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How Political Accountability Undermines Public Service Ethics: the case of Hong Kong

2011; Routledge; Volume: 20; Issue: 70 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10670564.2011.565180

1469-9400

Chor‐yung Cheung,

Public Policy and Administration Research

Abstract Hong Kong's Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS) aims to create a coherent political leadership within the government whose members are responsible for policy decisions. POAS also aspires to better protect the professional integrity of a neutral public service. Since the implementation of POAS in 2002, the objective of enhancing political accountability has come into conflict with the protection of the integrity of the public service. The reason for this is twofold. First, a critical analysis has revealed major institutional defects in POAS, which have undermined the integrity of the public service. Second, a close examination of some recent incidents has established that the implementation of POAS under an increasingly politicized environment has undermined some core values traditionally nurtured by Hong Kong's public service. Notes 1. Richard A. Chapman, ed., Ethics in Public Service for the New Millennium (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 1–2. 2. John C. C. Chan, ‘The Civil Service: continuity and change’, in Wang Gungwu and Wong Siu-lun, eds, Hong Kong's Transition: A Decade After the Deal (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 19–31. *Chor-yung Cheung teaches politics in the Department of Public and Social Administration of the City University of Hong Kong. He was twice an Administrative Officer of the Hong Kong Government. His latest academic publications include ‘Public service neutrality in Hong Kong: problems and prospects’, The Australian Journal of Public Administration 69(S1), (2009), pp. S17–S26; and The Quest for Civil Order: Rules, Politics and Individuality (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007). The author thanks anonymous referees of JCC and Joseph W. P. Wong, Ian Scott and David H. Rosenbloom for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. The author can be reached by email at: scccy@cityu.edu.hk. 3. Richard A. Chapman, ‘The end of the British civil service’, in Peter Barberis, ed., The Civil Service in an Era of Change (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1997), pp. 23–37. 4. Patrick H. Hase, ‘The district office’, in Elizabeth Sinn, ed., Hong Kong, British Crown Colony, Revisited (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2001), pp. 126–127. 5. I was there at the parliamentary hearing in London and heard these words said by Sir David first hand. 6. Sir Henry Self, ‘The responsibility of the administrator’, in A. Dunsire, ed., The Making of an Administrator (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956/1958 rpt), p. 73. 7. Ian F. C. MacPherson, ‘Aspects of Crown Service’, in Sinn, ed., Hong Kong, British Crown Colony, Revisited, p. 107. 8. Peter Harris, Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics (Hong Kong: MacMillan, 1988), p. 73. 9. See Steve Tsang, Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the 19th Century to the Handover to China, 1862–1997 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), particularly chs 9–10. 10. See, for examples, S. K. Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982); and Ambrose Y. C. King, ‘Administrative absorption of politics in Hong Kong: emphasis on the grass roots level’, in Ambrose Y. C. King and Rance P. L. Lee, eds, Social Life and Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981), pp. 127–146. 11. Anthony B. L. Cheung, ‘Between autonomy and accountability: Hong Kong senior civil servants in search of an identity’, in Chapman, ed., Ethics in Public Service for the New Millennium, pp. 185–202. 12. Ibid., p. 188. 13. Eric Peter Ho, Times of Change: A Memoir of Hong Kong's Governance 1950–1991 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp. 209–220. 14. Cheung, ‘Between autonomy and accountability’, pp. 189–190. 15. There were Mainland and Taiwan linked political forces in Hong Kong though, which were the spillovers of the Chinese civil war between the communists and the nationalists that were active in the colony, but they were concerned more with Chinese rather than Hong Kong politics. 16. Sir Philip Haddon-Cave, ‘Introduction: the making of some aspects of public policy in Hong Kong’, in David Lethbridge, ed., The Business Environment in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. xi–xix. 17. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989). 18. Anson Chan, ‘Speech by the Chief Secretary of Administration at an Asia Society luncheon’, HKSAR Government Press Releases, (19 April 2001), available at: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200104/19/0419138.htm (accessed 29 August 2009). 19. Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Legco) had its first direct elections in 1991, in which 18 of its seats were returned by universal suffrage, of which 16 were won by the democrats who have since strived for the early introduction of full democracy to Hong Kong. In 1995, the number of directly elected seats increased to 20, with the remaining 40 returned by indirect elections. After the establishment of the HKSAR in 1997, according to the Basic Law, 24 of the 60 Legco seats were returned by direct elections in 2000, and 30 in 2004. Under this mixed electoral system, the democrats, in which the Democratic Party and the Civic Party are the most popular, consistently get the support of about 55–60% of the electorate, yet they only manage to get 40% of the seats in the Legco because the conservatives or the pro-government parties (e.g. The Liberal Party and the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong) have dominated the indirectly elected seats (particularly the Liberal Party before 2008) that are not open for universal suffrage. The Basic Law also says that universal suffrage shall be gradually introduced to the election of the Chief Executive and to the legislature in an orderly manner eventually. In 2005, however, Beijing decided that Hong Kong was not ready for this in 2007 and 2008, respectively. In 2007, Beijing further decided that HKSAR could have universal suffrage for its Chief Executive and legislature elections in 2017 and 2020, respectively, if the conditions are right by then. 20. ‘The Government never accepted … that we [i.e. those who were born in post-war Hong Kong and received a good education in the colony] had a right to participate in the running of Government … Why shouldn't people like me’, asked Anna Wu, a member of the 1970s' Hong Kong Observers who sympathizes with the local democrats, ‘who wanted to contribute one way or another, have had the opportunity to go all the way to the top of the political hierarchy’. See Anna Wu, ‘Government by whom?’, in Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, eds, Hong Kong Remembers (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 164–165. Her fellow classmate Emily Lau later joined the Legco election in 1991 and has since been a democratic legislator. Lau is now a Vice Chairman of the opposition Democratic Party. 21. ‘Civil service neutrality is a British thing: state leader’, South China Morning Post, (17 October 2003). 22. See Anson Chan's speech in the Legco, available at: www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200006/28/0628173.htm (accessed 23 December 2009). 23. Joseph W. P. Wong, former Secretary for the Civil Service of the HKSAR Government, told the author in a private correspondence that the principle of political neutrality of the civil service was never articulated in writing in the HKSAR Government until the implementation of POAS. 24. See Chor-yung Cheung, ‘The Principal Officials Accountability System: not taking responsible government seriously?’, in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2005), pp. 151–184. 25. Ian Scott and John P. Burns, eds, The Hong Kong Civil Service and Its Future (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 1. 26. Richard A. Chapman, Ethics in the British Civil Service (London: Routledge, 1988). 27. One can find these core values at http://www.csb.gov.hk/english/admin/conduct/134.html (accessed 23 December 2009). 28. Constitutional Affairs Bureau, Consultation Document on Further Development of the Political Appointment System, (July 2007), p. 23, available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/ca/papers/ca0731cb2-consultation-e.pdf (accessed 29 August 2009). 29. C.K. Yeung and J. P. Lee, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Allegations Relating to the Hong Kong Institute of Education (2007). 30. For Mike Rowse's personal account of the whole incident, see Mike Rowse, No Minister & No, Minister: The True Story of HarbourFest (Hong Kong: Treloar Enterprises Co., 2009). 31. This later point (i.e. being the Controlling Officer of HarbourFest) is disputed by Mr Rowse, who argued in his book that ERWG only decided that the government, via InvestHK, was to sponsor the event and up to that point, government sponsorship had never required a controlling officer on behalf of the government to exert cost control of the sponsored event. See ibid., pp. 48–51. 32. See Moses Mo-chi Cheng and T. Brian Stevenson, Report of the Independent Panel of Inquiry on the HarbourFest (May 2004). Legco's Public Accounts Committee also published its report on HarbourFest in June 2004, which largely concurred with Cheng and Stevenson's conclusions. For Rowse's rebuttals of these charges, see his No Minister & No, Minister. 33. ‘After long wait, Norman Chan to be named HKMA chief’, South China Morning Post, (17 July 2009), p. A3. 34. Cheung, ‘The Principal Officials Accountability System’, pp. 178–181. 35. ‘Chief explains reasoning behind punishment of Caritas executives’, South China Morning Post, (20 February 2009), p. C1. My understanding of this case has benefited from a private discussion with Dr Lau Yuk-kong. 36. ‘Angry doctors oppose “unfair” punishment’, South China Morning Post, (23 March 2009). 37. Mike Rowse came to more or less the same conclusion after the HarbourFest saga: ‘One consequence of HarbourFest may well be that the role of head of civil service must be taken away from a political appointee and given to the most senior actual serving civil servant’. See his No Minister & No, Minister, p. 83.