Security: Missing from the Northern Ireland Model
2015; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/17419166.2015.1004663
ISSN1741-9166
Autores Tópico(s)Gender, Security, and Conflict
ResumoAbstractThe Northern Ireland model is best defined as the framing of the political endgame of Northern Ireland’s conflict culminating in the 1998 Belfast Agreement, otherwise known as the Good Friday Agreement. The Northern Ireland model is popularly portrayed as a negotiated settlement. It focuses primarily on the bargain reached by Northern Irish political parties, assisted by British and Irish governments and mediated by US senator George Mitchell. Academics and officials alike use it to explain how the “Troubles” ended and peace was achieved. Conspicuously absent from this model is security. It also grossly understates the difficulty in dealing with a modern insurgency (the Provisionals) and leans too heavily toward skewed post-conflict thinking that views insurgents as “peacemakers” prevented from making peace because of a manifestly poor security response, particularly that of the police force and its intelligence agency (Special Branch). The perspective of politicians and diplomats who brokered the peace settlement prioritizes political negotiations at the expense of the security response; in so doing, the role of security is undermined and overlooked. Most contemporary academic works promote this outlook. Excluding security, however, thwarts a comprehensive analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict and renders any examination partial and unrepresentative. There is therefore a significant intellectual gap in our understanding of how peace was achieved, which this article redresses. Ultimately, it questions the Northern Ireland model’s capacity to assist in other relevant conflict contexts in any practical sense by arguing that a strategy where security pushed as politics pulled brought about peace. In other words, security played a crucial part because it forced the main protagonists into a situation out of which the Belfast Agreement emerged.Keywords: ConflictInsurgencyIntelligenceProvisionalsPoliceSpecial BranchSecurityTerrorism Notes1. Merlynn Rees, Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective (London: Methuen, 1985), 334.2. Interview with former SB officer, author’s PhD research, UK 2011.3. Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal, 1966–96, and the search for peace (London: Hutchinson, 1995). Also see Michael Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 409.4. Rees, Northern Ireland, 308–309.5. Rees, Northern Ireland, 11 and 310. Also see Carver, Out of Step, 410–11, who was equally perplexed at how “harsh interrogation” techniques were introduced, blaming Whitehall and the Director General of Intelligence in the MOD who was not under his command.6. Brian Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1978), 124–125, also see Peter Taylor, Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980), 20.7. Robin Evelegh, Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society (London: C. Hurst & Company Publishers, 1978), 2 and 134.8. John D. Brewer and Kathleen Magee, Inside the RUC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 2–4.9. Chris Ryder, The Fateful Split: Catholics and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (London: Methuen, 2004), 33.10. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 372. Chris Ryder, The RUC: A Force Under Fire (London: Mandarin House, 1990), supports this view, noting the unionist government failed to recruit from the Catholic community. He shows that as the number of Catholic RIC officers dwindled due to natural wastage, the Catholic representation high of 21 percent steadily reduced to 17 percent.11. “Inquiry will not hear from police chief,” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1853552.stm (accessed 21 April 2012). Detective Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan’s statement of evidence is exhibit JL1 in the “Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry” by the Rt Hon Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman), 2010.12. According to a Special Branch officer who served in Derry City at the time of Bloody Sunday. Interview with former SB officer, author’s research, Iraq 2009.13. Chehab, Inside the Resistance, 17, claims that fifteen Iraqi deaths in Fallujah were caused by the 82nd Airborne Division shooting into a demonstration protesting at a teacher’s killing on the previous day.14. Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), 28, claims that two US soldiers were killed and nine wounded.15. Zaki Chehab, Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East (NY: Nation Books, 2005), 22.16. While the US-led Coalition Forces had all the kinetic aspects (modern parlance for the use of conventional military force) of the invasion worked out; there were acute problems with Phase IV—what happens once the conventional war was won? In other words, the counterinsurgency approach. A former US Army officer (interviewed in Afghanistan 2010 as part of author’s research) recounts: “In the run up to the invasion we practiced everything except Phase IV, this was left undone and we all knew it. We knew it would come back to bite us in the ass.” Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 496–597, describes Phase IV as post-hostilities, stabilization, and reconstruction. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency, (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 3, is critical on the Phase IV issue. He claims Rumsfeld’s office “put intense pressure on the US military to plan for the lowest possible level of US deployment” and underestimated the scale of Iraq’s ethnic/sectarian divisions and economic problems. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 29–30, outlines, “top Bush administration officials acknowledged in late summer 2003 that their plans for postwar Iraq had been flawed on the security front.” While the United States had engaged previously in counterinsurgency operations fighting “shrewder and better organised irregular enemies [refers to Vietnam] than the Iraqi insurgents. The Bush administration was simply not expecting a wily and determined enemy in Iraq,” Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 496–536, counters Hashim’s allegations when claiming he was acutely aware of the religious, tribal and general ethnic tensions of the region that would need accommodated in Phase IV. Rumsfeld’s claims are somewhat undermined, however, when reading Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack. (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 413, where he relates the senior US commander, General Tommy Franks, had predicted the “decisive combat operations would go very fast and they needed to focus on the aftermath. But Rumsfeld and others had been focused on the war” Indeed, Franks—Tommy Franks, American Soldier (NY: HarperCollins, 2005), 861—recognized chaos would follow the conventional stage and that Phase IV would take around 5 years. Woodward, Plan of Attack, 413, accepts that some blame Franks for “blowing the stability operations,” as Franks had all the experience and troops to succeed. From Franks’ position, Woodward points out the general was unable to convince politicians about postwar plans, feeling they only paid lip service to his appeals. For further reading see, Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), Paul L. Bremer III, My Year in Iraq (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006), Patrick Cockburn, The Occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq (London: Verso, 2007), Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004) and Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, Zarqawi: The New Face of al-Qaeda (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).17. House of Commons Defence Committee, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One. Seventh Report of Session 2013–14: Volume 1 (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2014), 30.18. David E. Spence, “Post-Cold War Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America” in Rich and Duyvesteyn eds., The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 246. Spence shows that the Police in Rio killed 1,200 in 2008. Rio de Janeiro’s population of 5 million is just over three times that of Northern Ireland’s 1.6 million.19. The percentage is derived from census data that show the Catholic population in Northern Ireland in 1961 was 35.3 percent and in 2001 at 43.76 percent. Statistics from the 2001 Northern Ireland consensus show a 5 percent decline in the number of Protestants, from 58 percent to 53 percent and a 2 percent increase in the Catholic population from 42 percent to 44 percent. The Catholic community in 2001 makes up the majority of Belfast’s population. Since 1961, when the Protestant figure was 63 percent, it has fallen in every census while the Catholic population has increased from 35 percent. See http://www.4ni.co.uk/northern_ireland_news.asp?id=6135 (accessed 31 Dec 2012). The 2011 census shows Protestants are 45 percent (a decline of 5 percent from 2001) and Catholics are 45 percent of the population (an increase of 1 percent from 2001), see Mark Davenport, “Census figures: NI Protestant population continuing to decline,” BBC News Northern Ireland (11 Dec 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20673534 (accessed 16 Feb 2013). Also see the CAIN website for a summary of each census, found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/popul.htm (accessed 16 Feb 2013).20. Sudarsan Raghavan, “War in Iraq propelling massive migration: Wave creates tension across the Middle East,” Washington Post Foreign Service, (4 Feb 2007). Raghavan estimates that 2 million Iraqis left the country, 8 percent of the prewar population. Also see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/03/AR2007020301604.html (accessed 22 Feb 2011) and UNDP, Arab Human Development Report: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries (New York: UN Publications 2009), 94, where refugee figures in 2007 for Iraq show: Syria – 1.5 million; Jordan – 0.5 million; Iran – 57,414; and Lebanon – 50,000. Total refugees equal 2,107,414.21. Gerry Adams, Hope and History: Making Peace in Ireland (Ireland: Brandon, 2004), 279.22. Anne Cadwallader, Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland (Cork: Mercier Press, 2013), 341; and Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth, The Crowned Harp: Policing a Divided Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), 33 and 158.23. Eamon Mallie and David McKittrick, The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Peace Process (London: Heinemann, 1996), 1554.24. Deborah White, “Iraq war Facts, results & Statistics” (January 31, 2012) shows that 4,487 US soldiers were killed, 32,223 seriously wounded, and 316 non-US troops were killed, 179 of which were British. She also estimates that roughly 55,000 Iraqi insurgents were killed and insurgent strength gradually increased from 15,000 in November 2003 to 70,000 in June 2007. Retrieved from http://usliberals.about.com/od/homelandsecurit1/a/IraqNumbers.htm (accessed 7 Jan 2013). One must be aware that estimates of civilian casualties and responsibility for deaths can widely vary.25. McKittrick et al., Lost Lives, 1553.26. Toby Harnden, Bandit Country: The IRA & South Armagh (London: Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1999), 221.27. Richard J. Chasdi, Counterterror Offensives for the Ghost War World (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010).28. Bill Clinton, My Life (London: Arrow Books, 2005).29. George W. Bush, Decision Points (US: Virgin Books, 2010). Also see Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011).30. Margaret Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), John Major, John Major: An Autobiography (London: HarperCollins, 1999), William Whitelaw, The Whitelaw Memoirs (London: Arum Press, 1989), Merlyn Rees, Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective (London: Methuen, 1985) and Roy Mason, Paying the Price (London: Robert Hale, 1999).31. See Fitzgerald, All in a Life.32. Dean Godson, Himself Alone: David Trimble and the Ordeal of Unionism (London: HarperCollins, 2004).33. Interview with General Petraeus. Kabul 2010.34. Ibid.35. Faulkner, Memoirs of a Statesman, 115.36. M. L. R. Smyth, Fighting for Ireland: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement (London: Routledge, 1996), Brendan O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 1999), Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York: W. W. Norton., 2002) and Rogelio Alonso, The IRA and Armed Struggle (London: Routledge, 2007).37. David H., Petraeus, James F. Amos and John A. Nagl, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 10.38. David Kilcullen, Counter Insurgency (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), 187–188.39. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Praegar Security International, 2006). 1; and Kilcullen, Counter Insurgency, 206. Also see Seán MacStiofáin, Memoirs of a Revolutionary (Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), 133, where he identifies December 1969 as the date when the Provisionals were created.40. Steven Metz, “Rethinking Insurgency” in Rich and Duyvesteyn, eds. The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 38.41. Ibid.42. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling Shot and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2006), 208.43. MacStiofáin, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 143–146. MacStiofáin’s template was a three-phase strategy to defend Catholics in the north then, “as soon as it became feasible and practical, the IRA [PIRA] would move from a purely defensive position into a phase of combined defence and retaliation,” followed by “launching all-out offensive action against the British occupation system.” Also see Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. (US: Praeger, 2007).44. Metz, “Rethinking Insurgency,” in The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, in Rich and Duyvesteyn, eds., 38.45. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 150.46. O’Brien, The Long War, 107.47. Ibid48. Peter Hart, The I.R.A. and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916–1923 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).49. Petraeus, Nagl and Amos, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 385, Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 2, and Charles Townsend, “The Culture of Paramilitarism in Ireland,” chapter 8 in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 315.50. Evelegh, Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society, 40, extends this view in pointing out that the Provisionals were unconcerned about the loss of life of a Catholic in an attack by loyalists but welcomed it as an opportunity to project a propaganda message that the “Army had connived” in the shooting because it was a Catholic victim51. See A. R. Oppenheimer, IRA the Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009).52. Ryder, The RUC, 26.53. Author’s PhD research. The document was captured on a leading PIRA figure in February 1974.54. Figures obtained from an analysis of David McKittrick, David, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton, and David McVea, Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2008).55. Christina Lamb, “Mullahs stopped Bin Laden killing children,” Sunday Times (3 June 2012), 23. Lamb identifies that close associate of bin Laden, Fadil Harun, sat on an al-Qaeda committee that directed, “captured soldiers were not to be killed as they were no longer a threat.”56. Francis Costello, The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath 1916–1923: Years of Revolt (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003). Also see Chris Ryder, The RUC: A Force Under Fire (London: Mandarin House, 1990), 211–213.57. Author’s PhD research.58. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 40. Also see Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (US: Praeger, 2007), 43–44; where he outlines guerilla warfare cannot exist without the support of the masses.59. Interview with Tim Collins, Kabul 2010.60. Kevin Toolis, Rebel Hearts: Journey’s within the IRA’s Soul (New York: Macmillan, 1995), 20.61. Ed Moloney, Voices From the Grave (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 273–274.62. See Conor Cruise O’Brien, Ancestral Voices: Religion and Nationalism in Ireland (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1995) and also Robert Kee, The Green Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism (London: Penguin Books, 2001).63. Robin Evelegh, Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1978), 7.64. Brid Rodgers was interviewed by Mark Carruthers on ‘The View’, BBC 1 (9 April 2013).65. Europol, TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague: Europol Publications), 26–27, categorizes ‘IRA’ terrorism as ethno-nationalist. ETA in Spain is similarly categorized.66. Charles Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber 1986), 67.67. D. J. Betz, “Cyberspace and Insurgency” in Rich and Duyvesteyn, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 56–58.68. Interview with General Petraeus, author’s PhD research, Kabul 2010.69. Ryder, The RUC, 147.70. John Hermon, Holding the Line (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1997), 99.71. Ibid, 99–111. Hermon explains that Merlyn Rees argued that the Army should not be in control of security and advocated Police primacy. He further illustrates Police primacy was central to a speech by Rees in parliament in January 1976. Rees, Northern Ireland, 91, identifies the policy of Police primacy was first thought of by him in 1974. However, it was not until 1 January 1977, according to Chris Ryder, The Fateful Split: Catholics and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (London: Methuen, 2004), 249, that a new era was ushered in by Newman. Ryder describes it as, “police primacy with the RUC in the driving seat.”72. General Petraeus supplied the author (December 2010) with papers detailing in broad terms the Whole of Government strategy the US newly drafted for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.73. Richard Iron, “Britain’s Longest War: Northern Ireland 1967–2007” in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 177–178, provides an excellent account of Framework Operations conducted by regular Police and Army that were designed to deter and prevent insurgent activity.74. Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher, 384.75. Ibid.76. Ibid.77. Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher, The Authorized Biography. Volume One: Not For Turning (London: Penguin Books, 2013).78. Henry Patterson, Ireland’s Violent Frontier: The Border and Anglo-Irish Relations during the Troubles (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 189.79. Author’s PhD research broke down the evolution of Special Branch during the conflict into three stages: Reactive (1969–1976); Developmental (1977–1982); and Mature (1983–1998).80. Lord Gardiner (Chairman), Report of a Committee to consider in the context of civil liberties and human rights, measures to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland (London: HMSO, 1975).81. H. G. Bennett (Chairman, Hon Judge, Q.C.), Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland (London: HMSO, 1979). These reports and others relating to the conflict can be found at the excellent CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet) website located at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk82. For the Converted Terrorist concept, see Tony Gifford, Supergrasses: The Use of Accomplice Evidence in Northern Ireland—A Report by Tony Gifford QC (London: Cobden Trust, 1984).83. Interview with a retired SB officer, author’s PhD research, Iraq 2009.84. Thomas Hennessey, The Evolution of the Troubles 1970–72. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 345.85. Patrick Bishop and Eamon Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Heinemann, 1987), 15. The authors interviewed McGuinness. Also see Peter Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 172.86. Rees, Northern Ireland, 149.87. David Fairhall, “Sir Frank Cooper,” The Guardian (31 Jan 2002). http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2002/jan/31/guardianobituaries.falklands (accessed 16 March 2013).88. Aaron Edwards and Cillian McGrattan, The Northern Ireland Conflict: A Beginners Guide (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2010), 25–27.89. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 142.90. Interview with former SB officer, author’s PhD research, UK 2012.91. Eamon O’Kane, “Learning from Northern Ireland? The Uses and Abuses of the ‘Irish Model,’” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 12 (2010): 239–256.92. Patterson, Ireland’s Violent Frontier, 11–14.93. Baron Hunt (Chairman), Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland (Belfast: HMSO, 1969). A connected report is, Lord Cameron, Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Belfast: HMSO, 1969).94. Georgina Sinclair, “Sir Arthur Young: The Quintessential English Policeman (Part II – Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary October 1969–November 1970)” Constabulary Gazette, Historical Society Supplement (Spring 2000): 5–8 and 6. For further reading on Sir Arthur Young see, Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945–1980 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).95. Peter Taylor, Stalker: The Search for the Truth (London: Faber and Faber, 1987). Taylor’s account disclosed secret tactics about covert operations and speculated on the identity of sources.96. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 390.97. Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland 1919–1921: The Development of Political and Military Policies (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 41.98. Ronald Weitzer, Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 213.99. Ori Brafman and Rod D. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations (New York: Portfolio Group, 2006), 39.100. Interview with former SB officer, author’s PhD research, UK 2012.101. Urban, Big Boys’ Rules, 47 and Ellison and Smyth, The Crowned Harp, 93.102. Author’s PhD research, report by ACC M Slevin (Head of Special Branch), to the NIO, 2 Oct 1979 (Ref: POLF8/SL) regarding the establishment of ‘E’ Department (SB).103. At a conference in Belfast (1 July 2014) hosted by the Criminal Administration of Justice (CAJ) and the Transitional Justice Institute of the University of Ulster, Paul O’Connor (Director of the Pat Finucane Centre) delivered a presentation entitled ‘Deadly Intelligence and the Rule of Law.’ During his delivery O’Connor claimed Special Branch was under the direct control of MI5, which was undisputed by the panel or audience. Regarding the role of MI5 see, Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009). There is nothing in Andrew’s work that states or implies MI5 directly controlled SB.104. Stalker, John Stalker.105. Andrew Sanders, “Northern Ireland: The Intelligence War 1969–75,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (BJPIR) 13 (2011), 230–248; and Jon Moran, “Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland,” Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 1 (February 2010), 1–23.106. Bernard Porter, The Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch before the First World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987).107. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Chichester: Capstone, 2010).108. Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl, The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 34 and 79.109. Home Office Circular 97/69, “Guidance on Participating Informers” (1969). Author’s PhD research.110. Anon, Tales of the R.I.C, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1921).111. Raymond Gilmour, Dead Ground: Infiltrating the IRA (London: Warner Books, 1998), Sean O’Callaghan, The Informer (London: Corgi Books, 1999), Kevin Fulton, Unsung Hero: How I Saved Dozens of Lives as a Secret Agent Inside the IRA (London: John Blake, 2008) and Martin McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking: The Heroic True Story of a British Agent Inside the IRA (London: John Blake, 2009).112. Chris Reid and John Buckley, Human Source Management: A Better Approach to Managing Sources (UK: Home Office Research, 2005).113. Dennis G Fitzgerald, Informants and Undercover Investigations: A Practical Guide to Law and Policy (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2007).114. Desmond De Silva, The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review: The Rt Hon Sir Desmond de Silva QC (London: Stationary Office, 2012), 6.115. David A. Charters, David A. “Have A Go: British Army/MI5 Agent-running Operations in Northern Ireland 1970–72,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 2 (31 October 2012), 202–229.116. Martin Dillon, The Dirty War (London: Arrow Books, 1991), 468–469.117. Although the Stalker/Sampson Report has never been published, in 2013 it was given to Martin McCauley (resident in the ROI as he is wanted in Colombia having escaped from serving a custodial sentence related to training FARC terrorists in 2004) the family of Michael Tighe and associate solicitors with the proviso it cannot be disclosed. See Alan Erwin, “Shoot-to-kill reports key to Colombia Three man’s appeal,” The Belfast Telegraph.co.uk (26 April 2013). http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/shoottokill-reports-key-in-colombia-three-mans-appeal-29224575.html (accessed 4 May 2013).118. Peter Taylor, Provos The IRA and Sinn Fein (London: Bloomsbury, 1998), 214–215. Also see Sean Cronin, Irish Nationalism: A History of Its Roots and Ideology (Dublin: The Academy Press, 1980) where Glover’s report is reprinted, 339–357.119. David Ramsbotham, “General Sir James Glover: Soldier whose assessment of the IRA changed the course of war and peace in Ireland,” Guardian, Obituaries (16 June 2000). http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2000/jun/16/guardianobituaries1 (accessed 2 Sept 2012) shows that Glover’s assessment was considered ahead of its time. Also see Richardson “Britain and the IRA” in Art and Richardson eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism Lesson from the Past, 78 and Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal, 1966–96, and the search for peace (London: Hutchinson, 1995), 248–250.120. See Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers’ Party (London: Penguin Books, 2010).121. Patterson, Ireland’s Violent Frontier.122. Fitzgerald, All in a Life, 279 and 572-575.123. Stephen Dempster, “What about Dublin?” BBC Spotlight, BBC1 (7 Feb 2012). The figures relate to the period 1973–1998. The program can be found online at, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006v04h/episodes/guide?page=2 (accessed 18 Feb 2014).124. Mallie and McKittrick, The Fight for Peace, 64.125. Figures from author’s PhD research.126. 242 prisoners were republican and 194 loyalist, 12 prisoners had no particular affiliation. http://www.dojni.gov.uk/northern-ireland-prison-service.htm (accessed 12 May 2010).127. Jim Cusack and Henry McDonald, UVF: The Endgame (Dublin: Poolbeg, 2008), 221.128. Interview in Afghanistan 2010.129. Not all those convicted and imprisoned on terrorist-related criminal offences would have been active “volunteers,” particularly in Divisional arrests (local Uniform Police), but active supporters caught up in assisting the commission of a terrorist crime—supplying vehicles, providing information on Security Forces, hiding munitions etc.130. Includes the Det who killed 3. Also, three innocent civilians were killed (two Protestants and one Catholic) as well as three Special Forces soldiers in 22 separate incidents. One loyalist paramilitary was also killed. McKittrick et al., Lost Lives, 1551, attributes the SAS with killing 62 people throughout the ‘Troubles,” however, it appears to include anything of a military covert nature under the SAS label and does not itemize how many where insurgents, innocent civilians, loyalist paramilitaries or Security Forces.131. Sam Trotter, Constabulary Heroes 1869–2009: Incorporating the RUC GC/PSNI and their Forebears including the USC (Coleraine: Impact Printing, 2009), 338–353.132. Tony Geraghty, The Irish War: The Military History of Domestic Conflict (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 124.133. Ryder, The RUC, 2.134. Geraghty, The Irish War.135. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.136. Ellison and Smyth, The Crowned Harp, 133.137. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000), 234.138. Urban, Big Boys’ Rules, Taylor, Stalker, and Peter Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA. (London: Bloomsbury, 2002).139. Ellison and Smyth, The Crowned Harp, 141–142, claim the Security Forces killed 27 during this period [Jan 1988–Dec 1992], 16 in “undercover” operations. However, McKittrick et al, Lost Lives, 1553, show the Security Forces were responsible for 39 deaths in this period (Army 31, RUC 7 and UDR 1). Of this total (39), 22 were killed in twelve separate covert operations. This comprised 19 insurgents; I member of the UVF; I innocent civilian bystander (Protestant); and 1 E4 HMSU officer.140. 22 people killed in 12 separate incidents (17 PIRA, 1 IPLO, 1 INLA, 1 UVF, 1 E4 HMSU and I civilian).141. Ellison and Smyth, The Crowned Harp, and John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland (London: Palgrave, 2002).142. Ní Aoláin, The Politics of Force, 55 and 59.143. Taylor, Brits, 302.144. Brian Feeney, Insider: Gerry Bradley’s Life in the IRA (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 2009), 234 and Jack Holland and Susan Phoeni
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