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‘Noises Off’: South Africa and the Lancaster House Settlement 1979–1980

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 35; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/03057070902920007

1465-3893

Sue Onslow,

Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics

Abstract In the existing historiography on the final settlement of the long running Rhodesian UDI crisis, the role of the South African Government has received relatively cursory consideration. The memoirs of key British players hint at the importance of Pretoria's policy towards final Zimbabwean independence, and the imperative need for the new Thatcher government to manage this aspect of the Rhodesian imbroglio. However, these accounts fail to elaborate sufficiently on the policy and behaviour of the Nationalist Party Government under its new hard-line Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, and the extent to which this interacted with the incoming Conservative government's diplomatic initiative to resolve the Rhodesian issue. Newly available archival material in South Africa casts a fascinating light on the attitudes and behaviour of the South African Government, as well as the interaction between Pretoria and London. Although the British archives covering the period of the Lusaka Conference and subsequent Lancaster House Conference remain closed, oral testimony of key British players – both politicians and civil servants – points to the centrality of importance of the role of South Africa – both in terms of British policy making, and South Africa's own highly conscious management of this long running crisis for the RSA. Thus, just as in the period 1964–65 in the run up to UDI when South African policy occupied a key place in the origins of the original confrontation between Salisbury and London, so South Africa as a key regional player occupied a critical position in the final peaceful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe in April 1980. Notes 1 Professor Terence Ranger's opening remarks, at the ‘Rhodesian UDI: 40 Years On’ Conference, London School of Economics, January 2005. 2 See S. Onslow, ‘“We Must Gain Time”: South Africa, Rhodesia and the Kissinger Initiative’, South African Historical Journal, 56 (2006). 3 G. Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War Against Zimbabwe 1965–1980 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 265–8. 4 D. Owen, Time To Declare (London, Michael Joseph, 1991); C. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984). 5 J. Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History – In Search of a Nation State (London, Blackwell, 1999), p. 228. South Africa's own reform programme was announced by P.W. Botha in August 1979. 6 See forthcoming article, S. Onslow, ‘South Africa and the Owen–Vance Initiative 1977–1979’. 7 J. Barber and J. Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945–88 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 248. 8 J. Barber and J. Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy: The search for Status and Security 1945–88 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 248. 9 J. Barber, ‘Zimbabwe's Southern Africa Setting’, in W.H. Morris-Jones (ed.), From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House (London, Frank Cass, 1980), p. 81. 10 Although formally the SCC only had an advisory role, its influence rested upon its membership. This comprised the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Justice and Police, Defence, Foreign affairs, plus the senior cabinet Minister (if not one of the four named), and the regular attendance of the Ministers of Finance, Constitutional Development and Planning. Senior civil servants from relevant departments were also members, as well as the chiefs of the internal security services. It was supported by a permanent secretariat, headed by a high level military officer. Officially, its recommendations were subject to Cabinet approval. 11 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 252. 12 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 254. 13 SADFAA (South African Department of Foreign Affairs Archives, Pretoria) BTS 1/156/3, Volume 4, P. Killern, Political Action Committee, Pretoria, 19 January 1979, ‘Guide-Lines to Formulate a Total National Strategy For Rhodesia (Short Term) and for Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (Longer Term) and South West Africa’. 14 Smith claimed authorship. I.D. Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith (London, Blake, 1997), p. 294. 15 Approximately 64.7 per cent of the electorate participated. The victorious Bishop Muzorewa was installed as Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity (GNU) on 1 June 1979. 16 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume Four, ‘SVR Guidelines for ZR in the Light of the London Conference and the Actions which May Arise in Consequence. Strategic Information Summary and Threat Analysis’. 17 ZANLA (the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army) was the military wing of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); ZIPRA (the Zimbabwe Independent People's Revolutionary Army) comprised the armed element of ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African People's Union), led by Joshua Nkomo. 18 Smith even went so far as to suggest the release of Nelson Mandela and negotiations with the ANC. Smith, The Great Betrayal, p. 300. 19 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 ‘Telegram from ZRGBS, Salisbury, to Secretary of Central Security Council’, Pretoria, May 1979. 20 A supervisory commission, led by Alan Lennox-Boyd (former Conservative Colonial Secretary), to oversee the Zimbabwean/Rhodesian electoral process. 21 Vance, Hard Choices, p. 295. 22 SADFAA BTS 1/56/1/6 Volume Two: Zimbabwe: Mediation and Discussions between Britain and Zimbabwe 21.2.66–31.7.79, SAPA report (undated). 23 M. Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonization in Regional and International Politics (London, Cass., 1989), p. 260. 24 SADFAA, BTS 1/156/3, HA Geldenhuys 5.7.79. 25 This decision was reached before Mrs Thatcher's departure to the Lusaka CHOGM. 26 R.F. Botha, quoted in M. Charlton, The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990), p. 86. 27 R. Renwick, Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997), p. 27. 28 Botha, in Charlton, The Last Colony, p. 87. 29 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17, Salisbury 16.8.79, Immediate No. 154, Secret, To Sextern Pretoria. 30 SANA (South African National Archives, Pretoria) CAB 1/1/10 Cabinet Meeting 14.8.79. 31 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 4, Zrgbs Report: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Z-R) Political Development, October 1979. 32 See S. Onslow, ‘“We Must Gain Time”, South Africa, Rhodesia and the Kissinger Initiative’, South African Historical Journal, 56 (2006). 33 SADFAA BTS 5/5 Volume 10, Prime Minister's speeches, General File. Botha's address to public meeting at Parow Civil Centre, 24 September 1979. 34 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17, Permanent SA Mission to UN to Secretary FA, Pretoria, 7 September 1979. 35 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume Four, Svr Guidelines for ZR in the Light of the London Conference and the Actions which May Arise in Consequence. Final Draft, October 1979. 36 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3, Volume Four, SVR Guidelines. 37 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3, Volume Four, Meeting of the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs with the British Prime Minister and British Foreign Minister, London, 17 October 1979. 38 SANA CAB 1/1/11 Cabinet Meetings, 16 October 1979. 39 SANA CAB 1/1/11 Cabinet Meetings, 16 October 1979. 40 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume Four, Minister of Foreign Affairs, London Conference on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 23 October 1979. 41 The Financial Times, 17 October 1978, quoted in Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe, p. 260. 42 SADFAA, BTS 1/156/3 Memorandum October 1979. From: Secretary of the CSC [Central Security Council], CSC/6/3. To: Chairman of the CSC. The RSA Action as a Result of the Visit of His Honourable Minister R.F. Botha to Britain: 17 October–20 October 1979. 43 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3/4, Top Secret, Meeting Held at Libertas on Saturday, 20 October 1979 at 1400 hours between Hon. Prime Minister, and a Zimbabwe/Rhodesia delegation led by the Rt Hon. Deputy Prime Minister. 44 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3/4 S Rhodesia Relations with South Africa, Pretoria 21 October 1979/0920 Oppositely London, Priority, No. 402 Top Secret. 45 At this point, it appeared certain that the Patriotic Front of ZANU and ZAPU would fight on the same ticket. Mugabe only declared his party's intention to campaign independently in mid-December 1979. 46 Lord Renwick, interview with S. Onslow, 30 March 2006. 47 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3/4, top Secret, Telegram No. 443 of 2 November 1979, Carrington. Rhodesia: South Africa approach. 48 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Telephone conversation with Mr Rowan Cronje, Friday, 2 November 1979. 49 See S. Onslow, ‘South Africa and the Owen-Vance Plan of 1977’, South African Historical Journal, 51 (2004). 50 A former Defence Minister and Foreign Minister in Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front government before 1979, P.K. Van Der Byl was loathed by South African officials who despised the reactionary Rhodesian politician as a ‘Piccadilly Dutchman’. 51 The Times, 27 November 1979. 52 The Rand Daily Mail, 29 November 1978, quoted in Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe, p. 271. 53 J. Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia 1979 (Bolder, CO, Westview Press, 1984), p. 81. 54 Renwick, Unconventional Diplomacy, pp. 82–83. SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17A, Patriotic Front document, 27 January 1980. In contrast, Flower's memoir admitted to ‘about 800 SA personnel’ p. 284. The independent Commonwealth monitoring force found it extremely difficult to calculate the exact number. 55 Renwick, Unconventional Diplomacy, p. 82. 56 The word ‘impression’ is used four times in the original Afrikaans document. 57 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume Four, Urgent, to His Honour the Prime Minister, from Minister Pik Botha, 11 December 1979. General Magnus Malan was chief of the South African Defence Force. 58 This was subsequently amended by the British government to read: ‘South African forces are present, with the Governor's agreement at Beitbridge for the sole purpose of help in to ensure the protection of the bridge, which is the essential communications link between SA, Rhodesia and Zambia.’ 59 K. Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964–1981 (London, Murray, 1987), p. 258. 60 Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington (London, Collins, 1988), p. 305. 61 The Observer, 20 January 1980. 62 In December Machel had ‘indicated’ to the British that there were approximately 500 Mozambican troops supporting ZANLA inside Rhodesia. Also, The Cape Times, 4 February 1980. 63 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17A, British Embassy note to DFA, 4 January 1980. 64 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17A, SA Embassy, 22 January 1980 to Secextern, Cape Town, No. K19 Secret. 66 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume Four, Salisbury 26 February 1980, Priority Secextern Cape Town, Top Secret K.113, Sahicom. 65 Smith, ‘The Great Betrayal’, p. 332. 67 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume Four, Pretoria 14 February 1980, Sahicom Salisbury, No. 22. 68 The Guardian, 28 January 1980. 69 ‘This also marked something of a turning point in the orientation of Rhodesian military personnel. Those who wished to continue their careers in uniform began to look primarily to South Africa (through the South Africa Incentive scheme)’. Flower, Serving Secretly, p. 258. 70 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume Four, RF Botha to Prime Minister, 10.1.80. 71 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3, Salisbury, 21 January 1980, Secextern Cape Town. No.K41. 72 Nkomo firmly believed he would win an outright victory, and refused to enter any such coalition. Flower, Serving Secretly p. 264. 73 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17A, Telegram No 45 from Salisbury to Secextern, Cape Town 22 January 1980. 74 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17A, Telegram from Steward New York to Secextern FA, Kaapstad, o.K87, Geheim. Undated, February 1980. 75 The Times, 5 March 1980. 76 Barber and Barret, South Africa's Foreign Policy p. 262. 77 SANA CAB 1/1/11 Cabinet Meeting 4.3.80. 78 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17A, Telegram Bonn 4.3.80 to Secextern, FA Cape Town, No K34. 80 The Guardian, 28 January 1980. 79 There was one last throw of the dice envisaged by South African military intelligence. This was a planned assassination attempt by ex-members of the Rhodesian security forces (now under the direction of the South African Special Forces), of the ZANU leadership, together with other international dignitaries and heads of state, on their way to at the independence celebrations on 17/18 April 1980 This coup attempt was scotched by the Rhodesian intelligence community and the police, who were appalled at the prospect of a blood bath. See H. Holland, Dinner With Mugabe (London, Penguin Books, 2008), p. 34, and author's interview with Dan Stannard, 29 September 2008. 81 SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume Four, 17.4.80, Sexetern Cape Town, No. 213 Personal for Director Genera. 82 SADCC's stated objectives were ‘greater self-reliance, reduction of dependence on South Africa, and the gaining of international support for economic liberation’, Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, p. 229. See also, J. Barber, ‘Zimbabwe's Southern African Setting’, in W.H. Morris-Jones (ed.), From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House (London, Frank Cass, Studies in Commonwealth Politics and History, 9, 1980). 83 Renwick, Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa, p. 103. 84 Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa, p. l08. 85 Unnamed British diplomat, quoted in S. Steadman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe 1974–1980 (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 176.