Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

How Adenauer Lost Power: Understanding Leadership Rivalry and Succession Conflict in Political Parties

2007; Routledge; Volume: 16; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09644000701358932

1743-8993

Paul ’t Hart,

Populism, Right-Wing Movements

Abstract In this article, we reconstruct and interpret the Adenauer–Erhard leadership rivalry in the CDU. This leadership struggle culminated in Erhard replacing Adenauer in 1963 and Adenauer's continued 'guerrilla' warfare against Erhard's leadership, which was one of the contributing factors to the brevity of Erhard's tenure. The case is of intrinsic historical interest but also provides a muster for recent and ongoing leadership succession predicaments in governing parties in Germany and elsewhere. The article presents a conceptual framework of party leadership succession, and zooms in on the (mis)match between the tactical choices made by the incumbent leader and key succession candidates as a key factor explaining the nature and impact of successions. The framework is then applied to the case, and the implications of the findings are placed in a broader comparative context. Notes 1. R. Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1962[1911]); P. Calvert (ed), The Process of Political Succession (London: Sage, 1978). 2. P. Calvert (ed.), The Process of Political Succession (London: Sage, 1987); R. Punnett, Selecting the Party Leader: Britain in Comparative Perspective (London: Wheatsheaf, 1992); J.W. Davis, Leadership Selection in Six Western Democracies (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998); F. Bynander and P. 't Hart, 'The Politics of Party Leader Survival and Succession: Australia in Comparative Perspective', Australian Journal of Political Science 42/1 (2007), pp. 47–72. 3. Cf. F. Bynander, and P. 't Hart, 'When Power Changes Hands: The Political Psychology of Leadership Succession in Democracies', Political Psychology 27/5 (2006), pp.707–30. 4. P. Norton, 'Choosing a Leader: Margaret Thatcher and the Parliamentary Conservative Party', Parliamentary Affairs 43/3 (1990), pp.249–59; K. Alderman and N. Carter, 'The Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1994', Parliamentary Affairs 48/4 (1995), pp.438–55; K. Alderman, 'The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997', Parliamentary Affairs 51/1 (1998), pp.1–16. 5. P. Weller, 'The Vulnerability of Prime Ministers: A Comparative Perspective', Parliamentary Affairs 36/1 (1983), pp.96–117; idem, 'Party Rules and the Dismissal of Prime Ministers', Parliamentary Affairs 47/2 (1994), pp.133–43; Calvert, The Process of Political Succession; Davis, Leadership Selection in Six Western Democracies. 6. K. Günther, Der Kanzlerwechsel in der Bundesrepublik: Adenauer – Erhard – Kiesinger (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1970); Punnett, Selecting the Party Leader; J.C. Courtney, Do Conventions Matter? Choosing National Party Leaders in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995); L. Stark, Choosing a Leader (London: MacMillan, 1996); Davis, Leadership Selection in Six Western Democracies; T. Quinn, 'Electing the Leader: The Brtish Labour Party's Electoral College', British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6/3 (2004), pp.333–52; idem, 'Leasehold or Freehold? Leader-Eviction Rules in the British Conservative and Labour Parties', Political Studies 53/4 (2005), pp.793–815. 7. L. LeDuc, 'Democratizing Party Leadership Selection', Party Politics 7/3 (2001), pp.323–41. 8. See Bynander and 't Hart, 'When Power Changes Hands'. 9. The model is, as always, a simplification. It deals with only one dyad, but in reality there may be more potential successors, and the resultant succession process is more difficult to model because of the anticipation and reaction effects that occur among multiple players when one of them shifts position. 10. K. Adenauer, Erinnerungen, Band I (Stuttgart: DVA, 1965), p.228. 11. A. Metz, Die Ungleichen Gründervater: Adenauer's und Erhard's Langer Weg an die Spitze der Bundesrepublik (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 1998). 12. P. Koch, Konrad Adenauer: Eine Politische Biographie (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1985), p.452. All quotes have been translated by the authors from German sources. 13. Ibid., p.451. 14. Ibid., p.454; cf A. Baring, 'Sehr verherter herr Bundeskanzler'. Heinrich von Brentano im Briefwechsel with Konrad Adenauer, 1949–1964 (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1974). 15. H.-P. Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann: 1952–1967 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1991); G. Knapp, Kanzler: Die mächtigen der Republik (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1999), pp.78–80. 16. Metz, Die Ungleichen Gründervater; K. Sontheimer, Die Adenauer-Ära: Grundlegung der Bundesrepublik (München: DTV, 2003). 17. Schwarz, Adenauer. 18. D. Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer (München: Propyläen, 1998 [orig. edn. 1987]), pp.175–6. 19. Ibid., p.184. 20. Baring, 'Sehr verherter herr Bundeskanzler'. 21. Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt, p.193. 22. Koerfer, Ibid., pp.233–383. 23. Cited by Koch, Konrad Adenauer, p.465. 24. R. Barzel, Ein Gewagtes Leben: Erinnerungen (Stuttgart: Hohenheim, 2001), p.206; A. Baring and G. Schöllgen, Kanzler, Krisen, Koalitionen (Berlin: Siedler, 2002), p.78. 25. Later on, Erhard would lobby incessantly for British inclusion, to De Gaulle's and Adenauer's growing fury. After the Franco-German cooperation treaty was negotiated in summer 1962, De Gaulle pressed ahead in January 1963 imposed a unilateral veto on British entry to the EEC one week before the Franco-German treaty was to be signed. Erhard argued in cabinet against signing the treaty under these circumstances. He managed to gain his colleagues' support, giving Adenauer a rare defeat at the cabinet table. He and the Erhard Brigade campaigned to have the Elysee treaty's preamble revised. On 5 February 1963 the Süddeutsche Zeitung published an interview with Erhard in which he regretted the French veto against Britain and argued emphatically that West Germany should strive to maintain its close relations with the UK and the US. In that interview he stated publicly for the first time that he was prepared to take over the Chancellorship. Adenauer was seething, but by that time he was almost out of the game and Erhard was almost Chancellor. 26. Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt, pp.421–2. 27. A.C. Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard. Der Wegbereiter der sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Biografie (Berlin: Siedler, 2005), pp.268–70. 28. Ibid., pp.269–70. 29. Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt. 30. Ibid., p.547. 31. Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard, p.276; Koch, 1985: 481; H.-O. Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU, 1945–1982, edited by G. Buchstab (Stuttgart: DVA, 1993), p.186. 32. Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU, 1945–1982, p.186. 33. Der Spiegel had published highly critical articles about defence minister Strauss, who had subsequently had its chief editors arrested and its offices searched on flimsy charges. Adenauer supported Strauss's actions – in the process condoning Strauss's blatant by-passing of the FDP's interior minister normally responsible for police matters – and the two become the chief target of mass demonstrations, parliamentary uproar, and FDP indignation. 34. Koch, 1985, p.491. 35. Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU, 1945–1982, pp.240–41. 36. Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard, p.285. 37. Barzel, Ein Gewagtes Leben, pp.199–200. 38. Günther (Der Kanzlerwechsel in der Bundesrepublik) is the key source that gives a systematic explanatory account of the case and compares it to the subsequent Erhard–Kiesinger transition, which was, however, of a completely different kind. 39. Metz, Die Ungleichen Gründervater. 40. Mierzejewski, 2005, pp.316–17.