line, only the 84 km long railway from Amsterdam through Haarlem and The Hague to Rotterdam had to be refitted with the new gauge standard. Interestingly, the only other railway lines on Dutch soil in operation at that time, Moerdijk-Antwerp and Aachen-Maastricht, were constructed with a 1435 mm gauge already. Due to their cross-border nature, the Dutch government had made an exception for these lines by not forcing them to apply the Dutch standard. 4. The Netherlands and Belgium were united at the 1814–15 Vienna Congress. For the history of this line, see Van der Herten, van Meerten, and Verbeurgt Sporen in België, 50–63; Van der Herten, ‘De internationale gerichtheid van België.’ 5. On this line see Denkschrift zur Gegrundung der Projectes der Erbauung einer Eisenbahn zwischen Cöln und Eupen; Kumpmann, Die Entstehung der Rheinischen Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft 1830–1844. 6. By the late 1830s, railway companies were well aware of the implications of having high fixed costs. They understood that because many costs were fixed their cost efficiency depended critically on the volume of traffic and distance traveled. See, for example, Hansemann, Die Eisenbahnen und deren Aktionäre in ihrem Verhältniss zum Staat, 14–18. See also Lardner, Railway Economy, 496–501. 7. See Schipper and Schot, this issue; Jachtenfuchs, ‘The Governance Approach to European Integration’; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, ‘Review Article: The “Governance Turn” in EU Studies.’ 8. For an overview of various national histories we refer to Merger and Polino, COST 340: Towards a European Intermodal Transport Network. European railway histories hardly existed. See O’Brien, Railways and the Economic Development; Ville, Transport. Both books concentrate on the hypothesis that railway (or transport) was a key sector that induced industrialization and economic development. 9. Laurent Tissot was one of the first to publish a number of important articles on how railways passed borders. See, for example, Tissot, ‘Naissance d’ une Europe ferroviaire’; Tissot, ‘Les modèles ferroviaires nationaux.’ See also Burri, Elasser, and Gugerli, Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn 1850–1970; Franke, ‘Europäische Verkehrsintegration im 19. und in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts’; Van der Vleuten et al., ‘Europe’s System Builders’; Anastasiadou, ‘In Search of a Railway Europe’; Roth and Schlögel, Neue Wege in ein Neues Europa. 10. For this argument see, among others, Dienel, ‘Die Eisenbahn und der europäische Möglichkeitsraum, 1870–1914.’ Whether the argument is true remains to be seen. Christian Henrich-Franke, for one, presents another hypothesis, contending the main trend after WWI was not a return to nationalism but rather a general growth of complexity, while also perceiving less discontinuity and more continuity between the nineteenth and twentieth century. See Henrich-Franke, ‘Changing Patterns of Infrastructure Governance in the Transport and Communication Sectors in Europe.’ 11. For this notion we refer to Schot and Lagendijk, ‘Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years.’ 12. On the international financing and ownership of railways see Roth and Dinhobl, Across the Borders. 13. Beijen, Geschiedkundige herinnering aan de Nederlandsche Rhijnspoorwegmaatschappij; Ameshoff, De Nederlandsche Rhijn-Spoorweg. 14. On financing and ownership of Belgian railways, see Buelens, van den Broeck, and Willems, ‘British and French Investments in the Belgian Railway Sector during the Nineteenth Century.’ Also see Van der Herten, van Meerten, and Verbeurgt, Sporen in België. 15. Tissot, ‘The Internationality of Railways,’ 263. 16. Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 64–7; Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 41–2; and Ziegler, Eisenbahnen und Staat, 127. 17. Ameshoff, De Nederlandsche Rhijn-Spoorweg, 46–7. 18. Annual Reports of the Dutch Rhenish Railway Company 1862–4; Ameshoff, De Nederlandsche Rhijn-Spoorweg, 46–7; Statement of H. Ameshoff, Enquiry of the Dutch Parliament on the Dutch Railways, 37. 19. Statements of W.K.M. Vrolijk and H.F.C. Kerstens, Enquiry of the Dutch Parliament on the Dutch Railways, 599–612 and 91–5. 20. For a European history of the role of national governments in various infrastructures including railways, see Millward, Private Public and Enterprise, chap. 4. 21. See, among others, Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 129–30; Reverdy, Les travaux publics en France, 1817–1847. One initiator of the Cologne-Antwerp line, Rhinelandish businessman and politician L. Camphausen, pointed explicitly to this tradition when trying to win financial support of the Prussian state for the founding of the (German) Rhenish Railway Company. See Camphausen, Zur Eisenbahn van Köln nach Antwerpen, 7–8. On the role of the state in railway construction in the nineteenth century, see also Fremdling, ‘European Railways’; Doukas, French Railroads and the State. 22. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 72–3. 23. On the military role in relation to other actors in France, Prussia, and Germany, see Mitchell, The Great Train Race, in particular 79–84, 168–74, and 259–69. 24. Veenendaal, Spoorwegen in Nederland, 59; North Brabant German Railway Company, Annual Reports 1871–3. 25. Chandler, ‘The Railroads: Pioneers in Modern Corporate Management.’ 26. For this history of the gauge see Puffert, Tracks across Continents, Paths through History, in particular 45–83. 27. Festschrift über die Thätigkeit des Vereins Deutscher Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen in den ersten 50 Jahren seinen Bestehens 1846–1896, xvii, I. 28. For an account of these early networks, see Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 203–12. 29. The history of this association is not written. The best sources are histories produced by the association such as Festschrift; Vereinshandbuch, Herausgegeven anlässlich des 90jährigen Bestehens des Vereins im November 1936. 30. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 197. 31. For the origins and the confrontation with the Prussian state, see Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 162–73; Ziegler, Eisenbahnen und Staat im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung, 37–105. 32. See, for example, the report by Weissenbruch, ‘NOTE sur la réunion de l’association des ingénieurs du VEREIN.’ 33. Rückblick auf die Thätigkeit der Techniker-Versammlungen des Vereins, 16. 34. For the main rules, see their 1896 Festschrift. 35. Festschrift, 23–39; Vereinshandbuch, 15–18. The 45% is based on railway statistics in Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, Europe, 1750–2005. 36. Vereinshandbuch, 27; Festschrift, 198–211. 37. For the Verein’s constitution, see Vereinshandbuch, 29–35. 38. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 168–9. 39. For an extensive overview of these regulations, including original agreements, see Festschrift and Vereinshandbuch. 40. On this issue and the position of the Verein, see Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 171–2; Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 40–1; Philippe, ‘Notice sur l’union (Verein) des chemins de fer Allemands,’ 251; Festschrift, 412. 41. On their international organization and its history, see Vereinshandbuch, 36–53; Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 169–70. An important discussion was who should count as member: stockholders or managing companies. The Verein wanted to ensure implementation of its rules, and wanted members who would be in the position to guarantee this. For a long time it tried to commit both owners and directors, but this caused confusion (for example because sometimes the directors only were responsible for certain parts of the network owned by the stockholders), which is why in 1886 it was decided to relate the membership to the managing directors who agreed on behalf of the company. Vereinshandbuch, 29–30. 42. See Festschrift, 411–12, and 414, where it is argued that coercion to force general implementation is impermissible as well as unnecessary and will not help to get compliance (‘Einen Zwang zur allgemeinen Annahme der Bestimmungen hielt man damals noch für “ebenso unzulässig, als unnöthig und unzweckmässig”,’ italics in original). 43. Philippe, ‘Notice sur l’union (Verein) des chemins de fer Allemands.’ 44. Festschrift, 198. 45. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 164–5. The Vereinshandbuch, 19, refers to the power to bind nations together (‘völkerverbindenden Kraft’). See also Ribeill, ‘Aux origines de l’utopie du rèseau ferroviaire européen integer,’ who argues that railway development was nurtured by utopian views of uniting people and civilizations on the Continent. He also refers to what he calls the natural calling for railways to serve long-distance transport, given the high level of fixed costs. 46. Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 123. 47. This emphasis comes through when reading the histories produced by the Verein. It is very explicit in Stieler, Der Internationale Eisenbahnverband und die Entwicklung älterer Internationaler Eisenbahnorganisationen seit Kriegsende, 11–14. Also Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 40, notes that the Verein sought to avoid political overtones. In his view, this was a second-best strategy due to Germany’s lack of a strong political center. In such a situation only a voluntary cooperative technical effort could ensure technical uniformity. He ignores, however, that the Verein was created in opposition to Prussia state efforts to gain more control over private railway companies. We agree with Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 196, that the emphasis on voluntary action originated in the desire to avoid political influence. This opposition is a main theme of railway history in the nineteenth century. The Verein itself cherished its emphasis on voluntary action. The concluding words of its 1896 Festschrift stressed the unique collaborative character of the Verein, notably when compared with England or France. While in England collaboration mainly focused on mutual clearing of accounts and leaving standardization to the market, which resulted in less uniformity and more competition, in France the power to standardize was in the hands of the national state and its engineers who tried to control the six companies formed in the 1850s. When explaining the Verein for Belgium and French companies, Philippe, in ‘Notice sur l’union (Verein) des chemins de fer Allemands,’ 245, argued that despite the fact that the Verein united as many as 110 companies, it had become a powerful actor not easily overruled by the German state. 48. See, for example, Lochner, who at the 50th anniversary in 1896 claimed that (quoting another Verein member):Technical science recognizes but one language – that of Nature – but one law – that of mathematics – regards neither bridges as German, not rolling-stock as Austrian or Hungarian, makes no distinction between locomotive traffic or permanent way experts; does not set up divisions between men, but unites them within a single sphere of useful activity. (Lochner, ‘The Influence of the German Railway “Verein” on the Construction and Equipment of Railway Rolling-Stock’, 452). 49. Enquiry of the Dutch Parliament on the Dutch Railways. 50. Ville, Transport and the Development of the European Economy, 1750–1918, chap. 5 on Railways, 114–71; see also Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 142–4. 51. One was a line across the Semmering Pass, connecting Vienna to Trieste and which opened in 1854. 52. The first transalpine rail link was the line across the Semmering Pass connecting Vienna with the port city of Trieste. The link was opened in 1854. In 1860 Trieste was connected by rail to Venice. 53. Stockmar, Histoire du chemin de fer du Simplon. On Cenis, see also Schram, Railways and the Formation of the Italian State in the Nineteenth Century, 34–5. 54. For a brief historiographical overview of the vast Gotthard literature, see Schueler, Materialising Identity. For the public representation, see 59–82. Mitchell calls the Gotthard the greatest economic coup of nineteenth century Europe in a brief discussion of its history since the late 1840s; Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 58–60; see also 146, where he shows that trade doubled or even tripled between Germany and Italy. 55. For these discussions, see Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 106–8. 56. Ribeill, ‘Aux origines de l’utopie du réseaux ferroviaire Européen intégré,’ 45. See also Burkhart, Der schweizerische Gütertransitverkehr, 15. The Swiss were also active in other areas such as telegraphy and postal mail, activities that were an example for the ones for railways, see Tissot, ‘Naissance d’ une Europe ferroviaire,’ 287. 57. Tissot, ‘Les modèles ferroviaires nationaux,’ 319–26. Tissot identifies three driving forces: the railway companies; small countries such as Switzerland and Belgium with an interest in smooth transit; and the group of business intermediaries such as transport companies, travel companies, and chambers of commerce. 58. Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 51. 59. Ibid., 128 for proposals about the Verein; for the struggle on the nationalization of railways, see 120–41. 60. Ibid., 139. 61. Ibid., 85–90. 62. Tissot, ‘Naissance d’une Europe ferroviaire,’ 289–93; Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 108–9. 63. Ribeill, ‘Aux origines de l’utopie du rèseau ferroviaire Européen intégré,’ 47. 64. Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer en France, 1740–1883, 499–533. 65. Stieler, Der Internationale Eisenbahnverband und die Entwicklung älterer Internationaler Eisenbahnorganisationen seit Kriegsende, 3–5. 66. Ribeill, ‘Aux origines de l’utopie du rèseau ferroviaire Européen intégré,’ 48. 67. Tissot, ‘Naissance d’une Europe ferroviaire.’ For the railway transport of goods crossing borders of more than one state, the Berne Convention created a special common legislation. This formed a complete code of ‘international’ traffic by rail. It was a compromise between the various legislations that applied to the transport in the interior of the countries that signed the agreement. 68. Technische Einheit im Eisenbahnwesen (TE)/Unité technique des chemins de fer (UT) Festschrift zum hunderjährigen Jubiläum 1882–1982. 69. Ribeill, ‘Aux origines de l’utopie du rèseau ferroviaire Européen intégré,’ 48–9. 70. See Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 14; Festschrift, 211–12; Vereinshandbuch, 27. 71. Mitchell, The Great Train Race, 248–9. 72. Ibid., 259. 73. Complaints by passengers were abundant; for a rich account of this, see Hård and Oldenziel, European Technological Dramas. Their work raises the important question of how to relate the practice of conventions and rule-making to the practice of every day railway use. 74. Festschrift, 189–90. Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 4. 75. Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 6. The conferences were also used to organize specific international passenger trains. International custom regulations were often a topic of discussion as well; see Zeitung des Vereins Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen, 84–5. 76. We owe this suggestion to a discussion with Ruth Oldenziel. 77. For its history, see Behrend, The History of Wagons-Lits, 1875–1955; Mühl and Klein, 125 Jahre Internationale Schlafwagen-Gesellschaft. 78. After Bucharest, the train stopped at Giurgiu, where passengers crossed the Danube by ferry to Ruse in Bulgaria, where a second train would be waiting for a journey to Varna on the Black Sea. A steamer then connected for the sea voyage to Istanbul. A direct line was completed in 1889. 79. Railway Gazette, ‘Restaurant and Sleeping-Car Services in Central Europe,’ 119; ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ 581; ‘The International Sleeping Car Company To-Day,’ 340. 80. For a history of this organization, see Schipper et al., ‘New Connections for an Old Continent.’ 81. This relationship is recorded in Wedgwood and Wheeler, International Rail Transport, 11–15; Stieler, Der Internationale Eisenbahnverband und Die Entwicklung älterer Internationaler Eisenbahnorganisationen Seit Kriegsende; and Anastasiadou, ‘In Search of a Railway Europe,’ 79–124. 82. See three brief articles (without author) in the Railway Gazette: ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ 798; ‘International Sleeping Car Company,’ 714; ‘Restaurant and Sleeping-Car Services in Central Europe,’ 119. 83. See Schot and Lagendijk, ‘Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years.’ 84. Suggested by Alec Badenoch in a discussion during a workshop.