Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà Vu?
2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/0163660x.2013.825557
ISSN1530-9177
Autores Tópico(s)Global Peace and Security Dynamics
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgments The author is grateful to James Cameron, Zachary S. Davis, Frank O'Donnell, Mark Fitzpatrick, Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, and David O. Smith for comments on drafts of this paper. All errors are my own. Notes 1. Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” Asian Survey 41, no. 6 (December 2001). 2. Bruce Riedel, ed., “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House Bruce Riedel,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: the Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 139. Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, November 11, 2001. 3. Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination,” in Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2012), 37–38. 4. Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (Times Books, 2012), 146. 5. Shyam Saran, “Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” Speech at India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, April 24, 2013, http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf. 6. See, for example, Vipin Narang, “Indian Nuclear Posture: Confusing Signals from DRDO,” New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), September 26, 2011, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndianNuclearPostureConfusingSignalsfromDRDO_vnarang_260911; Daniel Buchonnet, “MIRV: A Brief History of Minuteman and Multiple Reentry Vehicles,” Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, February 1976, pg. 12, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/NC/mirv/mirv.html; Rajesh Basrur, “Nuclear Weapons and India's National Security Strategy,” in Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond, ed. Krishnappa Venkatshamy and Princy George (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis (IDSA), 2012), 132–136. 7. Andrew Bast, “Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2011): 75, csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumnbast_0.pdf. For a dissenting view of Pakistan's fissile material inventories, see “Mansoor” excerpted in Michael Krepon, “The Tortoise and the Hare: A Rebuttal,” Arms Control Wonk, April 23, 2013, http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3754/the-tortoise-and-the-hare-a-rebuttal. 8. Zia Mian, “Pakistan,” in Assuring Destruction Forever: Nuclear Weapon Modernization Around the World, ed. Ray Acheson (Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 2012), 53. 9. “The South Asian Nuclear Balance: An Interview With Pakistani Ambassador to the CD Zamir Akram,” Arms Control Today, December 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_12/Interview_With_Pakistani_Ambassador_to_the_CD_Zamir_Akram. 10. Bruno Tertrais, Pakistan's Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks, Non-Proliferation Papers, no. 19 (EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, July 2012), 18, http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais5010305e17790.pdf. 11. “Press Release,” Inter Services Public Relations, no. PR94/2011-ISPR, April 19, 2011, http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721. 12. Janet Wood, Nuclear Power (Stevenage, United Kingdom: The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2007), 8. 13. Rajuram Nagappa, Arun Vishwanathan, and Aditi Malhotra, Hatf-IX/Nasr - Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak Deterrence, (Bangalore, India: National Institute for Advanced Studies, July 2013). 14. Bruno Tertrais, Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: a Net Assessment (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), June 13, 2012), 9; Zahir Kazmi, SRBMs Deterrence and Regional Stability in South Asia: A Case Study of Nasr and Prahaar (Islamabad: Institute Of Regional Studies, October 2012), 14, http://www.irs.org.pk/strategic/spso12.pdf. 15. Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), 396, 250. 16. Narang, “Indian Nuclear Posture: Confusing Signals from DRDO”; Ajai Shukla, “Army's ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine Gets Teeth,” Business Standard, July 22, 2011, http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/army-s-cold-start-doctrine-gets-teeth-111072200071_1.html. 17. Verghese Koithara, Managing India's Nuclear Forces (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 192–193. 18. Shashank Joshi, “India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 (August 2013): 12–13. 19. Maleeha Lodhi, “Pakistan's Nuclear Compulsions,” The News International, November 6, 2012, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-141314-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-compulsions. 20. Rajesh M. Basrur, “Kargil, Terrorism, and India's Strategic Shift,” India Review 1, no. 4 (2002): 39; Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (January 1, 2008): 158–190. 21. David O. Smith, “The U.S. Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia” Stimson Center, March 4, 2013, 32, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/David_Smith_Tactical_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf. 22. Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 36. 23. Christopher Clary, Thinking About Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War, IDSA Occasional Paper (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), September 2010), 21. 24. Khan quoted in Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 59. 25. Naeem Salik, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability,” Naval Postgraduate School, pg. 3, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2012/2012_002_Salik.pdf. 26. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 81–82. Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 2012), 33–41. 27. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 81–82. Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 2012), 103. 28. Tom Nichols quoted in David O. Smith, “The U.S. Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia,” The Stimson Center, March 4, 2013, 18, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/David_Smith_Tactical_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf. 29. J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 1983), 26–27; and Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, 37. 30. Feroz Hassan Khan and Nick Masellis, U.S.–Pakistan Strategic Partnership: A Track II Dialogue, Sixth Iteration (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, January 2012), 28. 31. Praveen Swami, “Nuclear apocalypse: that's what's at stake this Pakistan election,” First Post, May 9, 2013, http://www.firstpost.com/world/nuclear-apocalypse-thats-whats-at-stake-this-pakistan-election-765919.html. 32. A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan's Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack (Bradford: Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, November 11, 2010), 9, http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/faculty-staff/zia-mian/Limited-Military-Utility-of-Pakistans.pdf. 33. Ashley J Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 132–134. 34. Jeffrey G. Lewis, “Pakistan's Nuclear Artillery?” Arms Control Wonk, December 12, 2011, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4866/pakistans-nuclear-artillery. 35. Private information from multiple, mutually corroborating sources in the Indian military. 36. Private information from multiple, mutually corroborating sources in the Indian military. See Michael Krepon, “Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability,” Stimson Center, December 2012, pg. 20, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Krepon_-_Pakistan_Nuclear_Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf. 37. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 104; Ernest R. May and Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “History of the Development and Deployment of BNW,” in Battlefield Nuclear Weapons: Issues and Options, ed. Stephen D. Biddle and Peter D. Feaver (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 19. 38. Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond,” 48. 39. Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond,” 27–28. 40. Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan: a Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971), 7. One Pakistani author actually invokes Pakistani vulnerability to explain that the NATO/Pakistan analogy is misleading, and that therefore Pakistan “needs weapons” where the United States did not. See Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Deterrence Stability Between India and Pakistan (Naval Postgraduate School), 9, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2012/2012_002_Jaspal.pdf. 41. Gordon S Barrass, The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2009), 194. France was not then and is not now part of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, but it was an adherent of the view that TNWs ought to be seen less as battlefield weapons and more as signals. See Harald Muller and Annette Schaper, “Definitions, Types, Missions, Risks and Options for Control: a European Perspective,” in Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control (United Nations Publications, 2000), 34. 42. Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 35–43. 43. Ejaz Haider, a prominent Pakistani columnist, is one notable exception: Ejaz Haider, “Stupidity Goes Nuclear,” The Expres Tribune, April 25, 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/156311/stupidity-goes-nuclear--i/. 44. Catherine Kelleher quoted in Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond,” 53. 45. Catherine Kelleher quoted in Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond,” 24, 40; Günter Bischof, Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment (LSU Press, 1995), 182; Scott Douglas Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1990), 142–143; Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Brookings Institution Press, 1993), 46–52. 46. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Command-and-Control in South Asia During Peace, Crisis and War,” Contemporary South Asia 14, no. 2 (2005): 168–169. The SPD denies that it plans to devolve nuclear authority. See Bruno Tertrais, Pakistan's Nuclear and WMD Programmes. 47. Salik, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability.” 48. Peter J. Roman, “Ike's Hair-trigger: U.S. Nuclear Predelegation, 1953–60,” Security Studies 7, no. 4 (1998): 164, 159–160. 49. See, respectively, Roger M. Anders, “The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control,” Military Affairs 52, no. 1 (January 1988): 1; Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 171. 50. Tertrais, Pakistan's Nuclear and WMD Programmes, 7. 51. Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, no. 4 (April 1, 1994): 68. For Sagan's discussion of Pakistan, see pp. 82-83. 52. Michael Krepon, Ziad Haider, and Charles Thornton, “Are Tactical Nuclear Weapons Needed in South Asia?,” in Escalatin Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, ed. Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider (Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), 128–129. 53. David O. Smith, “The U.S. Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia.” 54. Clary, Thinking About Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis, and War, 32. 55. Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace?” 56. On the evolution of Soviet military doctrine, see Barrass, The Great Cold War, 212–215, 267–268; on the comparisons with India, see Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (January 1, 2008): 164–167. 57. Francisco Aguilar et al., An Introduction to Pakistan's Military (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kenendy School, July 2011), 10. 58. “Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2011,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 17, 2012, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-factsheet-on-military-expenditure-2011.pdf 59. Private information from multiple, mutually corroborating sources in the Indian military. 60. See, for instance, Munir Akram, “For Comprehensive Security,” Dawn, May 13, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/05/13/for-comprehensive-security/. 61. Benjamin Schemmer cited in Barrass, The Great Cold War, 214; Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 165; S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, Studies in Asian Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 51. 62. George Perkovich, “The Non-Unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia” (Stimson Center, December 2012), 7, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/George_Perkovich_-_The_Non_Unitary_Model_and_Deterrence_Stability_in_South_Asia.pdf. 63. Salik, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability,” 1. 64. Usman Ansari, “Pakistan Acknowledges Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent,” DefenseNews, May 23, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120523/DEFREG03/305230004/Pakistan-Acknowledges-Sea-Based-Nuclear-Deterrent?odyssey=nav%7Chead. Additional informationNotes on contributorsShashank Joshi Shashank Joshi is a Research Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, and a PhD Candidate at the Department of Government, Harvard University
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