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Building détente in Europe? East–West trade and the beginnings of Romania's nuclear programme, 1964–70

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13507486.2014.888706

1469-8293

Eliza Gheorghe,

Twentieth Century Scientific Developments

AbstractThis article examines the connection between détente in Europe and East–West nuclear technology transfers through the lens of Romania's co-operation policy in the field of atomic energy in the 1960s. It argues that until 1967 the bourgeoning relations between Western Europe and Romania did not stem from a desire to overcome the artificial division of Europe, but rather from the pursuit of unilateral economic benefits. This situation worked to the advantage of the Romanians, who acquired an important nuclear research reactor from the British by playing West European countries against one another. Afterwards, in order to boost their competitiveness, the West Europeans started pooling their nuclear industries together, although traditional rivalries such as the Anglo-French competition endured. Despite these efforts to achieve closer integration, the West Europeans failed to sell a nuclear power plant to Romania because of internal problems within their nuclear–industrial complexes, and because of Soviet meddling in the internal affairs of its satellites. This research adds to our understanding of Romania's détente policy during the 1960s, while also shedding light on the development of East–West relations in the field of atomic energy.Keywords:: détenteWestern EuropeEastern EuropeRomanianuclear proliferation Notes 1. Britain and France were struggling to manage the decline of their international positions, and tried to re-assert themselves as leaders of the Old Continent by using the leverage the Eastern bloc provided. CitationDeighton, "Ostpolitik or Westpolitik?," 893–901; CitationSoutou, "The Linkage between European Integration and Détente," 12. The Federal Republic of Germany sought to normalise relations with the socialist bloc (especially with the German Democratic Republic) and promote its interests by acknowledging the consequences of the Second World War. CitationFink and Shaefer, "Ostpolitik and the World, 1969–1974," 2. The USSR saw it as a chance to attract economic and political investment from Western Europe while maintaining the "most advantageous international position since 1945". CitationZubok, "The Soviet Union and the Détente of the 1970s," 434. For Moscow's allies in Eastern Europe, détente offered enticing opportunities but also posed difficult problems. For example, while the Poles tried to use détente to influence the Warsaw Pact's policies towards West Germany in ways that advanced Polish national interests, the German Democratic Republic found itself under pressure to make a series of changes in its foreign policy and in its position towards the Federal Republic of Germany. East Germany shifted from "an offensive to a defensive strategy, from an aggressive rhetoric to détente-compatible official language, from delimitation to more and more communication, contacts, and cooperation". CitationJarząbek, "Polish Reactions to the West German Ostpolitik and the East–West Détente," 38–40; CitationBange, "The GDR in the Era of Détente," 57. For further scholarship on European détente, see CitationBange and Niedhart, Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe; CitationBozo et al., Europe and the End of the Cold War; CitationDavy, "Helsinki Myths;" CitationJarząbek, "Hope and Reality;" CitationLoth, Overcoming the Cold War; CitationRomano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente; CitationRomano, "The Main Task;" CitationRomano, "Détente, Entente, or Linkage;" CitationRomano, "Untying Cold War Knots;" Citationvan Oudenaren, European Détente; CitationVillaume and Westad, Perforating the Iron Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985;CitationWenger, Mastny, and Nuenlist, Origins of the European Security System. 2. Hanhimäki, "Détente in Europe, 1962–1975," 198–218. 3. Most scholars explain Romania's opening up to the West as a manifestation of its "independent foreign policy". CitationDeletant and Ionescu, Romania and the Warsaw Pact: 1955–1989; CitationHarrington and Courtney, Tweaking the Nose of the Russians; CitationKing, A History of the Romanian Communist Party; amp;#Citationx21A;ârău, Între Washington și Moscova; Preda and Opriamp;#Citationx219;, România în organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia. For a more detailed review of the historiography on Romania's foreign policy, see CitationDragomir, "The Perceived Threat of Hegemonism," 3–5. There is still no agreed-upon definition of "independence", because Bucharest's contradictory behaviour resists categorisation: the Romanian leadership did not miss an opportunity to publicly criticise their Soviet counterparts, but its hostility did not translate into a definitive break with Moscow. Seen from this perspective, the main feature of Bucharest's foreign policy during the 1960s was not necessarily "independence" but "caution". Romania did not leave either the Warsaw Pact (as Albania did in 1968), or COMECON, because it understood that the line between independence and isolationism was a fine one. National Central Historical Archives (ANIC), Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC RCP), Foreign Relations Section (FRS), 70/1966, Minutes of conversation between Emil Bodnăraș; and Pham Van Dong, 6–10 May 1966. 4. Later on, the leadership in Bucharest sought to put pressure on the Soviets to supply Romania with a nuclear power reactor by hinting at the possibility of buying the facility in question from Western Europe. CitationGheorghe, "Atomic Maverick," 376. 5. One of the main reasons for Moscow's concerns about nuclear proliferation was Beijing's nuclear weapons programme in the context of the emerging Sino-Soviet split. After cutting off nuclear assistance to Beijing in the late 1950s, the Soviet leadership realised, in shock, that the Chinese nuclear arsenal was as much aimed at the US as it was aimed at the USSR. Moscow's own strategic considerations shaped its export policy towards Romania, rather than the personal tensions between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nikita Khrushchev, which gave rise to the idea of a Romanian-Soviet split. As Walker and Lönnroth note: "The Soviets were […] determined that future nuclear transactions with allies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere should have no chance of springing such nasty surprises." CitationWalker and Lönnroth, Nuclear Power Struggles, 15. 6. UK National Archives (UKNA), FO 371/176255, "Minutes from Smith to Brown, and Mason," 19 February 1964. 7. UKNA, FO 371/176255, "Foreign Office Report on Export of Power Reactors (nuclear) to Romania," 12 March 1964; Ministère des Affaires étrangères (MAE), Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8/1, 7 May 1968. 8. MAE, Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8, 29 May 1963. 9. National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS), FC/587 (Mihai Caraman), microfilm, "Précis regarding the activity of Col. Caraman Mihai," [undated] Top Secret; CitationAccoce and Pouget, Le réseau Caraman. 10. MAE, Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8/1, 19 December 1966. 11. Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE), Mănescu's visit to France, 220/1963 France, 4561/1, 16 October 1963, 2. 12. ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 91/1963, "Note no. 890/2 from the MFA to comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej," Top Secret, 7 November 1963, 12; AMAE, Mănescu's visit to France, 220/1963 France, 4561/1, 16 October 1963, 3. 13. ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 89/1964, "Report on Gheorghe Gaston Marin's visit to the US and the UK," 24 November–7 December 1963, 4. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 27. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. UKNA, AB 48/949, "Background Paper UKAEA from MacLean," 2 February 1968. 19. UKNA, FO 371/176255, "Letter Hope-Jones to Killick," UK Embassy, Washington undated [1964]. 20. ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 89/1964, "Report on Gheorghe Gaston Marin's Visit to the US and the UK," 24 November–7 December 1963, 29. 21. Ibid., 30. 22. Ibid. 23. UKNA, FO 371/176255, "Minutes of the Meeting between Authority Representatives and the Rumanian Trade Delegation," 17 February 1964. 24. CoCom dealt with the strategic embargo NATO countries imposed on the Communist bloc. Its decision-making process involved unanimity, so if any of the members disagreed, a deal would not go through. CitationMastanduno, Economic Containment. 25. Magnox reactors are pressurised reactors using natural uranium as fuel, carbon dioxide as coolant, graphite as moderator and magnox alloy as fuel cladding. 26. While the fabrication of fuel did not pose any risks, as natural uranium is not fissile, the reprocessing of spent fuel entails the extraction of plutonium, which can then be converted into nuclear weapons. 27. Romania's only demand was that the plutonium derived from their fuel elements should either be placed in an IAEA depot or sold to third parties, so that nobody could accuse Bucharest of helping Britain to increase its nuclear arsenal by providing it with the plutonium from Romanian reactors. UKNA, FO 371/176255, "Meeting with Hulubei and Cocos," 17 February 1964. 28. UKNA, FO 371/176255, "Minutes from Smith to Brown, and Mason," 19 February 1964. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. MAE, Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8/1, 9 Décembre 1966. 34. Officials in London decided to play the "loyal ally" card. If initially the Foreign Office refused to raise the issue of a CoCom exemption for the nuclear deal with Romania, the Romanians' approach to Washington for a nuclear reactor prompted the British to "tell the Americans that we would support them in any approach they made to CoCom." UKNA, FO 371/176255, "Minutes from Smith to Brown, and Mason," 19 February 1964. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Meeting Held in the Board of Trade," 15 December 1965. 39. ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 89/1964, "Marin Impressed US Businessmen," 18 June 1964, 31–2. 40.CitationOlariu, Stenström, and Hellborg, Proceedings, ix. 41. AMAE, Maurer's visit to France, 220/1964 France 8 Vol. II, "Report on the visit of the governmental delegation headed by the President of the Council of Ministers, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, 27 July – 3 August 1964," 201. 42. MAE, Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8/1, 19 Décembre 1966. 43. AMAE, Romanian delegations in France, Secret, 212E/1965 France, "Brief Regarding the Visit to France of a Romanian Delegation of Nuclear Scientists," 27 May 1965, 5. 44. Ibid., 6–7. 45. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Meeting held in the Board of Trade," 15 December 1965. 46. Ibid. 47. AMAE, The work plan and the performance report of the Romanian Embassy in London, 212/1966 Britain, "Romanian-British Relations," 25 January 1966, Top Secret, 91. 48. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 6 January 1966. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from Fairey Engineering Ltd.," 7 January 1966. 53. In August 1965, CoCom decided to permit the sale to Eastern European socialist regimes of civil research equipment and power reactors subject to certain safeguards. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Telegram from Washington to the Foreign Office," 23 June 1966. 54. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the Foreign Office," 18 June 1966. 55. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 21 April 1966. 56. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the Foreign Office," 18 June 1966. 57. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Telegram from Washington to the Foreign Office," 23 June 1966. 58. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA II), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), 1967–1969, Box 2916, Airgram 23 August 1968. 59. NARA II, RG 59, CFPF, 1967–1969, Box 2916, Memorandum of Conversation 16 January 1968. 60. MAE, Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8/1, 19 Décembre 1966; NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 2, Telegram 28 July 1967. 61. Ibid. 62. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 13 September 1966. 63. Ibid. 64. AMAE, Gunnar Lange's Visit to Romania, 220/1966 Sweden 1, "Minutes of conversation between Corneliu Mănescu and Gunnar Lange," 31 March 1966, 60–1. 65. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Telegram from the British Embassy in Stockholm," 20 July 1966. 66.CitationPreda, Romania – Republica Federala Germania, 37. 67. Ibid. 68. AMAE, Economic development in Canada in 1966, 1966/212 Canada, Secret, "Briefing Note Regarding the Prospects for Canada's Economic Development in 1966," 13 January 1966, Secret, 1. 69. National Canadian Archives (NCA), RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 1, Telegram, 27 January 1966. 70. NCA, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt. 1, Telegram, 13 May 1966. 71. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 23 June 1966. 72. MAE, Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8/1, 19 Décembre 1966. 73. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Telegram from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 1 August 1966. 74. Ibid. 75. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the British Nuclear Export Executive," 26 July 1966. 76. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Telegram from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 4 August 1966 77. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Atom No. 117/July 1966." 78. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Interim Report of the BNX Mission to Romania," 9–14 October 1966. 79. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 8 September 1966. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Minutes of Conversation between Hulubei and Birch," 12 October 1966. 83.CitationHecht, The Radiance of France, 55–131. 84. Ibid, 55–90. 85. Ibid. 86. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Interim Report of the BNX Mission to Romania," 9–14 October 1966. 87. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 30 November 1966. 88. MAE, Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8/1, 19 Décembre 1966. 89. Ibid. 90. MAE, Europe, Roumanie, Série29, Sous-série 17, dossier 8/1, 7 May 1968. 91. UK AB 48/949, "Member for Reactors Business Meeting," 9 January 1968. 92. UKNA, FO 625/13, "Letter from the British Embassy in Bucharest," 30 December 1966. 93. UKNA, AB 48/949, "Member for Reactors' Business Meeting," undated. 94. AMAE, Britain's relations with other states, 212/1967 Britain, "Note from Gheorghe Cioară," 27 July 1967, 5. 95. AMAE, 212/1967 Britain, Top Secret, "Informative note from the British Embassy in London," 11 October 1967, Top Secret, 4. 96. ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, 147/1967, "Meeting of the Executive Committee of the RCP," 17 October 1967, 35–40. 97. Ibid. 98. UKNA, AB 48/949, "Industrialimport Enquiry," October 1967. 99. UKNA, AB 48/949, "Letter from MacLean to Burkitt," 14 December 1967.100. This "experimental" first reactor would help the Romanian nuclear industry acquire skills and experience for the next, more complex stages of its development. In line with this emphasis on self-sufficiency (although envisaged for the medium- to long-term), Romania's nuclear programme entailed the least possible reliance on the import of foreign materials, such as HEU for fuel. UKNA, AB 48/949, "Meeting at Offices of Industrialimport," 15 December 1967.101. NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt.3, "Memorandum to the Ministers," 7 November 1968.102. NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt.3, "Report on Nuclear Power," 12 March 1968.103. NCA, RG 20, Vol. 1644, 20-68-Ra Pt.3, "Memorandum from Gauthier to Kniewasser," 10 October 1968.104. Ibid.105. UKNA, AB 48/949, "Letter from Searby to Burkitt," 31 July 1968.106. Hecht, The Radiance of France, 55–131; UKNA, AB 48/949, "Member for Reactors Business Meeting," 24 June 1968.107. UKNA, AB 48/949, "Letter from MacLean to Cole," 11 November 1968.108. UKNA, AB 48/949, "Letter from the Board of Trade to MacLean," 3 December 1968.109. Ibid.110. For more details on the Soviet-Romanian nuclear power plant deal, see Gheorghe, "Atomic Maverick," 389–90.111. ANIC, CC RCP, FRS, 79/1976, "Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and John S. Foster and A.M. Aikin, Atomic Energy Canada, Ltd.," 26 June 1976, 10.Additional informationNotes on contributorsEliza GheorgheEliza Gheorghe is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford, Department of Politics and International Relations. She specialises in Cold War history, nuclear proliferation, intelligence and security studies.