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Progressive embodiment within cyberspace: Considering the psychological impact of the supermorphic persona

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 24; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09515089.2011.556606

1465-394X

Garry Young, Monica T. Whitty,

Action Observation and Synchronization

Abstract This paper is premised on the idea that cyberspace permits the user a degree of somatic flexibility—a means of transcending the physical body but not, importantly, embodiment. Set within a framework of progressive embodiment (the assumption that individuals seek to exploit somatic flexibility so as to extend the boundaries of their own embodiment—what we call the supermorphic persona), we examine the manner of this progression. Specifically, to what extent do components of embodiment—the self-as-object, the phenomenal self, and the body-schema—find authentic expression within cyberspace? In addition, we also consider ways in which the issue of authenticity might impact on the psychological well being of the individual who seeks to transcend domains and present their supermorphic persona on- and offline. Keywords: Body-ImageBody-SchemaCyberspaceEmbodimentPhenomenal SelfSelf-as-Object Notes Notes [1] By “experience,” we refer to cyberspace providing the user with the opportunity to experience disembodiment in a manner compatible with Descartes’ conceptualisation of the mind as disembodied, but, importantly, without the problematic ontological baggage that accompanies strict Cartesian dualism. The disembodiment we speak of, then, is in keeping with much of the recent literature on this subject and is not characterised by any form of ontological division; it is simply something the user putatively experiences. [2] We borrow the term from Biocca (Citation1997). [3] It is worth noting that the authenticity issue we are addressing here does not, we contend, impact widely on what Heidegger would perhaps regard as the more fundamental issue of authenticity in relation to our ‘ontological anxiety’—that is, our failure to embrace our existential state of being. Perhaps the use of virtual reality technology as a means of transcending the physical body would be viewed by Heidegger as a further means by which we can fail to embrace the reality of our existential status. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for drawing this point to our attention. [4] The notion of ideal/authentic embodiment, presented here, has some similarities with Rogers’ (Citation1951) description of the ‘true self’, but is not meant to be equivalent. Neither is ideal embodiment equivalent to Higgins’ (Citation1987) ideal self. Nor, finally, is idealised/inauthentic embodiment the same as Higgins’ ought to self—although aspects are compatible. For a discussion on the similarities and differences between the ideal and idealised, as presented here, see Young and Whitty (forthcoming b). [5] Meadows describes the avatar as “an interactive, social representation of the user” that allows him/her to “interact in social spaces” (2008, p. 13), and also as “a narrative device for collaborative functions” (p. 18). Avatars can present in non-immersive environments as photographs or even as drawings, or in more complex forms as 3-D interactive characters with differing dimensions and perspectives. In immersive VEs, they correspond to the virtual mapping of one's embodiment perceived by oneself (and others) as immersed within the VE, and in whose form (however approximate this may be to one's objective body) one engages in, and experiences, fully immersed virtual interactions. [6] The word was originally used by Minsky (Citation1980). [7] As a predecessor to Lenggenhager et al.'s manipulation of embodied experience, Botvinick and Cohen (Citation1998) designed the rubber hand illusion. Here, the synchronicity between a visual stimulus (rubber hand being stroked) and a tactile stimulus (one's own hand being stroked) produces an alteration in one's body-image. What I see is not a rubber hand being stroked but my own hand, and where I see it being stroked is experienced as congruent with the proprioceptive sense I have of my own hand's location. [8] The body one's consciousness is directed towards should be understood as more than a mere biological entity, or what Gallagher (Citation2005b), following Metzinger (Citation2004), refers to as Körper; rather it constitutes the self embodied, or Leib. [9] The beneficial or detrimental effects might also depend on the experience one has whilst exploring different alternative selves. I might decide to ‘try out’ an idealised/inauthentic self, and from the experience learn about ways to behave and attitudes to possess that will ultimately contribute to an authentic presentation of myself-as-object. [10] Different theorists use different terminology. McKenna et al. draw from Roger's (1951) theory of the ‘true self’—what they refer to as the ‘Real Me’—to describe the manifestation of traits or characteristics genuinely possessed by the individual but who is otherwise unable to express them. [11] Ford also provides an example in which a paralysed sibling is able to interact with his younger, non-paralysed brother within a VE in ways not possible in the non-virtual world. [12] It is worth noting that Second Life, at the same time as providing individuals with disabilities the opportunity to ‘escape’ this aspect of their body-image, also provides the opportunity for those in wheelchairs (or even more physically able individuals) to create an avatar wheelchair user—see “Wheelies”. [13] Here ‘ideal’ should be understood as representing a cultural ideal, and therefore, on our reading, constitutes idealised. [14] In research reported by Hancock, Toma, and Ellison (Citation2007), individuals admitted to lying about their weight and height on their online dating profiles (women lying more about weight and men lying more about height). [15] Such exploration may be a necessary first step toward authenticity—again, as Turkle's example of Gordon demonstrates. [16] Some users of Second Life may wish to, and indeed do, interact offline. However, this is not the primary motivation for entering this space. [17] Because we are claiming that the experience is genuine/real, it is important to distinguish between VR experience and, say, hallucination. VR experiences are stimulated by external triggers—the virtual interface—whereas hallucinations are triggered by internal events. Despite this difference, each experience in no less genuine, as an experience, but only the former is an experience that stems from an external reality—i.e, a real physical source independent of the experiencing subject. For an interesting discussion on how virtual technology can inform the perennial problem of the brain-in-the-vat hypothesis, by constituting a complex physical source for the production of embodied experience, see Gallagher (Citation2005b). [18] Some may wish to question the difference between a genuine and an authentic experience. The use of these two terms is merely to distinguish between the experience, itself, and what the experience is an experience of, as will become apparent as we progress. [19] Similarly, Mueller, Stevens, Thorogood, O’Brien, and Wulf (Citation2007) describe a virtual game, Breakout for Two, in which a ball strikes blocks in a wall with the aim of dislodging them. The ball's impact intensity is mapped onto a three-point scale: the harder the ball is hit, the higher the intensity is registered on the scale and the more the block ‘cracks’. However, what this means is that the actual intensity of the strike is ‘filtered’ down to one of only three possible levels of virtual strike. [20] We can see the emergence of Mooradian's example at a commercial level in Wii games such as Punch Out, Fight Night, and The Circle. [21] As evidence for the importance of this last point, when investigating the rubber hand illusion (see also note 5), Costantini and Haggard (Citation2007) found that a mismatch in the synchronicity between one's perception of the rubber hand being stroked and the tactile sense one has of one's own hand being stroked reduced the illusion. [22] It could be that the VE is a more suitable environment for the realisation of one's embodied potential than a non-virtual environment because, by fighting virtual opponents, one is able to engage in a higher level of combat, with a more skilled opponent, than would be practically possible, or even available, in the offline world. [23] We recognise that we are running somewhat roughshod over the quite serious issue of accurately (authentically) simulating the sensory experience of impact and resistance, as well as the equally problematic issue of pain. This brings us back to Fairweather's point about ‘safe’ sport being inauthentic sport. [24] See Auvray and Myin (2009) for a related discussion on sensory substitution devices which allow a person access to features of the world that are normally available only through another sensory modality—for example, allowing a blind person access to visual features of the world through the substitute modality of audition. [25] Of course, the appropriation of cyberspace as a tool applies to any body-schema; it is simply that the examples provided by Ford are particularly apt, we feel. In addition, Mueller et al. (Citation2007) talk of “providing a new sensation and experience by leveraging the technological opportunities that lie in a ubiquitous computing environment” (p. 635). Thus they engaged in what they called their FlyGuy project in order to allow users to experience what is not possible in the offline world—namely, flying. [26] The example of Second Life applies to both aspects of one's body-image—namely, the self-as-object, and the phenomenal self. However, we recognise that Second Life, as yet, does not incorporate full immersion technology. Nevertheless, users do experience a certain degree of presence within the VE.