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Islamist moderation without democratization: the coming of age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development?

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13510340802575890

1743-890X

Eva Wegner, Miquel Pellicer,

Multiculturalism, Politics, Migration, Gender

Abstract This article studies a novel factor relevant for the moderation of an Islamist party: the degree of dependency on a social movement organization. This question is examined in a case study analysing the evolution of the relationship between the Moroccan Islamist party, Party of Justice and Development (PJD), and its founding social movement organization. Over time, the PJD has been gaining autonomy, becoming more moderate and simultaneously gaining strength. Contemporaneously, liberalization in Morocco has been partially reversed, partly as a result of the rising Islamist strength. These findings suggest that it is the strength of the Islamist opposition, rather than its ideological rigidity, that makes MENA rulers reluctant to liberalize. We study the implications of these findings for European Union policy towards Islamist parties in the MENA region. Keywords: Islamist partiesMoroccomoderationauthoritarianism Notes See Nancy Bermeo's discussion of the literature in her article 'Myths of Moderation'. See, for instance: Clark, 'The Conditions of Islamist Moderation'; Schwedler, Faith in Moderation; Robinson, 'Can Islamists be Democrats?'. Schwedler, 'Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties', 59, emphasis in the original. See Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, 149. Clark, for instance, writes that 'questions concerning whether the inclusion of Islamist political parties is leading to their ideological moderation and, as a result, the deepening of democracy, have become important and expanding areas of study in the literature on the Middle East' ('The Conditions of Islamist Moderation', 541). More generally, the fact that moderation is defined in relation to democratic practices and that its importance is motivated by the 'paradox of democracy' whereby possibly non-democratic actors may subvert democracy suggests that the Islamists' ideological rigidity is indeed perceived as a barrier for democratization in the Middle East. See Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, chapter 1. Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean'; Jünemann, 'Support for Democracy or Fear of Islamism?'; Sharp, 'US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East'. For the implications of such an 'external sponsor' of a political party, see Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power. There are some issues that are typically part of the agenda of Islamist groups, such as the promotion of conservative morals, of personal status laws that are in line with supposed Qu'ranic principles, and of shari'a law. In accordance with the vagueness of the religious texts on which Islamist groups draw, the actual content of the ideology of Islamist parties or movement organizations as well as the role ascribed to shari'a is not immutable and varies across organization, country, and time. For a good overview of variations of Islamist ideology, see Krämer, Gottes Staat als Republik. Of course, this development may not apply in all cases: some social movements may eventually become more moderate while some of these parties may never do so. The history of other social movement parties in general, however, shows that the large majority of such parties eventually drop a fundamentalist, ideologically driven agenda. See, for instance, Offe, 'Reflections on the Self-Transformation of Movement Politics', or Hanagan. 'Social Movements'. The 2003–2004 field research was carried out by Eva Wegner; field research in 2007 was undertaken by both authors. The other strand is Sheikh Yassine's Justice and Charity organization (al-'Adl wal-Ihsan). This organization is barred from participation in political institutions. Its exclusion is 'self-chosen' as it refuses the conditions of political participation: to accept both the religious legitimacy of the monarchy and its dominant role in politics. The dates given for the founding of the Islamic Youth Association range from 1969 to 1972. Sayyed Qutb (1906–1966) is considered one of the most influential Islamist theorists and activists in the twentieth century. In the 1950s and 1960s, he became the mastermind of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He is especially known for his view of Islam as a general religious, moral, social, and political system in his book Mile Stones in 1964. According to Qutb, shari'a is supposed to be the sole base of government and social relations in an 'Islamic state'. Accordingly, Qutb rejected the extant Arab regimes and advocated not only proselytizing and exemplary behaviour but also violence to achieve the true Islamic society. He was sentenced to death in 1966. For the history of the Movement of Unity and Reform, see Tozy, Monarchie et Islam politique au Maroc. The charter is cited in Shahin, Political Ascent, 189. Al-Tajdid, Special Issue on the Movement of Unity and Reform (December 2002), 4. Ibid., 16. The party received four million dirhams for the 1997 elections, 17m dirhams for the 2002 elections, and another 4m dirhams for the 2003 communal elections (figures provided by the PJD's treasurer). The membership subscription is collected once a year. Working members (those who have been active for more than one year and have the right to vote in the party's internal elections) pay 200 dirhams (around €20). Participating members (those who have just joined to the party and still have to prove their commitment) pay 100 dirhams (around €10). While it was impossible to get precise figures, these were given by party leaders during author's interviews with members of the PJD's general secretariat, Rabat, 4 September 2003 and 17 November 2003. Data collected at the PJD's party congress in 2004. See Wegner, The Inclusion of Islamist Movements. Data is available from the authors upon request. Profiles published daily in Al-Tajdid from 12 to 26 September 2002. Data available from the authors upon request. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power. The 1997 by-laws were published in the PJD's newspaper Al-'Asr, 10 October 1997, 4. Al- Tajdid, Editorial, 'The PJD and the Present Responsibilities', 1 December 1999, 1. Author's interview with member of the PJD's general secretariat, Rabat, 12 December 2003. Author's interview with member of a PJD local secretariat, Khenitra, 9 November 2003. Author's interviews with delegates at the PJD's party congress, Rabat, 8–11 April 2004. Author's interview with a member of the PJD's general secretariat and the MUR's executive bureau, Rabat, 12 November 2003. Author's interview with a member of the PJD's general secretariat and member of the MUR's executive bureau, Rabat, 17 November 2003. Author's interview with a member of the PJD's general secretariat, Rabat, 4 September 2003. See Wegner, The Inclusion of Islamist, chapter 3. In the 1997 parliamentary elections, the PJD covered around 50% of the electoral districts and won nine (out of 325) seats. In the autumn of 1999, after by-elections and the defection of two MPs from other parties, the figure increased to 14. According to the US Embassy's Country Report on Human Rights Practices, most independent observers concluded, however, that the 1997 election results were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the government. In the more transparent 2002 elections, the PJD covered again around half of the electoral districts and increased the number of seats to 42 (out of 325). In 2007, the party covered all districts except one and won 47 seats. Author's interview with a member of the PJD's general secretariat, Rabat, 7 March 2003. At that time, the National Council was composed of the PJD's MPs, the General Secretariat, and the leaders of local and provincial secretariats. This is calculated on the basis of the number of ministers allocated to parties with similar electoral results. Al-'Asr, 7 November 2002, 5, author's translation. Author's interviews with PJD MPs and party leaders, Mohammedia and Rabat, 1 March 2003, 9 November 2003; 12 November 2003, 11 December 2003. Author's interview with a member of the PJD's general secretariat, Rabat, 4 September 2003. Interview with Abdelilah Benkirane, member of the general secretariat and former MUR leader, La Vie Économique, 16 June 2003. Aujourd'hui Le Maroc, 12 May 2003, 1. Author's interview, Rabat, 6 November 2003. Author's interview, Rabat, 12 April 2004. Conversation with a member of the PJD's Forum for Development at the party congress, Rabat, 8 April 2004. Authors' interviews with PJD leaders, Rabat, 1, 2, and 3 November 2007. For an illustration of this, see Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, chapter one, Schwedler, 'Democratization', and Clark, 'The Conditions'. Cf. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE29/004/2004/en/dom-MDE290042004en.html Al-Ayam, 18 July 2003, 1. See, Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 7–13 December 2003, 1–2. Author's interview with a PJD member, Rabat, 12 April 2004. Author's interview with a PJD leader, Rabat, 12 November 2003. The party later portrayed the reduction of the coverage as its own, autonomous decision. See Wegner, 'Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence'. At the time of writing, it is not clear whether the weak result of the PJD (as compared to the expectations) was the outcome of vote-buying – as claimed by the PJD – or of weaker electoral support for the PJD than expected. Whatever the truth, for our argument, it is not the result as such that matters, but what everybody believed before, namely that the PJD would be by far the strongest party after the elections. Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 297–98. See the EU's external relations' website at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm, and for the 1995 Barcelona declaration, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm. See Wegner, 'Authoritarian King and Democratic Islamists'. For EU policies towards Morocco, see among others, Haddadi, 'The EMP and Morocco' and Haddadi 'Two Cheers for Whom?'. See European Commission, 'Euro-Med Partnership: Morocco. National Indicative Programme 2005-2006', June 2004, 1. Interview with a member of the IAF's executive bureau, Amman, 14 June 2007. Bermeo, 'Myths of Moderation'.