Militarization Without Civil War: The Security Dilemma and Regime Consolidation in Haiti
2005; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 7; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13698280600682981
ISSN1743-968X
Autores Tópico(s)Colonialism, slavery, and trade
ResumoAbstract This essay examines why paramilitary forces have become increasingly critical to Haitian politics over the past half century as an attempted solution to political instability during the previous 150 years since the 1804 independence. The repeated interruptions at democratization in the past two decades have accelerated instability and reliance on paramilitary forces. The strategy worked during much of the Duvalier dictatorship (1957–86) by institutionalizing the state paramilitary, which became known as the Tons Tons Macoutes. The abolition of the Macoutes after the end of Duvalierism in 1986 did not halt the reliance on paramilitary coercion by the state. As paramilitary forces were used by the opposition, as well as the state, paramilitaries escalated insecurity and human rights violations by all sides. Particularly during his second presidential term, Jean Bertrand Aristide (2001–04) feared another coup and exile such as occurred during his first term (1991–94). His paramilitary came from urban gangs, which led to increases in arms wielded by proliferating, corrupt forces on all sides. The second major UN peacekeeping mission (2004–present) provided relative stability during the 2006 elections but, along with the interim government (2004–06), failed to disarm the urban gangs and rural armed groups. Notes 1. The best depiction of the predatory state is in Robert Fatton, Jr., Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002). The first conceptualization comes from Robert I. Rotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 1971). For an anthology see J. Michael Dash and Charles Arthur, Libete: A Haiti Anthology (Latin American Bureau 1999). See also the bibliographic essays in Robert Lawless, Haiti: A Research Handbook (New York: Garland Publishing 1990). 2. Max Weber wrote: 'Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master. Where domination operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism. It is this which distinguishes it from every form of rational authority'. Max Weber, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1978) pp.231–2, italics in original. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1996) pp.5–4. 3. For example, an architect of shock therapy in Poland after 1989, Jeffrey Sachs, defended the anti-imperialist Aristide and opposed neo-liberal policies in Haiti 15 years later. Michele Montas, the widow of the country's most famous journalist, Jean Dominique, who was probably murdered by forces of ex-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, advocated that Aristide not be forced out of office, as he was on 29 Feb. 2004. Many who once worked closely with Aristide ultimately reviled him and his movement claiming to benefit the poor. 4. For examples of this anti-imperialist and/or class-based analysis, see the anthology of James Ridgeway (ed.), The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis (Washington, DC: Essential Books 1994); as well as Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of Democratic Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1997); Robert Fatton, Jr., Haiti's Predatory Republic (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002); Paul Famer, The Uses of Haiti (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press 1994); Amy Willentz, The Rainy Season (New York: Simon and Schuster 1989). 5. For a negative view of Haitian exceptionalism, see Lawrence Harrison, 'Voodoo Politics', The Atlantic (June 1993). For a positive view of Haitian exceptionalism, see the anthropological analysis in Jennie M. Smith, When the Hands are Many: Community Organization and Social Change in Haiti (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2001). 6. It is possible that the Dominican military assisted the Haitian rebels. At the time of writing, the most reputable account was from David Adams, who wrote: 'With the backing of a small group of Haitian dissidents in the Dominican Republic, a few dozen weapons and a handful of cash, the rebels were extraordinarily successful. In less than a month they toppled the government and in the process forced Washington into a major shift in policy', 'Anatomy of a Ragtag Rebellion', St Petersburg Times, 12 April 2004. 7. Lydia Polgreen, 'A Master Plan Drawn in Blood', The New York Times (2 April 2006), Section 4, pp.1 and 4. 8. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton 2003); Larry Diamond, 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes', Journal of Democracy 13/2 (April 2002) p.27. 9. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books 2003). 10. 'US Policy in Haiti: The Failure to Help Despite the Rhetoric to Please', Journal of Haitian Studies 8/2 (Autumn 2002) pp.86–111. 11. Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race and Underdevelopment Since 1700 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1989). 12. Robert D. and Nancy G. Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company 1978). 13. Morris Janowitz, 'Paramilitary Forces in the Developing Nations', in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press l977) p.46. 14. Morris Janowitz, 'Paramilitary Forces in the Developing Nations', in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press l977) p.7. 15. Morris Janowitz, 'Paramilitary Forces in the Developing Nations', in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press l977) p.45. 16. Morris Janowitz, 'Paramilitary Forces in the Developing Nations', in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press l977) p.5 17. Morris Janowitz, 'Paramilitary Forces in the Developing Nations', in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press l977) p.45. 18. Morris Janowitz, 'Paramilitary Forces in the Developing Nations', in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press l977) p.7. 19. Joel Migdal, 'The Politics of Survival', in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner (eds), Understanding Political Development (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co l987) p.398. 20. Laurence Whitehead, 'On Presidential Graft: the Latin American Evidence', in Michael Clarke (ed.), Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Control (New York: St Martin's Press l983) p.148. 21. After the US occupation MREs no longer stood just for morally repugnant elites and became 'meals ready to eat'. 22. C.L.R. James, Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage Books 1989). 23. Maurice Keen, Nobles, Knights, and Men-At-Arms in the Middle Ages (London; Rio Grande, OH: Hambledon Press 1996) pp.51–9. 24. Major Ralph Peters, 'The New Warrior Class', Parameters 24 (Summer 1994) p.16. 25. Robert Fatton, Jr., Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002). 26. It would appear that the second US occupation of Haiti fits Marx's addition to Hegel in the opening line: that 'All important facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. The first time as tragedy. The second as farce'. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers 1987), p.15. 27. 'Free Trade and Underdevelopment in Haiti: The World Bank/USAID Agenda for Social Change', in Hilbourne A.Watson (ed.), The Caribbean in the Global Political Economy (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner 1994) p.107. 28. Interview, Port-au-Prince, 9 Jan. 1992. Perhaps from a constitutional viewpoint, the OAS negotiations in the months after the coup for the return of President Aristide should have been conducted with the Prime Minister's government, instead of parliamentary leaders. Legally, Jean Jacques Honorat's term exceeded the apparent, 90-day constitutional limit for an interim prime minister. Practically, the OAS simply did not want to collaborate with this unexpected coup supporter, who had recently received the American Bar Association's human rights award. 29. Max Weber wrote: 'Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master. Where domination operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism. It is this which distinguishes it from every form of rational authority'. Max Weber, Economy and Society (see note 2) pp.231–2, italics in original. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1996) pp.51–4. 30. For the review of his theory of legitimacy and authority, see Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1958) ch.4, pp.77–128. 31. Taiwan has provided food aid to the Aristide presidency in recent years. 32. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathon (Indianapolis, IN: BobbsMerrill l958) pp.106–107.
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