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Why Do Large Countries Prefer Quantitative Trade Restrictions?

1988; Wiley; Volume: 41; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1467-6435.1988.tb02733.x

1467-6435

William H. Kaempfer, Stephen V. Marks, Thomas D. Willett,

Agricultural Economics and Policy

KyklosVolume 41, Issue 4 p. 625-646 Why Do Large Countries Prefer Quantitative Trade Restrictions? William H. Kaempfer, William H. Kaempfer *University of Colorado, Boulder, and Claremont Graduate School.Search for more papers by this authorStephen V. Marks, Stephen V. Marks **Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School.Search for more papers by this authorThomas D. Willett, Thomas D. Willett ***Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate School.Search for more papers by this author William H. Kaempfer, William H. Kaempfer *University of Colorado, Boulder, and Claremont Graduate School.Search for more papers by this authorStephen V. Marks, Stephen V. Marks **Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School.Search for more papers by this authorThomas D. Willett, Thomas D. Willett ***Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate School.Search for more papers by this author First published: November 1988 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1988.tb02733.xCitations: 7AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. 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