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The Spider in Europe's Web? French Grand Strategy From Iraq to Libya

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 18; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14650045.2012.698336

1557-3028

Luis Simón,

Defense, Military, and Policy Studies

Abstract This article examines the relationship between geopolitical change and the evolution of French grand strategy from Iraq to Libya. While the European Union (EU) and the bilateral relationship with Germany continue to feature high in French grand strategy, France has in the space of just a few years substantially strengthened its Atlantic connection (with the US, Britain and NATO) and upgraded its relationship with other European powers – particularly Russia. It is argued that the driving reason behind this diversifying trend is the weakening of the US-led West, both globally and in Europe. If US military power laid the foundations of order in and around Europe, America's shift of geostrategic attention eastwards is underpinning a political destructuring of Europe and its broader neighbourhood. For one thing, Europe is moving towards a more multipolar balance, as evidenced by Russia's resurgence in the east and southeast, Turkey's drifting from the EU and growing influence in the continent's southeast and, crucially, Germany's increasing influence over the direction of the EU. For another, France's so-called axis of strategic priority (Northern Africa, the Sahel, Levant, Horn of Africa/Red Sea and the Gulf) is characterised by mounting instability and increasing penetration by external powers. Against this backdrop, the special relationship with Germany and the EU are insufficient to guarantee French influence in Europe, the stability of Europe's broader neighbourhood or France's aspirations to global power. In an increasingly uncertain global and regional environment, France is seeking to reconcile a deeper politico-military relationship with Britain (and the United States), a special relationship with Germany in the politico-economic sphere and strong ties with Russia, thereby positioning itself as a sort of spider in an increasingly multipolar European geopolitical web. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Amelia Hadfield, François Heisbourg, Jolyon Howorth, Alexander Mattelaer, Alister Miskimmon, James Rogers and three anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. Notes 1. Walter Russell Mead, 'The Wilsonian World Order Has Once Again Been Postponed', The American Interest, 5 Oct. 2011. 2. The Iraq intervention did not get United Nations Security Council back up, it was a full-blown invasion and had little support in the Arab world. In contrast, the one in Libya was mostly circumscribed to airstrikes, enjoyed UNSC cover and the political support of the Arab League. 3. France's intervention in Libya along NATO, Britain and the US must be seen in the broader context of its reintegration in NATO's command structure (2009), improvement of bilateral ties with the US (since 2008) and signing of two military treaties with Britain (November 2010). Hence, the alignment patterns of the 2011 Libya War are highly illustrative of the process of geostrategic reorientation that concerns the article. Having said this, this article does not contend that France's grand strategic reorientation explains its decision to intervene in Libya nor does it intend to provide an explanation of the factors that led to such intervention. The paper is concerned with grand strategic trends, not specific foreign policy decisions (a distinction explained below). 4. See Fréderic Bozo, 'Alliance atlantique: la fin de l'exception française? La fin de l'exception française', Document du travail, Fondation pour l'Innovation Politique, Feb. 2008; Jolyon Howorth, 'Prodigal Son or Trojan Horse: What's in it for France?', European Security 19/1 (2010) pp. 11–28. 5. See André Dumoulin, France-OTAN: vers un rapprochement doctrinal? Au delà du 40e anniversaire de la crise franco-atlantique (Brussels: Bruylant 2006). 6. The French White Paper on Defense and National Security (Paris: Documentation Française 2008) pp. 41–42, 72, 136, 202, 302. 7. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf 1948). 8. Rudolf Kjellén, Staten som Lifsform [The State as a Living Organism] (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers 1916). 9. On how a country's geographical context reflects upon its strategic culture or Grand Strategy, see Colin Gray, 'Geography and Grand Strategy', Comparative Strategy 10/4 (1991) pp. 311–329. 10. For other classic works on geopolitics, see Halford J. Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', The Geographical Journal 23 (1904) pp. 421–437; Nicholas Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company 1944). For classic French geopolitical works see Jacques Ancel, Géopolitique (Paris: Delagrave 1936); Yves Lacoste, La Géographie ça sert d'abord à faire la guerre (Paris: Maspero 1976). For alternative conceptions of geopolitics see Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996); Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1998). 11. For post-structuralist works on international relations see David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1992); Robert B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993). 12. Colin Gray, 'Inescapable Geography', Journal of Strategic Studies 22/2 (1999) p. 163. I will therefore use grand strategy and geostrategy indistinctively, just as I will refer to the international environment, the geopolitical environment and geopolitics indistinctively. 13. On the concept of grand strategy, see Paul Kennedy Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press 1991); Basil H. Liddel Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (Whitstable: Latimer Trend and Co Ltd 1967); Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986). 14. Pascale Vennesson, 'Competing Visions for the European Union Grand Strategy', European Foreign Affairs Review 15 (2010) pp. 59–60. 15. Albeit not dealing with grand strategy proper, James Fearon explains aptly the differences between foreign policy trajectories and decisions when comparing International Relations theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. See James Fearon, 'Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and Theories of International Relations', Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998) pp. 289–313. 16. On the impact of the balance of domestic forces upon a state's constitution, see Jim Bulpitt, Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: an Interpretation (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1983); Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, and Derek Urwin (eds.), State formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999). On domestic politics and grand strategy, see Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993). On domestic politics and foreign policy, see Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', International Organization 52/1 (1998) pp. 513–553. 17. See Leopold von Ranke, 'Dialogue on Politics', in Theodor von Laue (ed.), Leopold von Ranke. The Formative Years (Princeton, 1950) p. 172. See also Leopold von Ranke's essay on 'The Great Powers', in Roger Wines (ed.), Leopold von Ranke. The Secret of World History. Selected Writings on the Art and Science of History (New York: Fordham University Press 1981) pp. 121–155. For a debate on the primacy of foreign policy see Brendan Simms, 'The Return of the Primacy of Foreign Policy', German History 21/3 (2003) pp. 275–291. 18. See Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, 'Toward a Realist Theory of State Action', International Studies Quarterly 33/4 (1989) pp. 457–474. 19. See Pierre Lellouche, 'France and the Euromissiles: The Limits of Immunity', Foreign Affairs 62/2 (1983/1984) pp. 318–334. 20. See David Howarth, The French Road to European Monetary Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001) pp. 60–66. See also Ronald Tiersky, François Mitterrand: A Very French President (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000). 21. On the three axes of French geostrategy, see Jean Dufourcq, 'A la charnière', Politique Etrangére 2 (2002) pp. 471–486. 22. On the 'extrovert' vs 'introvert' discussion, see Francois Heisbourg, 'Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity', Survival 42/2 (2000) pp. 5–15. On the differences between maritime, continental and hybrid power see James Rogers and Luis Simón, 'Three Geographies – and Societies: The European Union's Enduring Problem', Strategic Snapshot 2 (2011), Group on Grand Strategy. 23. Illustrative map showing the main directions of French geostrategy. 24. Fernand Braudel, L'identité de la France: Espace et Histoire, Tome 1 (Paris: Flammarion 1990) pp. 321–333. 25. See Halford J. Mackinder, The Rhine (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company 1908). 26. On Germany's importance upon French politics and history, see Gaston Zeller, La France et l'Allemagne depuis dix siecles (Paris: Colin 1932). 27. See Braudel (note 24) pp. 315–318. 28. See Robert Morrissey, L'empereur a la Barbe Fleurie – Charlemagne Dans la Mythologie et l'Histoire de France (Paris: Gallimard 1997). 29. See Braudel (note 24) pp. 329–331. Mahan argued that, due to their lack of mobility, states with a land and a sea border were in clear geostrategic disadvantage in respect to insular states. See Alfred T. Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political (London: Sampson, Low, Marston 1902). For a more detailed discussion on France's continental vs. maritime dilemma, see Emile Bourgeois, Manuel Historique de politique étrangère V1: Les origins (Paris: Belin Frères 1892). The existence of two seaboards does not necessarily present a geostrategic liability in itself. However, in France, the problem is compounded by the enormous distance existing between the Atlantic and Mediterranean seaboards, separated by Spain, Portugal and, critically, Britain's presence in Gibraltar since 1713. This means that these countries stand in between a smooth communication between France's two fleets, what explains France's historical attempts to establish a foothold in the strait of Gibraltar. 30. See Henri Lorin, La France: Puissance Coloniale. Étude d'histoire et de Géographie (Paris: Augustin Challamel 1906). 31. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House 1987) pp. 143–373. On the revitalisation of the Eurasian heartland following the geographical expansion of the industrial revolution see Halford J. Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', The Geographical Journal 23 (1904) pp. 421–437. 32. Dufourcq (note 21) pp. 473–474. 33. For a perceptive analysis of France's strategic objectives after World War Two see William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Stability in Europe, 1945–1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1998). 34. Author's interviews at the British and German Permanent Representations to the EU in Brussels (May 2009). On France's attempts to use the EU as an instrument at the service of its national interests in Africa, see Bruno Charbonneau, 'Dreams of Empire: France, Europe and the New Interventionism in Africa', Modern & Contemporary France 16/3 (2008) pp. 279–295. See also Gorm Rye Olsen, 'The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?', International Peacekeeping 16/2 (2009) pp. 245–260. Similarly, and without prejudicing its eventual outcome, so was France's proposal for a Union for the Mediterranean animated by its will to use the EU as a multiplier of French interests and an instrument of French priorities there (author's interview at the EU General Council Secretariat in Brussels, Nov. 2010). On this questions see Rosa Balfour, 'The Transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean', Mediterranean Politics 14/1 (2009) pp. 99–105. 35. Robert Frank, 'La France et son rapport au monde du XX siècle', Politique Étrangère 3/4 (2000) pp. 832–833. 36. See Adrian Treacher, 'Europe as a Power Multiplier for French Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation', European Security 10/1 (2001) p. 24. 37. For a comprehensive analysis of this puzzle and how the French sought to channel their preferences under the constraints imposed by Washington, see Hitchcock (note 33). 38. Ibid., pp. 99–133. 39. On France's Golden Age or Trente Glorieuses see Bruno Palier, Gouverner la Sécurité Sociale. Les réformes du système de protection sociale depuis 1945 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2005) section III. 40. Author's interview with French defence official in Paris, June 2009 (interviewee 1). On the impact of the Suez crisis on French grand strategy see Maurice Vaïsse, La Grandeur: politique étrangère du général de Gaulle (1958–1969) (Paris: Fayard 1998). 41. See Étienne de Durand, 'Quel format d'armée pour la France?', Politique Etrangére 4 (2007) pp. 729–742. On the French nuclear deterrent see Bruno Tertrais, La France et la dissuasion nucléaire: concept, moyens, avenir (Paris: La Documentation Française 2007). For an overview of French defence industrial strategy, see Hélène Masson, L'industrie de défense française à la croisée des chemins. Partie 1: Industries de défense et actionnariat public: une singularité française (Paris: Annuaire stratégique et militaire de la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 2001). On de Gaulle's flirtations with the Soviet Union, see David Thomson, 'General de Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons', International Affairs 41/1 (1965) pp. 11–21. 42. Kennedy, Rise and Fall (note 31) p. 624. 43. Other NATO countries (including Britain) concentrated primarily on tactical military capabilities that would add up to NATO's overall effort. France, on its part, put much emphasis on building up the kind of strategic military capabilities that would underpin autonomy. On this see Durand (note 41) pp. 738–739. 44. See Niall Ferguson, 'The End of Europe?', American Enterprise Institute Brandley Lecture (2004); Andrew Moravcsik, 'De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy 1958–1970 (Part 1)', Journal of Cold War Studies 2/2 (2000) p. 5. 45. See Kennedy, Rise and Fall (note 31) pp. 627–630. The force de frappe's added value was that it provided an independent centre of nuclear decision-making (from NATO's), which added to the Soviet Union's uncertainty. France, however, never stopped military cooperation with NATO and with the US. See Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri, and Frédéric Bozo, La France et l'OTAN, 1949–1996 (Brussels: Complex 1996) 46. Author's interview with French defence official in Paris, May 2009 (interviewee 2). 47. Ibid. See also Lellouche (note 19) pp. 318–334. 48. Lellouche (note 19) pp. 325–326. 49. See Kennedy, Rise and Fall (note 31) p. 553. It was in a spirit of curtailing their dependence on the US and West Germany, particularly in the monetary realm, that the French started to push for monetary cooperation at the European level from the late 1960s. On this, see Howarth (note 20). 50. Helen Parr, 'Anglo-French Nuclear Collaboration and Britain's Policy towards Europe, 1970–1973', in Jan van der Harst (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975 (Brussels: Bruylant 2007) pp. 35–60. 51. Wilfried Loth, 'European Political Co-operation and European Security in the Policies of George Pompidou and Willy Brandt', in Jan van der Harst (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975 (Brussels: Bruylant 2007) p. 32. 52. Interviewee 1 (note 40). See also Giles Andréani, 'La France et l'OTAN après la guerre froide', Politique étrangère 63/1 (1998) pp. 80–83. 53. On France's attempts to integrate Russia in the post-Cold War European security architecture, see Christian Lequesne, La France dans la Nouvelle Europe: Assurer le changement d'échelle (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po 2008) 54. Andréani (note 52) pp. 80–81. 55. Martin A. Smith, NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War (Norwell: Kluver Academic Publishers 2000) pp. 98–128. 56. Ibid., pp. 98–165. 57. See Andréani (note 52) pp. 77–92; Frédéric Bozo, 'Alliance atlantique: La fin de l'exception française?', Document du travail, Fondation pour l'Innovation Politique (Feb. 2008). France played a leading part in engineering a partnership between the Alliance and Russia, formalised at a NATO-Russia Summit in Paris in 1997, which it saw as a way to hedge against excessive US influence in Europe and to delay the whole process of Eastern enlargement. Author's interview with former US State department official, Washington DC (Feb. 2009). 58. Livre Blanc sur la Défense (Paris: Documentation Française 1994) pp. 26–27; 31–34; 73–74; 120–121. See also Jean-Philippe Douin, 'Adapting French Defence to the New Geostrategic Context', The RUSI Journal 142/4 (1997) pp. 1–5. 59. Author's interview at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, May 2006 (interviewee 3). 60. See Howarth (note 20) pp. 113–144. 61. Interviewee 3 (note 59). 62. On the birth of CSDP (formerly known as European Security and Defense Policy or ESDP), see Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?, Chaillot Paper 43 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies 2000). 63. Interviewee 1 (note 40). 64. On this process see André Dumoulin, France-OTAN: vers un rapprochement doctrinal? Au delà du 40e anniversaire de la crise franco-atlantique (Brussels: Bruylant, 2006). 65. Andréani (note 52) pp. 85–87. 66. Interviewee 1 (note 40). 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. See Andréani (note 52) pp. 89–90. 70. See Timothy Garden, 'The Future of ESDP – Defence Capabilities for Europe', The International Spectator 38/3 (2003) pp. 7–14. 71. See Stephen Walt, 'Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy', International Security 26/3 (2001) pp. 56–78 72. Christopher Coker, 'Rebooting the West: The US, Europe and the Future of the Western Alliance', Whitehall Paper 72/1 (2009). 73. See G. John Ikenberry, 'America's Imperial Ambition', Foreign Affairs 81/5 (2002) pp. 44–60; Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush doctrine', Political Science Quarterly 118/3 (2003) pp. 365–388. 74. Author's interview with UK Foreign Office official in London (April 2008). On France's rejection of US unilateralism, see Thierry Tardy, 'France and the US: The Inevitable Clash?', International Journal 59/1 (2003/2004) pp. 105–126. On embedded hegemony see G. John Ikenberry, 'Institutions, strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American Post-War Order', International Security 23/3 (1998) pp. 43–78. 75. Author's interview with former French defence official in Paris, May 2009 (interviewee 4). 76. Donald C. F. Daniel, Peter J. Dombrowski, and Rodger A. Payne, 'The Bush Doctrine: Rest in Peace?', Defence Studies 4/1 (2004) pp. 18–39. 77. Interviewee 4 (note 75). 78. See Bruno Tertrais, 'The Perfect Storm (Review Essay)', Survival, 46/3 (2004) pp. 161–167. 79. Eleventh Ambassadors' Conference, Speech by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, 29 Aug. 2003, Paris. 80. Interviewee 3 (note 59). 81. On this see Jolyon Howorth, 'The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of ESDP: A Question of Flexibility', European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2004) p. 5 82. Author's interview at NATO's International Staff in Brussels, April 2008 (interviewee 5). 83. 2003–2008 Military Programme Bill of Law (Paris: Ministère de la Defense 2002) p. 1. 84. Ibid., pp. 4, 9. 85. Interviewee 1 (note 40). 86. Interviewee 3 (note 59). 87. Interviewee 1 (note 40). 88. Interviewee 3 (note 59). On the ephemerity of the post-11 September world see David Calleo, Follies of Power: America's Unipolar Fantasy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009). 89. Interviewee 1 (note 40). 90. Author's interview at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, June 2006 (interviewee 6). 91. Ibid. 92. Author's interview at the EU General Council Secretariat in Brussels, May 2009 (interviewee 7). See also Simon Serfaty, 'Terms of Estrangement: French-American Relations in Perspective', Survival 47/3 (2005) pp. 86–87. 93. The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', Washington, DC, March, p 11, 21. 94. See Eva Gross, 'The EU and the Comprehensive Approach', Danish Institute for International Studies Reports 2008/13; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'NATO's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress', Danish Institute for International Studies Reports 2008/15. 95. Interviewee 7 (note 92). 96. It is important to bear in mind that this was a fortuituous alignment, not a conscious alliance. It was the result of a coincidence of interests of two countries coming from rather opposite angles in the so-called extrovert vs introvert and Europeanist vs Atlanticist cleavages. That is what made it 'awkward'. On the extrovert vs introvert and Atlanticist vs Europeanist debates, see, respectively Heisbourg (note 22) and Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, 'Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture', International Affairs 77/3 (2001) pp. 587–603. 97. Author's interviews with various defence officials in Berlin and London (March–June 2008). 98. Interviewee 1 (note 40). 99. Ibid. 100. On the centrality of the US to German foreign policy, see Helga Hafterndorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 2006). 101. See Calleo (note 88); Michael Cox, 'Is the United States in Decline – Again? An Essay', International Affairs 83/4 (2007) pp. 643–653; Richard Haass, 'The Age of Nonpolarity – What Will Follow US Dominance?', Foreign Affairs 87/3 (2008) pp. 18–43; Fred Halliday, 'International Relations in a Post-Hegemonic Age', International Affairs 85/1 (2009) pp. 37–53. 102. French White Paper (note 6) pp. 33–34, 72. 103. Interviewee 1 (note 40). On Sarkozy's connection with the US see Marcel H. Van Herpen, 'I Say NATO, You Say No NATO', The National Interest 95 (May/June 2008) pp. 92–96. 104. Interviewee 1 (note 40). See also Frederic Bozo and Guillaume Parmentier, 'France and the United States: Waiting for Regime Change', Survival 49/1 (2007) pp. 184–186. 105. Interviewee 1 (note 40); Bozo and Parmentier (note 103) p. 85. 106. Ibid. On France's increasingly open attitude in the framework of the debates over a comprehensive approach in NATO, see Jakobsen, NATO's comprehensive approach to crisis response operations. On France's reintegration in NATO's military command, see Fréderic Bozo, 'Alliance atlantique: La fin de l'exception française? La fin de l'exception française', Document du travail (Paris: Fondation pour l'Innovation Politique 2008); Howorth, 'Prodigal Son' (note 4) pp. 11–28. On the improvement of US-French bilateral relations, see Bozo and Parmentier (note 104); Van Herpen (note 103). 107. Author's personal communication with a member of the 2008 Livre Blanc commission, May 2010 (interviewee 8). 108. French White Paper (note 6) p. 35. 109. Luis Simón and James Rogers, 'British Geostrategy for a European Age', The RUSI Journal 156/2 (2011) p. 54. 110. Interviewee 8 (note 107). 111. Interviewee 2 (note 46). 112. French White Paper (note 6) pp. 41–42, 72, 136, 202, 302. 113. On how the global financial crisis has strengthened China's global position, see William H. Overholt, 'China in the Global Financial Crisis: Rising Influence, Rising Challenges', Washington Quarterly 33/1 (2010) pp. 21–34. It is, however, too early to tell whether a still ongoing financial crisis will result in a relative strengthening of Asia vis-à-vis the West in the long term. In this regard, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis', The Washington Quarterly 33/4 (2010) pp. 143–153. 114. Author's interviews to various French defence officials, Paris (April–June 2009). See also Mbaye Cisse, 'L'affirmation d'une stratégie de puissance: la politique africaine de la Chine', Diploweb: La revue géopolitique (2007). On China's increasing presence in Africa, see Chris Alden, 'China in Africa', Survival 45/3 (2005) pp. 147–164. 115. Yves Lacoste, 'Sahara: perspectives et illusions géopolitiques', Hérodote 142 (2011) p. 39. 116. Author's interview with former EU official in Brussels, Nov. 2011 (interviewee 9). In this same line see Jean-Pierre Chevènement, 'France and Britain – a New Special Relationship', The Guardian (26 March 2011); Jérôme Vaillant, 'Une embellie pour l'Allemagne, une embellie pour l'Europe?', Diploweb: La revue géopolitique (29 Sep. 2010). 117. Author's interview at the European Commission in Brussels, June 2011 (interviewee 10). 118. Author's interview with French defence official in Brussels, July 2011 (interviewee 11). On the impact of defence budget cuts on Europe's militaries see Thomas Valasek, 'Surviving Austerity: The Case for a New Approach to EU Military Collaboration (London: Centre for European Reform 2011). 119. Author's interview with French defence official in Brussels, Oct. 2011 (interviewee 12). 120. Ibid. 121. Author's interview with former British foreign affairs official in London, April 2008 (interviewee 13). 122. Author's interview with French defence official in Madrid, Febr. 2011 (interviewee 14). 123. Luis Simón and James Rogers, 'The Return of European Geopolitics: All Roads Lead Through London', The RUSI Journal 155/3 (2010) p. 61. 124. Author's interview at the UK Ministry of Defense in London, April 2011 (interviewee 15). 125. Interviewee 14 (note 122). On the Franco-Polish strategic partnership see Polish Embassy in Paris, Le partenariat stratégique polono-français, available at . 126. Interviewee 14 (note 122). The concept Weimar Triangle refers to a trilateral forum of consultation between Germany, France and Poland created in 1991. See Wolfram Vogel, 'The Franco-German-Polish Weimar Triangle: A Strategic Instrument of Franco-German relations', in C. Germond and T. Henning (eds.), A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 1991) pp. 261–272. 127. See Julian Lindley-French, 'Britain and France: A Dialogue of Decline?', Chatham House ISP PP, Feb. 2010. 128. Simón and James Rogers 'British Geostrategy' (note 109) p. 56 129. Ministère de la Défense et des Anciens Combattants, 'Sommet franco-britanique: une declaration conjointe de defense', 17 Feb. 2012, available at . 130. Author's interview with former French defence official in Brussels, Oct. 2011 (interviewee 4). 131. Interviewee 9 (note 116). 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. 134. Interviewee 10 (note 117). 135. Interviewee 9 (note 116). 136. Ibid. 137. Author's interview with EU Council official in Brussels, June 2011 (interviewee 16). On how Germany tied its support for Monetary Union to 'Political Union' (and greater coordination in foreign and defence policy in particular) during the Maastricht negotiations see Michael J. Baun, 'The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France and European Integration', Political Science Quarterly 110/4 (1995–1996) p. 616. 138. Interviewee 11 (note 118). In this regard, the 2008 French White Paper (note 6) continued to emphasise the importance of enhancing the EU's 'presence in the fields of security and defence' (p. 75) and to European technological and strategic autonomy (pp. 251–271). 139. Author's interview with various French defence officials in Paris and Brussels (May 2009– July 2011). In this same line see Kaare Dahl Martinsen and Annette Hurun, 'The French Return to NATO', Comparative Strategy 30/4 (2011) pp. 333–346. 140. Interviewee 11 (note 118). See Federico Santopinto, 'La France et l'Europe de la défense: deux énigmes', Note d'Analyse du GRIP (28 March 2011). 141. 'Sidestepping the UK over EU Military Headquarters?', European Voice, 15 Sep. 2011. 142. Author's interview with Polish defence official in Brussels, Nov. 2011 (interviewee 17). 143. Author's interview with members of the Political and Security Committee from three different national delegations in Brussels, Oct./Nov. 2011 (interviewees 18, 19, and 20). On France's loss of enthusiasm on CSDP see Clara Marina O'Donnell, 'Britain and France Should Not Give Up on EU Defense Co-Operation', Centre for European Reform Policy Brief (Oct. 2011) p. 4. 144. Lacoste, 'Sahara' (note 115) p. 39. 145. On America's mounting presence in this area see Enrique Fojón, 'Uganda: el AFRICOM a escena', Atenea, 25 Oct. 2011. On Franco-American cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel area see Antonin Tisseron, 'Enchevêtrements géopolitiques autour de la lutte contre le terrorisme dans le Sahara', Hérodote 142 (2011) pp. 98–107. 146. Author's interview with EU Council official in Brussels, June 2011 (interviewee 21). 147. Ibid. 148. Interviewee 9 (note 116). 149. Author's interview at a national delegation to the Political and Security Committee in Brussels, Oct. 2011 (interviewee 18). 150. Ibid. 151. Ibid. 152. Interviewee 4 (note 130). See James Rogers and Luis Simón, The Military Installations of the Member States of the European Union and their Potential for European Security and Defense Policy (Brussels: European Parliament 2009). 153. Interviewee 8 (note 107). 154. Author's personal communication with French defence advisor, Sep. 2011 (interviewee 22). On Indo-French defence cooperation see Vijay Sakhuja, 'India, France Strategic Partnership: Nuclear and Maritime Cooperation', Analysis Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, 28 May 2011. 155. Author's interview at the EU General Council Secretariat. On France's view of the EU as a contributor to the Western-led "collective security" system see French White Paper (note 6) p. 115. On the EU's position on the disputes between China, Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea see Pia-Lee Brago, 'EU Ready to Assist in West Philipinne Sea Dispute', Asia's Maritime Security Brief, 24 Nov. 2011.