Desiring the Truth and Nothing But the Truth
2009; Wiley; Volume: 43; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00702.x
ISSN1468-0068
Autores Tópico(s)Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
ResumoNoûsVolume 43, Issue 2 p. 193-213 Desiring the Truth and Nothing But the Truth Christian Piller, Christian Piller University of YorkSearch for more papers by this author Christian Piller, Christian Piller University of YorkSearch for more papers by this author First published: 28 May 2009 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00702.xCitations: 11Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL References Adams, Ernest W. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals, Dordrecht : Reidel. Chisholm, Roderick M. (1977). Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition, Englewood Cliffs : Prentice-Hall. David, Marian (2001). " Truth as the Epistemic Goal," Knowledge, Truth and Duty, edited by M Steup, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001, 151– 169. David, Marian (2005). " Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis," Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by M Steup and E Sosa, Oxford : Blackwell, 296– 312. Edington, Dorothy (2001). " Conditionals," The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, edited by L Goble, Oxford : Blackwell, 385– 414. Engel, Pascal (2002). Truth, Chesham : Acumen. Field, Hartry (2001). Truth and the Absence of Facts, Oxford : Oxford University Press. Foley, Richard (1987). The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge , Massachusetts : Harvard University Press. Horwich, Paul (2006). "The Value of Truth," Nous 40. Humberstone, I.L. (1992). "Direction of Fit," Mind 101, 59– 83. James, William (1896). " The Will to Believe," in his The Will to Believe and other Essays on Popular Philosophy, New York : Dover Publications, 1956, 1– 31. Lynch, Michael (2004). "Minimalism and the Value of Truth," Philosophical Quarterly 54, 497– 517. Riggs, Wayne (2003). "Balancing our Epistemic Goals," Nous 37, 342– 352. Ross, Alf (1941). "Imperatives and Logic," Theoria 7. Roush, Sherrilyn (2005). Tracking Truth, Oxford : Clarendon Press. Rutte, Heiner (1996). " Über das Wahrheitsziel und den Willen zur Illusion," Philosophie in Österreich 1996, edited by A Schramm, Vienna : Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 35– 50. Sosa, Ernest (2001). " For the Love of Truth? Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, edited by A Fairweather & L Zagzebski, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 49– 62. Stalnaker, Robert (1975). "Indicative Conditionals," Philosophia 5, 269– 286. Wedgwood, Ralph (2002). "The Aim of Belief," Philosophical Perspectives 16, 2002. Citing Literature Volume43, Issue2June 2009Pages 193-213 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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