Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The Alliance Politics of Concerted Accommodation: Entente Bargaining and Italian and Ottoman Interventions in the First World War

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 23; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636412.2014.874177

1556-1852

Timothy W. Crawford,

Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

Abstract This article examines the challenges allies face in coordinating diplomatic efforts to accommodate and peel off their main enemy's potential allies. It elucidates the key dimensions, and the underlying coordination dynamics, of this problem of “concerted accommodation,” and it develops propositions about the conditions that shape the efficacy of such efforts. The argument links allies’ strength to their divergent or convergent assessments of the target state's ability to tip the war toward victory or defeat. Divergent assessments foster weak allied efforts that are likely to fail, but when allies agree that the target is a potential “war-tipper,” they will support their concerted accommodation policy with more robust cooperation that is more likely to work. The causal arguments and mechanisms are examined in a paired comparison analysis of two First World War cases: the Entente's efforts to induce (1) Ottoman neutrality and (2) Italian intervention. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author benefited from much helpful discussion of earlier drafts of this study. For this, he would like to thank participants in workshops at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University and the 2011 and 2012 International Studies Association Annual Meetings. Specific thanks for comments and criticism are due to several anonymous reviewers, the editors of this journal, Jason Davidson, Charles Glaser, Mark Haas, Harris Mylonas, George Quester, Evan Resnick, John Schuessler, Arthur Stein, Caitlin Talmadge, Christopher Williams, and to Gary Winslett for research assistance. This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Glenn H. Snyder, 1925–2013. Timothy W. Crawford is associate professor of political science at Boston College. Notes Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 1997); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 164–65; Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 6. Mancur Olson, “Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation,” International Organization 25, no. 4 (Autumn 1971): 867. This does not imply that success is always obtainable if the allies cooperate enough. The point is that in some instances there is an opportunity within reach that allies may realize or fail to realize, depending on their level of cooperation. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); Herbert Dinnerstein, “The Transformation of Alliance Systems,” American Political Science Review 59, no. 3 (September 1965): 589–601; Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations. (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 1977), 129–52, 419–70; Snyder, Alliance Politics; Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Palo Alto, ca: Stanford University Press, 2004); Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than A Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). Snyder, Alliance Politics, 177–78. On other facets of strategic cooperation among allies during wartime, see Evan N. Resnick, “Hang Together or Hang Separately? Evaluating Rival Theories of Wartime Alliance Cohesion,” Security Studies 22, no. 4 (2013): 672–706; Ajin Choi, “Fighting to the Finish: Democracy and Commitment in Coalition War,” Security Studies 21, no. 4 (2012): 624–53; Nora Bensahel, “International Alliances and Military Effectiveness: Fighting Alongside Allies and Partners,” in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Palo Alto, ca: Stanford University Press, 2007); Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 426–27. See also Snyder, Alliance Politics, 24–25; Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, 153–54; Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Social and Political Life (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 1997), 214. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 129–30. Duncan Snidal, “Coordination vs. Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes,” American Political Science Review 79, no. 4 (December 1985): 931–32. Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 498–531; Mark Haas, “Missed Ideological Opportunities and George W. Bush's Middle Eastern Policies,” Security Studies 21, no. 3 (2012): 416–54; Kai He, “Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity, Threat Perception, and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War,” Security Studies 21, no. 2 (2012), 154–91; Timothy W. Crawford, “Powers of Division: From the Anti-Comintern to the Nazi-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet Pacts, 1936–1941,” in The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance between the World Wars, ed. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 246–78; Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 155–89; Timothy W. Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940–41,” Security Studies 17, no. 1 (2008): 1–38; Stacie E. Goddard, “When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power,” International Security 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008/9): 110–42. See, for example, Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Christensen, Worse Than A Monolith; Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2008); Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances; Frank C. Zagare, The Games of July: Explaining the Great War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011); Songying Fang, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds, “To Concede or To Resist: The Restraining Effects of Military Alliances,” International Organization 68, no. 4 (Fall 2014). David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics 24, no. 1 (October 1971): 19–38; James Davis, Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Miroslav Nincic, The Logic of Positive Engagement (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2011); Etel Solingen, ed., Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Davis, Threats and Promises, 17–18; Nincic, Logic of Positive Engagement, 67–68. Jack L. Snyder, “International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change,” World Politics 42, no. 1 (1989): 1–30; Nincic, Logic of Positive Sanctions, 68–72; Solingen, Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nonproliferation; Steven E. Lobell, “Engaging the Enemy and the Lessons for the Obama Administration,” Political Science Quarterly 128, no. 2 (2013): 261–87. As Waltz notes, “The management of blocs is exceedingly difficult among near equals since it must be cooperatively contrived.” Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 167. By the same token, a weak bid is conducive to failure, but failure is not inevitable. A state determined to defect from its existing allies may still demand a high price from the outsiders and then go ahead with its plans, taking whatever the outsiders offer—even if it is a weak bid. This definition of the concept is imperfect. If the target is determined to rebuff the allies’ initiative but goes through the diplomatic motions making demands well beyond the allies’ capacity to fulfill, then the concept could identify as “weak” a bid with significant concessions generated by compound coordination among the allies. Careful process tracing is necessary to check for this possibility. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 57–58. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, 164. As collective action theorists would put it, “asymmetry of demand for the group good” leads to “dissipation” of collective effort and a qualitative drop in the quality of the group good. See Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 72–75. In this argument (contra to a possibility posed by Hardin), asymmetrical demand for the group good does not enhance the prospects for success because the “high demand” ally making all the concessions is unlikely to produce an efficacious bid, and in the context of inter-alliance competition, the “high demand” ally will be averse to being exposed as the soft spot in its alliance, most willing to make painful concessions, yet pushing a bid too weak to sway the target. The kind of reciprocity “at the heart of most alliances,” Snyder observes, “works both ways: not only is good to be returned for good but also bad for bad,” Snyder, Alliance Politics, 360. In theoretical terms, the interaction moves to a symmetrical coordination game among players with high demand for the group good. This is not a harmony game in which optimal cooperation entails individual efforts that are identical to what would be best for each ally acting unilaterally. In the subject at hand, the coordinated approach is still critical because it conveys the contingent all-or-nothing signal to the target, indicating that it cannot pick and choose concessions à la carte and play off the concerted parties. This argument thus posits a contingent influence of the free-riding problem. That problem recedes when alliance principals all come to believe that the target's alignment has war-tipping significance. Then they are willing to make sacrifices—even if they perceive that their partners are strongly motivated to do so as well—to maximize the probability of success. This runs parallel to the basic realist postulate that when states face a strong common threat, their perception of an “identity of interest” will increase the efficiency of their balancing behavior. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 270–71. The argument here also posits that convergent perceptions of common opportunity can have a similar effect on security cooperation, and perceptions of opportunity and threat are sometimes two sides of the same coin. War-tipping expectations will also influence how allies coordinate vis-à-vis targets of accommodation in peacetime. This article focuses on the dynamic in the context of war expansion, when alignment pressures will be strongest. On this dimension—where states try to outbid wedge attempts and retain their ally's loyalty—see Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Binding Strategy in Alliance Politics: Explaining the Soviet-Japanese-u.s. Diplomatic Tug of War in the Mid-1950s” (unpublished paper, October 2013). Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 2 (February 2010): 230–59; John Geering Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (London: Allen & Unwin, 2007), 131–33. Patricia A. Weitsman, “Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and Triple Entente,” Security Studies 12, no. 3 (2003): 99, 108. Turkey's intervention diverted Entente military pressure away from Germany and Austria-Hungary for critical periods in the war, and by choking off Russia supply lines through the Straits, Turkey significantly contributed to the Russian Revolution. As Lloyd George declared to the House of Commons in 1922, Turkey's entrance into the war “had the effect of prolonging the war by probably a couple of years [and] the collapse of Russia was almost entirely due to Turkey and would probably have never happened had the Black Sea been free.” Quoted in Y. Kurat “How Turkey Drifted into World War I,” in Studies in International Diplomacy, ed. K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (London: Longman, 1967), 294. Similarly, German general Erich Ludendorff claimed that Ottoman intervention added two years to Germany's staying power in the war. Dan Van der Vat, The Ship That Changed the World: The Escape of the Goeben to the Dardenelles in 1914 (Chevy Chase, md: Adler & Adler, 1986), 15. For elaboration on these points, see Mustafa Aksakal The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 128; Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914–1918 (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2003), 337; Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913–1923 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), 101–2; F.A.K. Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” in Decisions for War 1914, ed. Keith Wilson (New York: St. Martins, 1995), 229. Entente commitments to Italy closed off the option of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary in 1916–17, which could have forced German capitulation sooner and preserved much of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 106. On this strategic circumstance, see Zachary C. Shirkey, Is this a Private Fight or Can Anybody Join? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009). Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 167; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack L. Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137–68. For a critique, see Dominic Tierney, “Does Chain-Ganging Cause the Outbreak of War?” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 285–304. On ideological drivers of alignment choice, see Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2005). See case narratives below. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 78. Nevertheless, Turkey's and Italy's alignments also did not conform to the basic balancing logic of “flock[ing] to the weaker side.” Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127. Although the play of events in 1914–15 indicated a stalemate between the blocs, leaders in Rome and Constantinople tried to align with the side deemed more reliable to deliver rewards, which combined judgments about the size of the offer and the long-term prospects of victory. With the latter hard to discern, the former became most salient. For reviews of the balancing vs. bandwagoning debate, see John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, nj: Prentice Hall, 2003). Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions,” 165–66. William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 14. Ulrich Trumpener, “The Ottoman Empire,” in The Origins of World War I, ed. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 344. Geoffrey Miller, Straits: British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign (Hull, uk: University of Hull Press, 1997), 219–24. Trumpener, Germany, 16. Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 230. Trumpener, Germany, 28. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 123; Trumpener “Ottoman Empire,” 349. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 110; L. Bruce Fulton, “France and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 2nd ed., ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 161. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 112, 114. Trumpener, “Ottoman Empire,” 345; E.M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), 275–76. Ronald Bobroff, Roads to Glory: Late Imperial Russia and the Turkish Straits (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 97, 100. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, 98. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 3 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 619. Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy Since 1914 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 425. Miller, Straits, 279–82; Joseph Heller, British Policy Towards The Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914 (London: Frank Cass, 1983), 134, 137. Eber Harold Rice, “British Policy in Turkey” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1974), 350–51. Heller, British Policy, 123. Rice, British Policy in Turkey, 328. Allan Cunningham, “The Wrong Horse? Anglo-Ottoman Relations before the First World War,” in Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century: Collected Essays, vol. 2, ed. Edward Ingram (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 245. Rice, British Policy in Turkey, 330. Miller, Straits, 294–95. Ibid., 295. Cunningham, “Wrong Horse,” 244. Trumpener, “Ottoman Empire,” 347; Howard, The Partition of Turkey, 99. W.W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), 56n2. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 132; Howard, The Partition of Turkey, 100; C.J. Smith, The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914–1917 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 75. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 131; Howard, The Partition of Turkey, 100; Miller, Straits, 295. Gottlieb, Secret Diplomacy, 55. Bobroff, Roads to Glory, 106. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, 101. Gottlieb, Secret Diplomacy, 41. Bobroff, Roads to Glory, 106. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, 105–6. Bobroff, Roads to Glory, 103. Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War (New Haven, ct: Yale University Press, 1930), 71; Gottlieb, Secret Diplomacy, 38–39; Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 243; Bobroff, Roads to Glory, 106. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 131; Bobroff, Roads to Glory, 106; Smith, Russian Struggle, 73. Gerard E. Silberstein, Troubled Alliance: German-Austrian Relations (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970), 80; Aksasal, Ottoman Road, 115n87. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 136–37. Gottlieb, Secret Diplomacy, 109. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 148; Silberstein, Troubled Alliance, 81. Trumpener, Germany, 47. Trumpener, “Ottoman Empire,” 341–42, 347, 349, 350–52; Trumpener, Germany, 32, 53, 56–57; Kurat, “How Turkey Drifted,” 299–300; Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 242, 245, 251, 253. Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 247. Emin, Turkey, 70. Ibid., 71; Bobroff, Roads to Glory, 106. Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 172–73. Ibid., 171–72; Trumpener, Germany, 50–51. Z.A.B. Zeman, A Diplomatic History of the First World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 60; Gottlieb, Secret Diplomacy; Emin, Turkey, 71, 75. In relation to the influence of the Liman Von Sanders mission, it is worth noting that on 31 July, the German ambassador reported to Berlin that the colonel himself doubted that the Ottomans would declare for the Central Powers. Max Monteglas and Walter Schuking, eds., Outbreak of the World War—German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), document 517. The fact that a British officer was in a similar position of influence vis-à-vis the Ottoman navy also, logically, implies that the Von Sander mission was not a controlling factor. Well into September, German officials worried that the Porte might decide to send the German advisors home in order to conciliate the Entente powers. Aksakal, Ottoman Road; Handan Nezir-Akmese, The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 162, 184; Trumpener, “Ottoman Empire,” 341–44; Trumpener, Germany, 12–20; Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 232, 258. See Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 113-16, 120-25, 137-41; Trumpener, Germany, 371; Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 253. Earle, Turkey and the Great Powers, 271; Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: the Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789–1923 (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1999), 123; Albertini, Origins, 618. Trumpener makes the best argument that Turkey's declared neutrality was both a ruse to cover its military preparations and a way to enhance bargaining leverage with Germany. His evidence for this is that Enver revealed the talks with the Entente to Berlin, “albeit with some delay.” Trumpener, “Ottoman Empire,” 347, no. 34; Trumpener, Germany, 25. See also Karsh and Karsh, Empires of the Sand, 125. But if Turkey had remained neutral, the efforts of Enver and others in the Ottoman cabinet to reassure the Central Powers of Turkey's ultimate commitment, while seeking additional increments of material support for mobilization, would be interpreted as a clever strategy to string along Berlin and extract maximum resources from it (for references to such motives, see Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 114, 123, 138, 141; Trumpener, Germany, 29, 49–50), in order to subsidize what was intended ultimately to be a policy of armed neutrality. The fact that Enver informed the Germans that the Porte was also negotiating with the Entente, in this counterfactual scenario, would not count as evidence of the intensity of Enver's commitment to Germany but rather as a ploy to play off both sides. For earlier examples of this tactic, see Trumpener, Germany, 20; Aksakal, Ottoman Road, 112. Trumpener, “Ottoman Empire,” 341–42, 347, 349, 350–51, 352; Trumpener, Germany, 32, 53, 56–57; Kurat, “How Turkey Drifted,” 299–300; Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 242, 245, 247, 251, 253. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 212–14. Michael Palumbo, “German-Italian Military Relations on the Eve of World War I,” Central European History 12, no. 4 (December 1979): 343–47. William A. Renzi, In the Shadow of the Sword: Italy's Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War, 1914–1915 (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 9–12. James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (Harlow, uk: Pearson Longman, 2007), 76. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 349; Leo Valiani, “Italian-Austro-Hungarian Negotiations, 1914–1915,” Journal of Contemporary History 1, no. 3 (July 1966): 113–36. C.J. Lowe, “Britain and Italian Intervention, 1914–1915,” Historical Journal 12, no. 3 (September 1969): 533–48. Ibid., 534. Valiani, “Italian-Austro-Hungarian Negotiations,” 124. Renzi, Shadow, 202. Lowe, “Britain and Italian Intervention,” 541. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, “Italy,” in Origins of World War I, 382. Quoted in Lowe, “Britain and Italian Intervention,” 541, 542. Renzi, Shadow, 18. Fulton, “France,” 162–63. William A. Renzi, “Great Britain, Russia, and the Straits, 1914–1915,” Journal of Modern History 40, no. 1 (March 1970): 18n91. Lowe, “Britain and Italian Intervention,” 544, 547. The Anglo-Franco concession on the Straits is a crucial element in the pattern of compound coordination, for it indicates that the eventual agreement was not simply a matter of Britain and France demanding Russian acquiescence to their strategic priorities. Russia's flexibility on the Adriatic was, ultimately, propelled by both increased perceptions of Italy's strategic value and compensatory sacrifices by Russia's allies. Lowe, “Britain and Italian Intervention,” 542. Renzi, Shadow, 206. Gottlieb, Secret Diplomacy, 348; Lowe, “Britain and Italian Intervention,” 547; David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 91; Paul du Quenoy, “With Allies Like These, Who Needs Enemies?: Russia and the Problem of Italian Entry into World War I,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 45, nos. 3–4 (September-December 2003): 432. Renzi, Shadow, 208. Ibid., 210. Hamilton and Herwig, “Italy,” 383. See also Renzi, Shadow, 241. Alexander J. De Grand, “The Italian Nationalist Association in the Period of Italian Neutrality, August 1914-May 1915,” Journal of Modern History 43, no. 3 (September 1971): 408. Renzi, Shadow, 240, 247; De Grand, “Italian Nationalist,” 400. Renzi, Shadow, 251. Ibid. Brian Sullivan, “The Strategy of the Decisive Weight: Italy 1882–1922,” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 334. Renzi, Shadow, 218. Ibid., 241, 226. Ibid., 250 (emphasis added). Hamilton and Herwig, “Italy,” 384. R.J.B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 397; Hamilton and Herwig, “Italy,” 370, 374; Renzi, In the Shadow, 23. See, for example, David French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 78. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 100. Weitsman, “Alliance Cohesion,” 82–3. De Grand, “The Italian Nationalist,” 397. Bosworth, Italy, 182; Sullivan, “Strategy of the Decisive Weight,” 327. Renzi, Shadow, 201-7. See, for example, Snyder, Alliance Politics, 339–41; Liska, Nations in Alliance, 149. Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2010), 34n31, 104; Davis, Threats and Promises, 40–42; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 101–7. Shirkey, Private Fight. The relevant literature is extensive. See ibid., 14–25. Ibid., 22–25. Ibid., 32, 39.