Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record Straight on Irregular Warfare
2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 32; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01636600902772836
ISSN1530-9177
AutoresJohn A. Nagl, Brian M. Burton,
Tópico(s)Military and Defense Studies
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” Department of Defense Directive no. 3000.05, November 28, 2005, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf; “Counterinsurgency,” Department of the Army FM 3–24, December 2006, http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf; “Operations,” Department of the Army FM 3–0, February 2008, http://downloads.army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf; “Stability Operations” Department of the Army FM 3-07 October 2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-07.pdf; “Irregular Warfare,” Department of Defense Directive no. 3000.07, December 1, 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf. 2. Michael J. Mazarr, “The Folly of “Asymmetric War’, ” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008): 35, http://www.twq.com/08summer/docs/08summer_mazarr.pdf. 3. See Guy Raz, “Army Focus on Counterinsurgency Debated Within,” National Public Radio, May 6, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90200038; Sean McFarland, Michael Shields, and Jeffrey Snow, “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery's Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders,” http://www.npr.org/documents/2008/may/artillerywhitepaper.pdf; Tom Vanden Brook, “Army Plans Same Troop Levels in Iraq until 2010,” USA Today, October 11, 2006. 4. Gian Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities,” World Politics Review, March 4, 2008, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1715. 5. Gian Gentile's posting in response to “Gentile, Not Gentle,” Abu Muqawama, June 27, 2008, http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/06/gentile-not-gentle.html. 6. Robert M. Gates, speech, National Defense University, Washington D.C., September 29, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1279 [hereinafter Gates’ Remarks]. This speech was the basis for Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age”, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88103/robert-m-gates/how-to-reprogram-the-pentagon.html. 7. See David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); Sir Robert G.K. Thompson, “Basic Principles and Operational Concepts of Counterinsurgency,” in American Defense Policy, eds. Mark E. Smith and Claude J. Johns (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 260–271; David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review (January–February 2006): 2–12, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb06/Petraeus1.pdf; Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” Military Review (July–August 2005): 4–17; Peter W. Chiarelli and Stephen M. Smith, “Learning from Our Modern Wars: The Imperative of Preparing for a Dangerous Future,” Military Review (September–October 2007): 2–15. 8. On the U.S. military's problems adapting to counterinsurgency in Vietnam, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988) and John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). On the U.S. military's early failures to prepare for and effectively combat the Iraqi insurgency, see Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). 9. Mazarr, “Folly of ‘Asymmetric War,’” pp. 35 and 40. 10. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 2–9. 11. Robert M. Gates, speech, Kansas State University, Kansas, November 26, 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199. 12. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, “The Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America,” July 16, 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/07/107063.htm. 13. See Karen DeYoung, “Envoys Resist Forced Iraq Duty,” The Washington Post, November 1, 2007. 14. Mazarr, “Folly of ‘Asymmetric War’,” p. 41. 15. Mazarr, “Folly of ‘Asymmetric War’,” p. 46. 16. For example, U.S. Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap, Jr. writes that airpower should continue to be emphasized as “America's asymmetric advantage” rather than putting more “boots on the ground” in counterinsurgency campaigns in Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “America's Asymmetric Advantage,” Armed Forces Journal (September 2006), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013. Additionally, U.S. Army Colonel Gian Gentile asserts that new counterinsurgency and stability operations doctrine wrongly deemphasizes “fighting” from the soldier's repertoire in Gian Gentile, “Eating Soup with a Spoon,” Armed Forces Journal (September 2007), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780, and “Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 25–31, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqgentile.pdf. 17. See Theodor H. Winkler, “The Shifting Face of Violence,” World Policy Journal (Fall 2008): 29–36. 18. Jim Thomas, Sustainable Security: Developing a Security Strategy for the Long Haul (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, April 2008), http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?1924, p. 9. 19. Gates’ Remarks. 20. See Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 21. “Stability Operations,” Department of the Army FM 3–07, October 2008, p. 1–1, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-07.pdf. 22. For more on this point see John Nagl and Paul Yingling, “New Rules for New Enemies,” Armed Forces Journal (October 2006), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088425. 23. See Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), http://www.potomacinstitute.org/publications/Potomac_HybridWar_0108.pdf, and T.X. Hammes, “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges,” Military Review (May–June 2007): 14–17. 24. John D. McKinnon, “National Security Adviser Says Pakistan is Top U.S. Challenge,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123128052408558763.html. 25. See Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” June 2008, pp. 6–10, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf. 26. For example, see Gentile, “Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars,” p. 29; Dunlap, “America's Asymmetric Advantage.” 27. Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” pp. 8–9. 28. General George Casey, referring to the importance of the Transition Teams trained at Fort Riley, Kansas, quoted in Dustin Roberts, “Army Chief of Staff Visits Fort Riley,” Fort Riley Post, May 17, 2007, p.1. 29. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” 2007, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI_ISFreport062707/OI_Report_FINAL.pdf. 30. Ann Scott Tyson, “3,300 More Troops Sought to Train Afghans,” The Washington Post, November 13, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/12/AR2008111202681.html?nav=rss_nation/special. 31. See John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Command,” Military Review (September/October 2008), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081031_art007.pdf. 32. See Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” pp. 1, 18–19, 21–23. 33. See Andrew Hoehn, et al., A New Division of Labor: Meeting America's Security Challenges Beyond Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007); Andrew Feickert, “Does the Army Need a Full Spectrum Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, RL34333, January 18, 2008, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34333.pdf. 34. Feickert, “Does the Army Need a Full Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?” 35. His actual quote, regarding the war in Iraq, was, “That is the war we are in. That is the war we must win.” See Robert M. Gates, speech, Heritage Foundation, Colorado Springs, Colorado, May 13, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1240. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJohn A. Nagl John A. Nagl is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). A retired army officer who helped write the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (University of Chicago Press, 2007), he visited Afghanistan and Iraq in 2008 at the invitation of the U.S. Commands there Brian M. Burton Brian M. Burton is a research assistant at CNAS
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