Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence—A Key Prerequisite to Action
2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 31; Issue: 12 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/10576100802508086
ISSN1521-0731
Autores Tópico(s)Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
ResumoAbstract For Al Qaeda, intelligence is a critical operational resource. Its vigorous collection, scrutiny, and dissemination within the organization have proven fundamental to its capacity to engage in carefully crafted acts of terrorism. In addition to its operational utility, intelligence fulfills a range of other functions, including an ability to contribute to Al Qaeda's symbolic goals and elevate the confidence of operatives and leadership alike. Ultimately, however, Al Qaeda's collection and use of detailed intelligence reveals a capacity to calculate the consequences of alternative courses of action, thereby helping to dispel notions of an irrationality or fanaticism in which decision making is somehow removed from reality. Notes 1. Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, Military Series, n.d., p. 80. This 180-page training manual was recovered in the home of Al Qaeda member Anas al-Liby in Manchester, England, in May 2000. Full copy in author's possession. 2. Instruction manual found in Al Qaeda safe house, cited in Susan B. Glasser, "A Terrorist's Guide to Infiltrate West," Washington Post, 9 December 2001. 3. Abdulaziz Al-Moqrin, "Secret Work Group," Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 6, 17 March 2004. 4. The debate over the existence of an "old" and "new" terrorism is far from resolved. See, for example, Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign Affairs 75(5) (1996); Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," Political Psychology 21(2) (June 2000), pp. 411–415; Thomas Copeland, "Is the 'New Terrorism' Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism," The Journal of Conflict Studies 21(2) (2001). 5. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery. The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, n.d., available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Management_of_Savagery.pdf (accessed 12 December 2006), p. 29; Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2003), pp. 16–17. Indeed, for Jenkins, the importance of this objective forms the essence of Al Qaeda. He observes that Al Qaeda is not just an organization, but also a process, a reference to its ability to identify and generate new recruits. According to Jenkins, the ability of the organization to achieve operational success is, therefore, central to its capacity to draw new recruits to the cause. Brian Jenkins, Countering al Qaeda: An appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), pp. 5–6. 6. The importance of not engaging in uncalibrated acts of violence, for fear that this could alienate actual or potential supporters, appears in the writings of Al Qaeda's ideologues. For instance, in Knight's Under the Prophet's Banner, Zawahiri recounts an attempted assassination in the early 1990s on Egyptian Prime Minister Atif Sidqi. Using a car bomb, members of Islamic Jihad failed to kill the prime minister, instead killing a child named Shayma in a near-by school. Zawahiri recalls that the Egyptian government subsequently portrayed this incident as an attack against Shayma, not Prime Minister Sidqi. Zawahiri clearly viewed the death of Shayma as having the potential to damage the jihadists' cause by turning public opinion against them. Following this incident and in an obvious attempt to placate the jihadists' Muslim constituency, Zawahiri adopted the opinion of the eighth-century Islamic scholar, Imam al-Shafi'i, which called for a payment to the relatives of Muslims unintentionally killed in similar operations. Significantly, Zawahiri also implies that the death of Shayma stemmed from a failure in intelligence, observing, "[o]ur brothers who carried out the attack had surveyed the area and noticed that there was a school under construction. They thought the school had no students in it. It transpired later that only the external part of the school was being renovated but the rest of the school was operating normally." Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, as printed in al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 2 December 2001 (FBIS-NES-2002–0108), Part Six. Zawahiri again stressed the importance of popular support in his July 2005 letter to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Letter to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005, available at http://ensign.senate.gov/ static_media/101105_ zarkawi_letter.pdf (accessed 12 December 2006). In this letter, Zawahiri explains to Zarqawi the vital importance of "popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq," at one stage describing this as the mujahidin's "strongest weapon." Indeed, the majority of the thirteen-page letter is devoted to the issue of maintaining popular support, leading Zawahiri to caution Zarqawi to limit his violence against the Shi'a and refrain from committing further beheadings. In reference to these beheadings, Zawahiri explains, "[y]ou shouldn't be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men … they do not express the general view of the admirer and supporter of the resistance in Iraq … we should spare the people from the effect of questions about the usefulness of our actions in the hearts and minds of the general opinion that is essentially sympathetic to us." 7. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 121–249. 8. For instance, one Al Qaeda manual, Al-Battar Training Camp, has a regular feature entitled "Military Science," which dispenses operational advice, including how to conduct operations such as kidnappings and assassinations. 9. Sayf Al-Adl (1960 or 1963–) is a former Egyptian Special Forces officer who became a senior Al Qaeda trainer and is currently suspected of being its Chief of Security. His involvement with Al Qaeda, and some of its key figures, can be traced to the earliest stages of the organization's development, and as early as 1992 may have been on its military committee. One of Al Qaeda's most active and long-term members, he has been involved in the planning of the organization's main operations, including in more recent times, those in Iraq. Jack Roche confirmed with the author that Al-Adl was present at planning meetings with other senior members of Al Qaeda, playing a key role in Roche's tasking and operational preparations. Jack Roche, interview with author, 26 August 2005. Al-Adl's current whereabouts are unknown, although there is evidence to suggest that he is in Iran. 10. Sayf Al-Adl, "Planning Special Operations," Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 18, 13 September 2004. Emphasis added. 11. The Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, n.d., p. 25. An eleven-volume manual totaling approximately 8,000 pages, it covers a range of topics, including tactics, the manufacture of explosives, and security and intelligence. Although the identity of the author or authors of this manual cannot be stated with certainty, evidence indicates that it was compiled by the Afghan Service Bureau (Mekhtab al-Khidemat or MAK), a body created by bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam to organize the increasing number of foreign mujahidin entering Afghanistan in the mid-1980s. Indeed, the first two dedications in the manual are to Azzam and bin Laden. It is also believed that the manual was compiled some time between 1991 and 1993. Full Arabic version of manual in author's possession. 12. Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, p. 76. 13. The evidence indicates that Al Qaeda is a poor improviser unable to cope with dynamic circumstances, reinforcing its need for meticulous planning and high levels of operational certainty. Contingency planning appears to play little part in the organization's preparatory phase and training documents. If events do not unfold almost precisely as anticipated, the terrorist is left with next to no opportunity to reassess his position in light of the changed circumstances. The revision of plans increases the likelihood for error and operational failure. Al Qaeda in particular has exposed itself to the dangers inherent in the emergence of unforeseen circumstances. Al Qaeda, perhaps more than any other terrorist organization, has demonstrated a remarkable consistency of conduct, this being evident in the manner in which it recruits its members to the way it conducts its operations. This consistency in behavior can find its roots in the method of instruction used by Al Qaeda (and Islamic extremists in general). This method of instruction, which has a strong emphasis on repetition, is apparent throughout all Al Qaeda training manuals and documents. The net result is that Al Qaeda operations are consistently methodical, even mechanistic. 14. Sayf Al-Adl, "The Principles of Security," Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 3, 2 February 2004. 15. Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, pp. 21–42, 51–67, and 75–115. 16. Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2. 17. Sayf Al-Adl, "Transportation Security," Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 6, 17 March 2004. 18. Sayf Al-Adl, "Communications Security," Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 5, 28 February 2004. 19. Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, pp. 47–50. 20. Ibid., p. 89. 21. Cited in Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Masterminds of Terror (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003), p. 153. 22. Osama bin Laden, A Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html, August 1996 (accessed 24 April 2005). 23. Jason Burke, "Think Again: Al Qaeda," Foreign Policy 142 (May/June 2004), p. 19. This is also reflected in the language of individuals such as bin Laden, who have referred to the Zionist-Crusader alliance for many years now. In February 1998 bin Laden also announced the formation of the umbrella group of radical movements from across the Muslim world known as the World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders. 24. Kepel, Jihad, pp. 219–220. 25. Max Taylor and John Horgan, "The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic Fundamentalism," Terrorism and Political Violence 13(4) (2001), p. 37. 26. Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, p. 76. 27. Ibid. 28. Aside from the use of intelligence by the Prophet and other significant religious figures, intelligence also occupies a prominent position in the historical conduct of Muslims within the secular sphere. Intelligence was used extensively by successive caliphs shortly after the rise of the Arabs in the sixth century and subsequent emergence of Islam. For centuries, it played a critical role in the affairs of state and the defense of Islam from a range of enemies, including the Byzantines and the Crusaders. During this period, vast spy networks were established by successive caliphs to monitor internal threats. Extensive communication routes permitted the rapid dissemination of intelligence from all corners of the Arab Muslim empire. In a treatise on the art of government, an eleventh-century government official employed in the services of a Turkish (Seljuk) sultan stressed the necessity for an intelligence service in the following terms: It is indispensable for a sovereign to obtain information on his subjects and his soldiers, on all which happens near him or in distant regions, and to know about everything which is occurring, be it of small or great importance. If he does not do so, this will prove a disgrace, a proof of his negligence and neglect of justice. … Therefore, the appointment of a master of state posts is absolutely necessary. During the age of paganism and during the reign of Islam, the sovereigns used to obtain from this functionary the most recent information. … Officers who were well informed about all that was happening … were posted everywhere. (Cited in Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services [New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974], p. 224) 29. Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, p. 76. 30. Ibid., p. 77. 31. The Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, pp. 1–16. 32. Abu M'uadh Al-Makki, "The Islamic Verdict on Spies and Those Who Perform Espionage Against the Muslims," available at http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/main.asp (accessed 31 October 2003). 33. Bakri Muhammad, "Being Part of the Intelligence is a Sin and a Crime," available at http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/main.asp, 6 June 2001 (accessed 31 October 2003). 34. Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, p. 80. 35. Ibid., pp. 79–80. 36. Abdulaziz Al-Moqrin (1973–2004) was a former Al Qaeda leader in Saudi Arabia, where it is believed he was responsible for the kidnapping and beheading of American engineer, Paul Johnson. Al-Moqrin was killed in a shootout with Saudi security forces in June 2004. 37. Al-Moqrin, "The Group or Crew of Execution," Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 8, 14 April 2004. 38. United States District Court, United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al, 21 February 2001, p. 1146. 39. Al-Moqrin, "The Group or Crew of Execution." 40. Ibid. 41. United States District Court, United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari. Southern District of New York, 3 July 2001, p. 568. 42. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001), p. 112. 43. Similar intelligence phases have also been identified by Al-Adl. In chronological order, these phases of an "intelligence operation" are (1) identifying the target; (2) assessing the preliminary situation; (3) research and analysis; (4) evaluating the final situation. Sayf Al-Adl, "Concealment," Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 11, 1 June 2004. 44. United States District Court, United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al, 27 February 2001, p. 1532. 45. The receipt of intelligence from sympathizers capable of identifying targets is apparent in the operations of other Islamist groups, including those involving assassinations or kidnappings. This was apparent with the abduction of U.S. citizen Paul Marshall Johnson in Iraq in 2004. An article that subsequently appeared in the Al Qaeda journal Sawt al-Jihad confirmed that local mujahidin received, "… accurate information on the presence of an American who could be a good target for a kidnapping operation." Abdulaziz Al-Moqrin, "The Story of the American POW: Apache Engineer Paul Marshall: "From POW to Being Killed," Sawt al-Jihad, no. 19, 19 June 2004. The article goes on to observe that the local mujahidin then undertook the next phase of the operation, which entailed "confirmation and follow-up." Consistent with Al Qaeda methods, it is also interesting to note that video reconnaissance was performed on Johnson in the lead-up to his abduction. These images captured Johnson walking to and entering his vehicle, and also noted his route and destination. These images were viewed by the author at available at http://www.homelandsecurityus.com. 46. A transcript of Jack Thomas's description of his experiences can be found in Sally Neighbour, "The Transcript: What Thomas told Four Corners," The Australian, available at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20199530–601,00.html, 21 August 2006 (accessed 29 November 2006). 47. Stephen Moynihan, "Jihad Jack to Face Trial over al-Qaeda," The Age, available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/War-on-Terror/Jihad-Jack-to-face-trial-over-alQaeda/2005/04/01/1112302237924.html, 2 April 2005 (accessed 14 May 2005). 48. Cited in Alan Cullison, "Inside al-Qaeda's Hard Drive," The Atlantic Monthly (September 2004), p. 68. 49. Jack Roche, interview with author, 26 August 2005. 50. This receives additional support from the testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed before his Guantanamo Bay Tribunal hearing in March 2007. It is evident from this testimony that Khalid had organized surveillance on many potential targets throughout the world, only a few of which appear to have been selected for actual attack. Khalid explained that he organized surveillance on targets that included the Panama Canal, several former U.S. presidents, including Jimmy Carter, suspension bridges in New York, Heathrow Airport, Big Ben, night clubs frequented by U.S. and British nationals in Thailand, the New York Stock Exchange, U.S. embassies in Indonesia, Australia, and Japan, Israeli embassies in India, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, and Australia, and U.S. targets in South Korea. Combatant Status Review Tribunal for Khalid Sheikh Muhammad conducted on 10 March 2007 at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf (accessed 26 March 2007). 51. "Al-Qa'idah Suspect Denies Targeting French Cultural Centre in Sanaa," Yemen Observer, 29 March 2005. 52. Yoni Fighel, "Treason and Espionage in the Name of Jihad," The Institute for Counter-Terrorism, available at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=463, 2 March 2003 (accessed 12 November 2003). 53. N. A. N. Al-Bahri, "Interview with Osama Bin Laden's Former Bodyguard," The Middle East Media Research Institute. Special Dispatch Series No. 767, available at http://www.memri.org/bin/opener/cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP76704, 20 August 2004 (accessed 11 January 2005). 54. Ali Mohammed (1952–) is a former Egyptian military intelligence officer who held senior positions within Al Qaeda, including that of trainer, intelligence officer, and bin Laden bodyguard. See also Bergen, Holy War, Inc., pp. 127–133 for a detailed discussion on Mohammed. 55. United States District Court, United States of America v. Ali Mohamed. Southern District of New York, 20 Oct. 2000, p. 27. 56. United States District Court, United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al, 21 February 2001, pp. 1197–1198. 57. United States District Court, United States of America v. Ali Mohamed (see also ibid.), p. 28. 58. Ibid., p. 27; 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 68. 59. It is the case that Al Qaeda members also draw on sources other than intelligence to satisfy their need for confidence and certainty. Their strong religious convictions serve as a potent source of inspiration and confidence. The sincere and powerful belief that they are performing God's work, even being guided by the hand of God, is known to instill in the Islamic militant a strong sense of self-assurance. The co-ordinator of the 9/11 attacks, Ramzi Binalshibh, in commenting on a message sent by Mohammad Atta, said, "[t]he message also included reassurances that everything was going according to plan and that there were good signs and encouraging ideas—meaning visions and dreams of the brothers which filled them with confidence." Cited in Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 139. 60. United States District Court, United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, pp. 572–573. The importance of environmental familiarity in determining the attractiveness of a target was also revealed in the 2006 Canadian terror plot to attack high profile targets in that country. One plan to attack the Houses of Parliament in Ottawa and behead Prime Minister Stephen Harper was reportedly abandoned because none of the plotters was familiar with Ottawa. "The Plot Against Canada," Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 12 July 2006. 61. United States District Court, United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al, p. 1146. 62. Sayf Al-Adl, "Writing Intelligence Reports," Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 22, 22 November 2004. 63. United States District Court, United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al, p. 1144. 64. Glasser, "A Terrorist's Guide to Infiltrate West." 65. Al-Moqrin, "Secret Work Group." 66. Indian-born Dhiren Barot (1971–), also known as Issa al-Hindi and Issa al-Britani, has been described by the head of the London Metropolitan Police's Anti-Terrorist Branch as a "very important figure" within Al Qaeda. "Muslim convert who plotted terror," BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6121084.stm, 7 November 2006 (accessed 17 November 2006). Moving to the United Kingdom with his parents at the age of two, Barot, several years after converting to Islam, traveled to Pakistan in 1995, taking part in military action against Indian forces in Kashmir. Barot even wrote of his experiences, releasing a book entitled, The Army of Madinah in Kashmir (Birmingham: Maktabah Al Ansaar, 1999), under the name Esa Al-Hindi. From the late 1990s, he formed a strong association with Al Qaeda. At this time, for instance, he was dispatched by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to Malaysia to meet with Hambali, from whom he was to learn about the jihad in Southeast Asia. In early 2001, he was also sent to the United States by bin Laden, where he was to conduct surveillance on Jewish and economic targets in New York. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 150; Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Bin Laden's Mystery Man," Newsweek, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5738292/site/newsweek/, 20 August 2004 (accessed 30 November 2004). Barot was arrested in the United Kingdom in August 2004 and charged with planning attacks there, including, it was alleged, one involving the use of a radioactive "dirty bomb." He was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 2006. 67. United States District Court, United States of America v. Dhiren Barot, Nadeem Tarmohammad and Qaisar Shaffi (Criminal Indictment), Southern District Court of New York, 2005. The intelligence activities of Barot and his associates may provide further evidence of Al Qaeda's structured approach to the collection and development of intelligence. According to the U.S. indictment of Barot, he traveled to the United States on at least two occasions. His first trip, lasting three months in late 2000, saw him travel to New York and Washington, DC. He returned again in March 2001, where he remained for almost one month. Although speculative, it is feasible that the first trip served to identify potential targets, and the second to assess the feasibility of an attack through detailed intelligence collection after consulting either directly or indirectly with the Al Qaeda leadership. Indeed, it is known that during his second trip, he undertook extensive video surveillance, including that of the New York World Trade Center. David Stringer, "Man to Be Sentenced in British Bomb Plot," Washington Post, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/06/AR2006110600168.html, 6 November 2006 (accessed 7 November 2006). 68. "Al Qaeda Planning Attack Against U.S. Financial Institutions," CBS Evening News with John Roberts (Transcript), 1 August 2004. 69. Dan Eggen, "Indictment Cites Plans to Target Financial Hubs," Washington Post, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46550–2005Apr12.html, 13 April 2005 (accessed 18 April 2005). 70. The intelligence activities of Barot and his associates are important for another reason. They reveal something of the role of intelligence in maintaining Al Qaeda's operational capability and flexibility by providing a list of potential targets from which the leadership can draw when the need arises. At the time of Barot's intelligence activities in the United States, the preparations for the 9/11 attack were well underway. Indeed, it is likely that Barot was engaged in intelligence collection in New York at the same time the "musclemen" for the 9/11 operation were entering the United States. As the precursor to action, Barot's surveillance work gave the Al Qaeda leadership the option to mount an attack in the event of the failure of the 9/11 operation (it is significant to note that Barot conducted intelligence work in New York and Washington, DC) or to launch another strike on the United States some time in the future. The options provided by Barot's intelligence activities were important enough for bin Laden to accept the operational risk of having Al Qaeda members operating in areas that would soon become the scenes of the organization's most ambitious and successful attacks. 71. Stringer, "Man to Be Sentenced in British Bomb Plot." 72. Adam Zagorin, "Al-Qaeda in America: The Terror Plot," Time 164(7), 16 August 2004, p. 32. 73. "Manhunt for Heathrow Terror Suspects", Daily Mail, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=313047&in_page_id=1770, 6 August 2004 (accessed 10 October 2005). 74. Zagorin, "Al-Qaeda in America," p. 32. 75. United States District Court, United States of America v. Iyman Faris (Statement of Facts). Eastern District of Virginia (Alexandria Division), June 2003, pp. 3–4. Ayman al-Zawarhiri also recounts an incident in the early 1980s in which plans to bomb the U.S. embassy in Pakistan were abandoned after, "intensive and detailed surveillance [revealed] that the bombing … was beyond our capability." Al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, Part Two. 76. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 245. Of course, not all targets need to be identified through on the ground surveillance. Targets may also be identified through open source documents on places like the Internet. In early 2002, a report from the U.S. Government Accounting Office was found on an Al Qaeda computer in Afghanistan. This report detailed shortcomings in security in and around Washington, DC, describing how undercover agents easily penetrated security at two airports and 19 Federal buildings including CIA headquarters and the Pentagon. Eric Lichtblau, "Terrorists Noted Flaws In Security, Report Says," Los Angeles Times, 1 February 2002. The discovery of this report in the possession of Al Qaeda suggests that the organization collected and stored intelligence from a wide range of sources and could draw on this information to identify new targets when the time was right. 77. Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "FFI explains al-Qaida document," Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, available at http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/article.jhtml?articleID=71589, 19 March 2004 (accessed 15 February 2005). 78. Cited in Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27(5) (2004), p. 360. One observer subsequently reported that this document, "…suggested that a new intelligence was at work, a rationality not seen in Al Qaeda documents before." Lawrence Wright, "The Terror Web. A Reporter at Large," The New Yorker, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/040802fa_fact, 2 August 2004 (accessed 15 November 2004). 79. In describing the knowledge required to attain empathy, a commentator observed that one, "…must know the target's political and cultural history, including its religion and its traditions. And they must know the weaknesses and strengths of the people, and their leaders in particular—their values, inhibitions, expectations, frustrations, fears, anxieties, habit patterns, perceptions." In Ralph K. White, "Empathy as an Intelligence Tool," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1(1) (1986), p. 58. Al Qaeda's assessment of those countries most vulnerable to attack in, Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers, revealed a level of understanding of similar sophistication and complexity. 80. United States District Court, United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, p. 551. 81. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 245; John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop it (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2002), pp. 295–296; Joel Mowbray, "How They Did It: An 'Evil One' Confesses, and Boasts," National Review 54(24) (2002), p. 37. 82. Anonymous U.S. intelligence officer, personal communication, 17 September 2002. 83. The question of who was responsible for the Khobar Towers attack remains contentious. Although some believe it to be the sole responsibility of Saudi Hizballah (Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror [New York: Random House, 2003], pp. 224–225; Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda. The True Story of Radical Islam [New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004], p. 155), there is evidence to indicate Al Qaeda involvement in the attack. "Sept. 11 Plotters Initially Planned Broader Attacks," Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2004; 9/11 Commission Report, p. 60; George J. Tenet, "Unclassified Version of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet's Testimony before the Joint Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks Against the United States," available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/dci_testimony_06182002.html, 18 June 2002 (accessed 17 February 2005). 84. U.S. House National Security Committee, "The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident. Staff Report," 14 August 1996, p. 6. 85. At this time, the Khobar Towers housed a multinational force responsible for enforcing the "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq. This multinational force consisted of French and U.S. personnel. The compound also housed Saudi military and civilian personnel. Reconnaissance, and possibly other intelligence collection methods, would have been necessary to identify the location of U.S. personnel. 86. On 1 August, reconnaissance was conducted by Harun Fazil, one of the leaders of Al Qaeda's Kenya cell. United States District Court, United States of America v. Haroun Fazil. Southern District Court of New York. Sealed Complaint, 28 August 1998, p. 2. On 4 August, reconnaissance was also conducted by Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (aka Ali Saleh). Saleh is believed to have been the "mastermind" of both the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam attacks. United States District Court, United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al, 8 March 2001, p. 2089. 87. United States District Court, United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al
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