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Communist regimes and historical legitimacy: polemics regarding the role of the Red Army in Romania at the end of the Second World War

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 20; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13507486.2012.745832

1469-8293

Cezar Stanciu,

Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

Abstract How did Communism come to power in Romania? The scientific answer to this question was of no concern to the Romanian and Soviet Communists. History was just another tool of Party propaganda, aimed at providing people with official narratives. But when the Romanians and the Soviets pursue different propaganda goals, a fight over interpretations begins in which each side uses specific descriptions of historical events to serve its political needs. After Stalin's death, dictator Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej of Romania tried to find legitimacy and revolutionary prestige for his party, calling into question the Soviet contribution to Romania's Communisation. In doing so, his propaganda tried to demonstrate that Communism in Romania was not a product of Soviet intervention, but a materialisation of historical Romanian aspirations. Keywords: CommunismRomaniaSoviet Unionhistorypropagandalegitimacy Acknowledgements This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-1056. Notes 1. Haynes and Rady, In the Shadow of Hitler, 291. http://books.google.ro/books?id = ILRJ2ChennYC&dq = antonescu%27s+refusal&hl = ro&sitesec = reviews. 2. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 789. 3. Mitcham, The German Defeat in the East, 1944–45, 183–4. See also Deletant, Hitler's Forgotten Ally. 4. Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, 244. 5. Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu was the PCR's contact with the king and the other political parties involved in the coup. But he was far from being the Party's leader. Ştefan Foriş was officially appointed by the Comintern, but earlier that year Foriş had been “deposed” by a plot organised by Gheorghiu-Dej, leader of Communists in prison. A temporary leadership was established, in the absence of any contact with the Comintern. Gheorghiu-Dej managed to escape from prison shortly before the coup, although he was not directly involved in it. After August 1944, two groups appeared to compete for Party leadership: the Communists in Romania, imprisoned during the war and led by Gheorghiu-Dej, and the Communists in Moscow, who returned home with the Soviet Army after August 1944, led by Ana Pauker. The coup of 23 August 1944, organised in the absence of Communists in Moscow, was used by Gheorghiu-Dej as a justification of his claims to party leadership. Detailed descriptions about the PCR's involvement in the coup of 23 August and the narrative of events are available in English in Deletant, “What was the Role of the Romanian Communist Party in the Coup of 23 August 1944?,” 103–18. 6. Mark, Revolution by Degrees, 6–7. Practically, the “national front” strategy consisted of maintaining the appearances of “bourgeois democracy” by means of coalition. See also the classic work by Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 169. 7. Deletant, What was the Role of the Romanian Communist Party, 103. 8. Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania, 164–7. 9. Raportul politic general făcut de tovarăşul Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej la Congresul Partidului Muncitoresc Român din 21–23 februarie 1948, 14–20. Author's translation. All translations from original Romanian documents belong to the author. 10. Mark, Revolution by Degrees, 45. 11. Ghibianski, “The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform,” 472. 12. Azadovskii and Egorov, “From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism,” 67–8. 13. For detailed explanations, see Anonymous, “The Character of a Peoples' Democracy,” 145–7. 14. See a classic work on this issue: Reisky de Dubnic, Communist Propaganda Methods: a Case Study on Czechoslovakia, 45. The Nazi atrocities in Poland were sometimes described as if not directed against Jews in particular, but against Poles in general, so that propaganda could emphasise the dichotomy between the sufferings of the past and the “liberation” brought about by Soviet soldiers. For details: Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz, 104–5. 15. Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth, 162–3. For depictions of Soviet soldiers as “liberators” in Hungary, see for example Márai, Memoir of Hungary: 1944–1948, 128. 16. Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania, 147. For a comprehensive biography of Ana Pauker see Levy, Ana Pauker: the Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist. 17. Anton, “La limita devierii. Iosif Chişinevschi şi rezoluţia Biroului Informativ,” 316–19. 18. Betea, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Moartea unui lider comunist, 193. 19. Pauker, Cuvântare rostită la şedinţa solemnă în cinstea celei de a 34-a aniversări a Marii Revoluţii Socialiste din Octombrie, 12. 20. Gheorghiu-Dej, Cuvântare rostită la adunarea festivă pentru sărbătorirea celei de-a 10-a aniversări a eliberării României, 4. 21. Stenogramele şedinţelor Biroului Politic şi ale Secretariatului Comitetului Central al PMR, vol. II 1949, 299. 22. România. Din viaţa politică. Documente 1950, 239. 23. Levy, Ana Pauker, 194–220. 24. Tismăneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, 81. 25. Jovanović, International Economic integration: Limits and Prospects, 387. 26. Petrescu, “Community Building and Identity Politics in Gheorghiu-Dej's Romania (1956–1964),” 416. 27. Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, 11. 28. Barker, Legitimating Identities, 6–14. 29. Conces, “Book Review: The Quest for Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia,” 24–5. 30. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 118. Grzegorz Ekiert argued that society continuously exerted pressure upon the Communist regimes in Europe, especially after Stalin's death, which generated positive responses in the form of reforms aimed at satisfying, even partially, social needs and expectations. See Ekiert, The State against Society, 3–6. 31. Kemp-Welch, Poland Under Communism, 98–9. Marshall Konstantin Rokossovsky was a Soviet officer who became Minister of Defence in 1949, during the height of Stalinisation. 32. See for example Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961, 80; Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, 20. 33. Petrescu, “Building the Nation, Instrumentalizing Nationalism,” 528. See also Deletant, Romania under Communist Rule, 85–8. One of the accusations formulated against Ana Pauker and her group was that she underestimated and discredited the Party's participation in the “victorious insurrection” of 23 August 1944. See Neagoe-Pleşa and Pleşa, Dosarul Ana Pauker, 167. 34. Roper, Romania: the Unfinished Revolution, 29. 35. Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness, 73–6. 36. Roper, Unfinished Revolution, 30. 37. Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe,” 7–10. 38. “Şedinţa din 8 iulie 1953,” ANIC (National Historical Archives of Romania), fund CC al PCR (Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party), section External Relations, dossier no. 26/1953, 3. 39. Roper, Unfinished Revolution, 30. 40. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania was part of Khrushchev's peace initiatives. Initially it was Gheorghiu-Dej who brought up the issue and, despite a negative reaction at first, Khrushchev took on the idea and the withdrawal took place in the summer of 1958. Romania became the only Soviet satellite in which there were no Soviet troops stationed. In order to obtain this “favour”, Gheorghiu-Dej tried to gain Khrushchev's confidence, especially through a very submissive attitude. Moscow also appreciated Romania's stability in the context of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and also Gheorghiu-Dej's direct involvement in the organisational measures which followed the Soviet intervention in Hungary. It was in Romania that Imre Nagy was detained for two years before his staged trial. On the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania, see Falls, “Soviet Decision-Making and the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Romania.” 41. For a comprehensive study regarding the stationing of Soviet troops in Romania, see Hlihor and Scurtu, The Red Army in Romania. A large collection of documents on this topic was published in Romania Scurtu, România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice 1958. 42. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole şi cuvântări decembrie 1955 – iulie 1959, 496. 43. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole şi cuvântări august 1959 – mai 1961, 9. 44. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole şi cuvântări 1961, 11. 45. Zakharovich Rogovin, Stalin's Terror of 1937–1938, 426. 46. Georgescu, Politică şi istorie, 17. 47. “Notă a Direcţiei Treburilor a CC al PMR,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 56/1956, 18. 48. “Notă a Direcţiei Treburilor a CC al PMR,” 19. 49. “Stenograma şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 9.X.1959,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 37/1959, 21. 50. “Stenograma şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 9.X.1959,” 22. 51. Lecţii în ajutorul celor care studiază istoria PMR. 52. Lecţii în ajutorul celor care studiază istoria PMR 1960, 462–3. 53. Lecţii în ajutorul celor care studiază istoria PMR 1960, 468. 54. Lecţii în ajutorul celor care studiază istoria PMR 1960, 469. 55. Lecţii în ajutorul celor care studiază istoria PMR 1960, 469–70. 56. “Notă de convorbire a tov. N. Guină cu tov. Medvedev, adjunctul Secţiei Externe a CC al PCUS,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 70/1961, 1. 57. “Notă de convorbire a tov. N. Guină cu tov. Medvedev, adjunctul Secţiei Externe a CC al PCUS,” 2. 58. Dunbabin, The Cold War: the Great Powers and their Allies, 563. 59. Jovanović, International Economic Integration, 387. 60. Retegan, Război politic în blocul comunist. Relaţiile româno-sovietice în anii şaizeci. Documente, 190–1. 61. On the evolution of the Sino-Soviet split, see Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens. 62. Dan Cătănuş, “România şi schisma sovieto-chineză, V. Demersuri sovietice, 1963,” 165. 63. “Stenograma şedinţei Biroului Politic din ziua de 5 iunie 1963,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 25/1963, 15. 64. “Stenograma şedinţei Biroului Politic din ziua de 5 iunie 1963,” 15–16. 65. “Stenograma şedinţei Biroului Politic din ziua de 5 iunie 1963,” 15. 66. “Tovarăşului Nikita Sergheevici Hruşciov, Prim-secretar al CC al PCUS,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 25/1963, 33–4. 67. Scânteia, 23 August 1963. 68. Details about this ideological evolution are found in Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism, 216–23; Fischer, Nicolae Ceauşescu: A Study in Political Leadership, 169–71. See also: Boia, History and Myth, 77–82. 69. Tismăneanu, Stalinism Revisited, 420. Full text of the Declaration: Declaraţie cu privire la poziţia Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mişcării comuniste şi muncitoreşti internaţionale adoptată de Plenara lărgită a CC al PMR din aprilie 1964. 70. Petrescu, “Legitimacy, Nation-Building and Closure,” in Stolarik, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968, 239. 71. Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens, 44. 72. Cătănuş, Între Beijing şi Moscova, 367. 73. “Stenograma primirii de către tovarăşii Nicolae Ceauşescu, Chivu Stoica şi Leonte Răutu a delegaţiei Partidului Comunist Francez,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 61/1964, 33. 74. “Notă de convorbire,” ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 41/1964, 3. 75. Tismăneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 37. A good description of the Romanian Communist Party's situation in the inter-war period, in Tănase, Auntie Varvara's Clients. For an English-language history of the Romanian Communist Party, see King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party.